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ABSTRACT 
International mergers and acquisitions (M&As) are common expansive measures that 
provide companies with a unique set of opportunities but also challenges. The most 
critical part to the success of the M&A is often post-acquisition integration, where two 
companies come together and begin to create value. Integration managers facilitate the 
integration process with different roles and competences to ensure success. The main 
tools for integration managers are different means of communication due to the people-
related approach and this produced communication is argued to have positive effect on 
the emotions of employees.  
 
The aim of this thesis is first to argue what roles successful integration managers 
assume and what competences they need for that. Then the study presents arguments 
regarding how communication is likely to affect the emotions of employees. A 
framework is created to compile the most important communication roles and 
competences and to examine their argued effects on employees’ emotions. This 
theoretical framework is used as the foundation of the empirical study conducted in the 
form of a qualitative single case study of an international acquisition to explore the role 
of communication, integration managers and their effects on emotions of employees. 
The framework is compared with the empirical findings of the research and conclusions 
are drawn in order to seek theoretical generalization of the results. 
 
The study reveals that the case company did not appoint an integration manager but 
several managers strived to act some of the recognized integration manager roles to 
facilitate the integration process and to produce communication. Signs of the merger 
syndrome were visible on the employees but the perceived managerial communication 
from the integration managers had positive effects on the employees’ emotions although 
not completely eradicating the merger syndrome. This study connects communication to 
integration managers more comprehensively, builds on existing theory and makes 
arguments that provide contribution to both research and practice. 
______________________________________________________________________ 
KEYWORDS: International Mergers & Acquisitions, Integration Managers, 
Communication, Merger Syndrome.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1. Background information and research problem 
 
International mergers and acquisitions (M&As) are common activities in the business 
world and subject to a large number of studies regarding the various aspects they 
embody. As a substitute for many other types of expansive measures, M&As provide a 
unique set of opportunities in terms of capturing knowledge, technology and market 
share. Nevertheless, M&A literature often reports a relatively high failure rate making it 
a popular research topic and it is surrounded by various theories and operating methods 
that claim success or explain failure. The aspect of internationality also brings up 
several variables on the table, such as cultural and language differences that affect the 
M&A process quite extensively. (Buckley & Ghauri 2002; Quah & Young 2004; 
Teerikangas & Very 2006.) 
 
The performance of M&As often boils down to the integration of the two respective 
companies involved as it is regarded that the most value is created during the integration 
phase within the M&A, because value creation requires the two separate companies to 
come together and work towards a common goal (Haspeslagh & Jemison 1991: 105; 
Schweiger & Very 2003). Post-acquisition integration forms a significant part of the 
current M&A research and the field has shown an interesting combination of research 
both in theory and practice. However, some factors are yet to be researched in a 
sufficient manner. There is a noticeable gap in research regarding how companies 
manage and facilitate the integration process in practice. Also, from a theoretical 
perspective, for example Shimizu, Hitt, Vaidyanath and Pisano (2004: 335) suggest in 
their review of current M&A research that theoretical and empirical research about the 
human factors in integration, integration teams and their leaders is deficient. 
 
Within the post-acquisition integration process a major role is played by the manager 
responsible for the transition teams and leading the process (Evans, Pucik & Björkman 
2010: 551). In past research (Jemison & Sitkin 1986b: 161) senior managers of 
acquiring firms assigned to the job were noticed to be unacquainted with the situation, 
being more concerned about their strategic duties. This lead to the extensive use of 
outside consultants, whose expertise often lied in the pre-acquisition process and 
negotiation, rather than post-acquisition integration. Arguments about the concept of an 
actual full-time integration manager have thus been variable and unclear until the late 
10 
1990s, when Askhenas, DeMonaco and Francis (1998: 169) studied acquisitions 
conducted by General Electric where “a role was born” for a dedicated integration 
manager. Also Jemison and Sitkin (1986a: 109) had brought up the role of the integrator 
and Marks and Mirvis (1998: 140−142) the concept of transition managers, which very 
closely resemble today’s integration managers. The first dedicated study on the special 
characteristics of integration managers, which remains as one of the only in depth 
outlooks on the subject was conducted by Ashkenas and Francis (2000) a few years 
later. With the existing knowledge, integration managers can be defined as the key 
persons leading the post-acquisition integration process. Due to the noted importance 
further research is needed to utilize all aspects of integration management for theory and 
practice.  
 
Arguments concerning integration managers’ formal management role in the 
organization of the acquired company (Leighton & Tod 1969; Schweiger & Weber 
1989) compared to just leading the integration process (Askhenas et al. 1998; Ashkenas 
& Francis 2000; Schuler, Jackson & Luo 2004: 104) remains within schools of thought. 
The use of integration managers has spread from General Electric’s example and in 
their later research Ashkenas and Francis (2000) identified a wider sample of managers 
from different acquiring firms, appointed to solely lead the integration. What 
characteristics and competences define an integration manager and what roles they 
assume on a wider basis was what Ashkenas and Francis (2000) brought up as a subject 
of further study. The cause and effect relationship comprising of certain roles that 
require certain competences and certain competences leading to certain outcomes of the 
integration process calls for additional research to be proven. 
 
Communication is a mediating but also a very crucial factor when looking at the M&A 
process due to the rapid change that characterizes it. A human response to M&As is 
often the so-called ‘merger syndrome’ that creates negative emotions and feelings on 
employees when things important to them are challenged (Sinkovics, Zagelmeyer and 
Kusstatscher 2011: 29–30). To manage this merger syndrome, as Evans et al. (2010: 
555–556) put it, communication aims to relieve anxiety and stress of employees, 
essentially the symptoms of the merger syndrome, and provide feedback to the top 
management on the progress of integration. The constant need for communication starts 
from the announcement and continues till the very end concerning the multiple 
challenges that arise during the integration process. For example the management needs 
to create and communicate the new vision to the employees in order to assure the 
employees that the company is on a proper course. Fubini, Price and Zollo (2007: 44) 
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sum it up very skillfully by implicating how communication is not all about the 
messages, but connecting with people and triggering positive responses. As important as 
the content of the message is the existence of the communication itself because it is 
important in order to avoid rumors and hearsay about incoming events within the 
employees. One other vital part of communication is the goal of the M&A process, 
more specifically the “end state”. It is essential to make everyone aboard aware where 
the company wants to be after the M&A process is done in a strategic, organizational 
and cultural perspective. This applies to the company as a whole and also to different 
divisions and departments on their own levels. Essentially all these vital aspects of 
communication materialize in the integration process, which enhances the integration 
managers’ requirements for extraordinary communication competences. (Marks & 
Mirvis 1998: 74, 173−174.) 
 
Narrowing down to the very essence of the research problem, this study will tie together 
all these previously stated issues on a theoretical basis and then conduct an empirical 
research in the form of a qualitative case study to explore the matter further. Literature 
recognizes integration managers’ existence and the significance of communication in 
cross-border M&As but the specific roles they play, competences they have and how 
they affect the integration process remains undefined. There are important questions yet 
to be answered on this subject. What are the actual roles the integration managers play 
during post-acquisition integration in an international setting and what competences the 
managers need to be able to do that? How the integration managers and their roles 
appear in a real life setting? How do they manage the communication during the 
integration and how these roles and competences facilitate it? How does the 
communication affect the employees? 
 
 
1.2. Research questions 
 
Due to the obvious gap in research on integration managers and communication in 
cross-border M&As it still remains unclear what is the role of communication in post-
acquisition integration and how the communication by integration managers acting 
different roles affects the integration process and the employees. Previous studies have 
concentrated on the overall management of integration, but the specific actions of 
integration managers in charge of the ordeal and the importance of communication are 
largely left untouched.  
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The research problem culminates in the following research questions, to which answers 
will be sought:  
 
 What is the role of communication in post-acquisition integration in 
international mergers and acquisitions? 
 
o What are the roles and competences of the integration managers, and 
what makes them effective in these roles?  
 
o What are the effects of communication and the integration manager 
on employees’ emotions? 
The goal of this study is to examine communication and integration management in 
post-acquisition integration. First step is to argue on a theoretical basis what roles 
successful integration managers assume and what competences are needed in order to 
do that, starting from the general level and then narrowing down to communication 
specific roles and competences. Secondly the study presents arguments regarding how 
communication is likely to affect the emotions of employees. The third goal is to create 
a framework that compiles the most important communication roles and competences 
and examines their argued effects on employees’ emotions. This theoretical framework 
is then used as the foundation for the fourth goal which is to study the phenomenon 
empirically. The research is conducted in the form of a qualitative single case study of 
an international acquisition to explore the role of communication, the roles and 
competences of integration managers and their effects on employees. Then the study 
uses the theoretical framework as a template to compare the empirical findings of the 
research with and to draw conclusions in order to seek analytical generalization of the 
results (Yin 2003: 32−33).  These questions and goals determine what this research aims 
achieve.  
 
 
1.3. Scope of the study 
 
International M&As (IM&As) are usually divided into several phases depending on the 
study. This thesis will adopt a three-stage model adapted from Marks and Mirvis (1998: 
28) and Schuler et al. (2004: 86) with significant stress the second stage, post-
acquisition integration. It has already been identified as the most significant phase for 
value creation and in order to utilize the possibilities for effective value creation, proper 
management and communication has to be in place during the integration process. The 
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whole international M&A process will be analyzed to a necessary extent but the most 
emphasis in this study will be given to integration managers and communication within 
post-acquisition integration.  
 
Study of integration management and integration managers will concentrate on what 
roles they assume within post-acquisition integration process and what defining 
competences can be identified that are required to play those roles. The possible 
integration teams are only considered as extensions of integration managers to be 
utilized when managing the process. Special emphasis will be on communication roles 
and competences due to the vital importance of communication when dealing with the 
human side of integration. These will be reviewed in the light of how they are likely to 
affect the emotions of employees and support the integration process. Alternative 
research lines on the subject might include integration manager’s role in leadership, 
acculturation or governance and possibly a more specific setting such as a friendly or 
hostile M&A or a merger of equals.  
 
 
1.4. Structure of the study  
 
This thesis consists of six main chapters. The first chapter is the introduction which 
provides background information about the subject, briefly looks into existing studies 
and showcases the research problem. The research questions and goals of the study are 
also presented in the introduction together with an overview of the structure of the 
study. 
 
The second and third chapters contain the theoretical part of the thesis providing an 
outlook of the relevant literature. The second chapter goes through the three stages of 
the M&A process, starting from the pre-acquisition actions such as due diligence and 
indicates possible motives behind the acquisition, to such an extent as it is required to 
understand the field of study. Emphasis of this chapter is on post-acquisition integration 
due to the scope of the study. The communication perspective to M&As is also 
explained more precisely here. The third chapter concentrates on answering the research 
questions on a theoretical basis by defining the roles and competences of integration 
managers and the effects of communication on employees. Creation of the theoretical 
framework is also done in this chapter.  
 
The fourth chapter contains the methodological part and explains how the empirical 
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research has been conducted, showcasing the research strategy, methods of data 
collection and analysis and basis for the validity and reliability of the research. The fifth 
chapter reviews the findings of the research. The sixth chapter then makes the necessary 
conclusions and brings up discussion regarding the findings of the research and how it 
reflects to the theoretical base of the study. In this chapter there are also theoretical and 
practical implications and limitations of the study. 
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2. INTERNATIONAL MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 
 
 
2.1. The M&A process 
 
This chapter defines what one should understand when hearing the term international 
mergers and acquisitions (terms are used interchangeably) and what trends and 
challenges surround them. The M&A process is discussed with emphasis on post-
acquisition integration due to the scope of the study. Communication and integration 
management are in the key position when observing this phenomenon.  
 
As defined by Schuler et al. (2004: 5), in mergers two companies join their operations 
together as equal partners. In acquisitions one of the firms acquires a controlling share 
or full interest in the other company and seizes control of the operations. Mergers are 
the minority within these transactions, comprising less than 3 percent of cross-border 
M&As (UNCTAD 2000: 99). From the perspective of an outsider, one can appear to be 
just like the other, due to strategic or public relations issues (Evans et al. 2010: 527). 
M&As are commonly used features of conducting business in both domestic and 
international setting as companies seek stronger market position and opportunities for 
new markets (Child, Faulkner & Pitkethly 2001: 1). Altogether M&As constitute 
volumes in thousands of billions, for example in the record year, which was 2007 it was 
documented to be around 4,300 billion US dollars. Also, cross-border M&As are 
becoming more and more common; they already form approximately half of the total 
value of M&As (Evans et al. 2010: 528). Despite large volumes, M&As have a bad 
reputation for not creating a significant value for the buyer or even resulting in a failure 
(Evans et al. 2010: 531). The complexity and multiple success factors that characterize 
M&As provide them with an interesting setting, especially for those who manage the 
process. 
 
Statistics show that recent trends in M&As, both domestic and international, are clearly 
on an upward motion, excluding periods of global depression (Evans et al. 2010: 528). 
This creates a paradox comparing the ever increasing volume of M&As to the high 
failure rate of M&As generally reported by literature. Although scholars such as Bruner 
(2004) are quite adamantly challenging this paradox and claim that this “conventional 
wisdom” is incorrect and M&As actually perform relatively well. Also contrary to 
popular belief, international M&As have been reported to perform better than domestic, 
especially in the long run, mostly due to acquiring diverse and effective methods and 
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routines from disparate cultures (Morosini, Shane & Singh 1998; Teerikangas & Very 
2006; Chakrabarti, Gupta-Mukherjee & Jayaraman 2009). The examination of these 
curiosities in the global discussion of M&A performance, leads this study to track what 
are the most critical issues to post-acquisition integration, where the actual value 
creation is said to reside (Haspeslagh & Jemison 1991: 105; Schweiger & Very 2003). 
More precisely the issues in the management of the integration process and in the ways 
of communication within the new company are on the spotlight. 
 
The M&A process is commonly broken down into pre- and post-acquisition phases and 
additional phases added are subjective to the studies in question. Marks and Mirvis 
(1998: 28) and Schuler et al. (2004: 86) introduce quite similar three-stage models, from 
which a following model is adapted to be used in this study: 1) pre-acquisition; 2) 
combination and post-acquisition integration of the partners; 3) post-combination 
solidification and assessment of the new entity. The first stage contains actions before 
the actual legal decision to conduct the merger or acquisition is made. The second stage 
begins when the M&A is announced and is the most important phase considering the 
scope of this study and will be stressed throughout the study. In the third stage 
companies readjust, solidify and perfect their operations and integrated functions after 
the initial integration is complete and also strive to learn from it (Holland & Salama 
2010). The integration manager is most likely appointed to a new permanent office or 
has ventured to manage another integration process when companies enter the third 
stage, so this stage will not be opened up any further.  
 
 
2.2. Pre-acquisition stage 
 
Pre-acquisition stage is important in terms of identifying the rationale behind the 
decisions, which companies make when pursuing M&As. This stage will be described 
briefly and keeping in mind how the strategically important decisions are made which 
concern the integration process later on, mostly regarding communication strategy and 
the early participation of integration managers. 
 
2.2.1. Reasons and motives behind M&As 
 
According to Evans et al. (2010: 529−530), the reasons behind the pursuit for cross-
border mergers and acquisitions vary from strategic and tactical moves to egoistic 
crusades. They fall into the following six categories. The first reason is the pursuing of 
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market dominance and using it for economies of scale, reduced competition and channel 
control. The second reason is geographical expansion. Acquisitions are a common way 
to expand the company’s reach and global market share. The third reason is leveraging 
capabilities, which means that companies use their newly acquired capabilities for new 
product development, credit risk and debt management. The fourth reason is resource 
acquisition, which means acquiring a company which owns a large quantity of certain 
resources, such as oil or minerals. The fifth reason is capability acquisition where the 
company acquires for example smaller companies with competences in areas of interest 
for the acquiring company. The sixth reason is executive hubris, which circles around 
the egoistic needs of the CEO to run a bigger company. 
 
Bower (2001: 94−95) brings up five scenarios from a strategic point of view justifying 
the M&A activity. These activities are the overcapacity M&A, the geographic roll-up 
M&A, the product or market extension M&A, the M&A as R&D and the industry 
convergence M&A. These are analyzed regarding their initial strategic reasoning 
leading up to the means for the integration that results. Differences between industries 
and their life cycles can be detected when making distinctions between these scenarios. 
 
Also Schuler, Jackson and Luo (2004: 82−83) have identified more reasons behind 
cross-border mergers and acquisitions such as promoting growth, managing technology, 
responding to government policy, taking advantage of exchange rates, responding to 
political and economic conditions, reducing labor costs and/or increasing productivity, 
following clients, diversifying and managing risk, and achieving greater vertical 
integration. Some are interrelated to the ones from Evans et al. (2010) although reasons 
are slightly tipped towards a more people-related standpoint. Various other studies and 
literature (e.g. Peng 2006: 378−380, Hopkins 1999) have identified additional motives 
behind M&As from different perspectives, but this study concerns more about the 
common factors that appear after the reasoning for the M&A has been conducted. 
 
Once the reasoning and motives behind the decision to expand via M&A are done, the 
pre-acquisition stage continues with the formation of the acquisition team and election 
of the leader for it, which then starts to assess proper partners to merge with or to 
acquire. Once a proper partner has been selected the discussions and negotiations with 
them start and right alongside that starts the due diligence process. (Schuler et al. 2004: 
87−88.) 
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2.2.2. Due diligence 
 
“Due diligence is intended to be an objective, independent examination of the 
acquisition target. In particular, it focuses upon financials, tax matters, asset valuation, 
operations…” (Angwin 2001: 35). Cullinan, Le Roux and Weddigen (2004: 98) divided 
the due diligence into four basic questions: “What are we really buying? What is the 
target’s stand-alone value? Where are the synergies – and the skeletons? What’s our 
walk-away price?” As seen in both of these descriptions, the emphasis tends to be 
heavily on the “hard facts”, as in the target’s price, financial stability, cash flow, 
products and services, business and revenue logic, competitive position, future 
opportunities and ability to meet strategic objectives. General idea of due diligence is to 
strike confidence to the acquirer and stakeholders supporting the acquisition and to 
uncover anything that might possibly hinder the negotiations or later in the post-
acquisition phase result in a failure (Angwin 2001: 35). Evans et al. (2010: 541) suggest 
that the due diligence also has a significant “soft” side, which concentrates on the fit 
between the organizations, mainly culture and people factors. These issues, especially 
the soft side, have substantial significance when it comes to the communication and 
integration management in the post-acquisition phase. 
 
Angwin (2001: 36) raises additional concerns for due diligence when acquisitions occur 
across borders, which is also a major point of interest in this thesis. In this international 
setting generic problems and issues mentioned earlier can be mediated by culture, 
language, politics and regulations differing vastly between countries. Because Angwin’s 
(2001) research only consists of companies from European countries, the effect of 
cultural divergence might even be toned down in this case, compared to a case 
considering companies from a wider sample. Nevertheless, according to the study 
cultural discrepancy can have an effect on how companies emphasize the factors within 
the due diligence process or even how they perceive importance of the whole due 
diligence. Something that is relatively insignificant to one side, such as the employees 
comprising the due diligence team, might be a big issue to the other side. For example 
in Anglo-American culture, lawyers and accountants usually conduct the due diligence 
but for some other culture, it might be even considered hostile and lead to major 
controversy. 
 
Companies often stress the financial issues and underestimate the soft side, but 
especially in IM&As the effects can be very significant due to the before mentioned 
cultural mediations (Schuler et al. 2004: 99). Acquirers far too often overestimate 
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available synergies, fail to uncover significant problems and even when finding out that 
the target firm is only showing their good side they refuse to back down from the deal 
(Cullinan et al. 2004: 98). Both Schuler et al. (2004: 99) and Evans et al. (2010: 
541−543) underline the salience of proper human due diligence in terms of possible 
liabilities the human capital will bring, talent identification and cultural assessment. 
These are all something that may haunt the integration process after the acquisition is 
reality, create additional costs and require extensive work if not revealed in the due 
diligence and prepared for accordingly. 
 
2.2.3. Closing the deal 
 
Communication plays a rather minor role in the pre-acquisition stage due to the 
confidential nature of M&A negotiations. Information is not usually shared outside the 
teams and people working on the negotiations, due diligence, integration planning and 
other possible pre-acquisition activities (Kusstatscher 2005: 121; Evans et al. 2010: 
539). The closer we get to the closing of the deal and making the announcement, the 
more intense the preparations for communication and integration management become.  
 
One of these preparations should be the selection of the integration manager. Schuler et 
al. (2004: 87) placed selection of the integration manager to the combination and 
integration stage, but this study disagrees with that and argues that the integration 
manager should be appointed well before the announcement, an argument also 
supported by Evans et al. (2010: 547). Integration managers’ early involvement and how 
it affects the integration process is subject to a closer study in the third chapter, but other 
studies (Antila 2006; Ashkenas et al. 1998; Shelton 2003; Teerikangas, Véry & Pisano 
2011) have also hinted that it is beneficial. 
 
Other critical activities before the deal is closed and announced are extensive planning 
procedures for the integration process. These are carried out during the pre-acquisition 
stage according to the acquisition strategy but need conclusion at this stage (Evans et al. 
2010: 539). In IM&As the preparations for cultural factors are important and also 
establishing sufficient communication lines can prove vital (Evans et al. 2010: 546). 
Strategy is formed and necessary preparations for the announcement of the deal are set 
and the main focus from now on will be on post-acquisition integration. 
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2.3. Post-acquisition integration 
 
“Integration is the key to making acquisitions work. Not until the two firms come 
together and begin to work toward the acquisition’s purpose can value be created” 
(Haspeslagh & Jemison 1991: 105). Post-acquisition integration is considered as the key 
phase for the performance of the M&A, but also recognized to be “difficult, time 
consuming, uncertain and fraught with risks and setbacks” (Haspeslagh & Jemison 
1991: 105). Integration officially begins once the announcement for the deal is made. 
Key focus areas of post-acquisition integration in this study will be related to the 
research questions of this thesis. Main actor in the integration process is the integration 
manager between the two organizations and the mediating lens throughout process is 
communication. Goal is to reveal what is required for successful communication in the 
integration and how communicative actions eventually facilitate the whole process. 
Different levels and types of integration, acculturation and the people factor in the 
integration process will be taken into account as integral parts of IM&As but the focus 
remains on communication. The different characteristics and influencing factors in post-
acquisition integration will be reviewed in light of these research goals. 
 
This study accepts the standpoint of Birkinshaw et al. (2000: 396) dividing post-
acquisition integration into task and human integration. These concepts can be 
understood separately but are fundamentally interrelated when it comes to end state of 
the integration (see figure 1). Everything is naturally related to the integration strategy 
formed in the pre-acquisition stage, making it critical that integration management is 
well-aware of the decisions made in the previous stage. Task integration strives to 
identify and realize possible operational synergies in the integration process, basically 
merging and eliminating company functions. Human integration pursues the elimination 
of resistance to change, in this case the integration, essentially building mutual trust and 
respect between the employees of the acquirer and acquired. Both types of integration 
require a unique managerial and communicational approach, but they also affect one 
another, thus bringing a significant quirk to the work of integration managers. 
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Figure 1. Framework for integration management (taken from Birkinshaw et al. 2000: 
400). 
 
 
2.3.1. Level and type of integration 
 
One of the major issues in post-acquisition integration is the level of integration which 
the parent company assumes with the acquired company. It has effects on how 
integration managers can operate within the new entity and how communication has to 
be organized. In their study, Child et al. (2001: 94−96) have researched the integration 
process and compared various studies (Shrivastava 1986; Datta 1991; Gall 1991; 
Norburn & Schoenberg 1994; Morosini & Singh 1994) conducted on the reasons and 
difficulties that surround integration, and also how the level of integration is measured. 
These studies vary from identifying cultural traits that affect integration and finding the 
correct degree of integration in order to maximize acquisition performance. From these 
a consensus for a “spectrum of integration” can be drawn, which describes the variance 
in the level of integration in an acquisition from 1 to 7 (see figure 2). This model does 
not give any distinct dimensions why any level of integration should or should not be 
enforced, but concentrates on the possible levels of integration and what functions 
might then be integrated from the acquired company into the acquirer. On low levels (1 
to 2) the integrated actions are refrained to monitoring and minor control issued by the 
acquiring company. When partially integrated (levels 3 to 5) some functions are more 
likely to be integrated than others, such as strategy, finance, HR policies, R&D, IT 
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systems and possibly company image and brands. This all depends on the believed 
advantage these integrations will produce by the parent company. On the highest levels 
of integration (6 to 7) a total absorption of the acquired company and its functions is 
conducted and only things that may remain are very strong brand names, especially in 
services. (Child et al. 2001: 94−97) 
 
 
Figure 2. Level of integration (taken from Child, Faulkner & Pitkethly 2001: 96). 
 
 
Related to the level of integration in acquisitions, Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991: 
139−145) have identified two distinct dimensions that facilitate the choosing of the right 
approach and level to post-acquisition integration. These dimensions are the need for 
strategic interdependence and the need for organizational autonomy (see figure 3). The 
need for strategic interdependence concentrates on the ‘strategic fit’ of the M&A and 
searches for potential benefits gained from sharing and transferring capabilities, such as 
resources, functional skills, management skills and combination benefits between the 
acquiring and acquired companies. The need for organizational autonomy circles around 
the ‘cultural fit’ and asks whether autonomy is necessary in order to preserve the 
strategic capability of the acquired company and how much autonomy is necessary and 
in which areas it is most important. Answering to these needs and questions from both 
dimensions, a company can determine the proper degree of integration it needs. Pablo 
(1994: 806) adds an important question to this factor by advising to ponder whether the 
changes should affect both of the companies or just the acquired. (Haspeslagh & 
Jemison 1991: 139−145.) 
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Figure 3. Integration approaches (adapted from Haspeslagh & Jemison 1991: 145; 
Marks & Mirvis 1998: 72; Ellis 2004: 116). 
 
 
Based on these two dimensions Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991: 145) identified four 
types of post-acquisition integration; absorption, preservation, symbiosis and holding 
(see figure 3). Absorption requires a high need for strategic interdependence so that it 
can create the necessary value from the acquisition and a low need for organizational 
autonomy due to the high level of integration needed (Pablo 1994: 806). Preservation is 
quite the opposite from absorption, requiring low need for strategic interdependence and 
a high need for organizational autonomy. Essential level of integration remains low and 
the acquirer strives to maintain the acquired benefits, often found in unrelated 
acquisitions (Datta & Grant 1994: 39−40). Symbiotic integration requires both high 
level of organizational autonomy and strategic interdependence due to the nature of the 
acquired capabilities needing a different organizational setting than what the acquiring 
company has. The fourth type is the holding acquisition, where both dimensions remain 
low. This ‘hands off’ policy is usually related to capturing value for trading benefits. A 
fifth type, transformation, has been added by Marks and Mirvis (1998: 72), which is sort 
of an extreme version of symbiosis. Both companies involved are basically torn apart 
and totally reinventing all parts of their operation when creating the new entity (Ellis 
2004: 118).  
 
From the integration manager’s perspective the selection of the integration approach 
holds certain significance, because of different integration issues related to the chosen 
approach. Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991: 157−166) first and Ellis (2004) later on have 
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studied and argued that certain issues take the center stage in different integration 
approaches and they need to be managed in a certain way. These findings should play a 
role when the integration is planned and integration managers choose their approach to 
the integration process.  
 
2.3.2. Acculturation 
 
Larsson and Lubatkin (2001: 1574) compiled a very accurate description of the 
phenomenon of acculturation being the result of a collaborative process where the 
beliefs, assumptions and values of two companies form a new entity. They also issue a 
warning that it is a formidable challenge for the acquiring company and if not managed 
accordingly, can lead to a ‘cultural clash’. This materializes as lower commitment and 
cooperation, increased employee turnover, decreased shareholder value and declining 
operational performance. Taking into account the challenges that acculturation contains, 
especially in an international setting that this study postulates the capabilities of 
integration managers are put to the test. 
 
The effects of organizational and national cultural disparity, more or less acculturation, 
on international M&As have been studied diligently and results produced are diverse, 
producing both negative and positive results for cause-and-effect on integration. In their 
study Teerikangas and Very (2006: 31−33) compiled a list of studies (i.e. Datta 1991; 
Weber 1996; Nahavandi & Malekzadeh 1998; also Barmeyer & Mayrhofer 2008) 
supporting the conventional thought that vast cultural differences, national and/or 
organizational, affect the performance of M&As negatively. On the other hand some 
studies (i.e. Morosini et al. 1998; Chakrabarti et al. 2009) have come to the conclusion 
that cultural disparity enhances the performance of M&As by bringing new, more 
diverse and innovative routines and repertoires to the daily operation. In addition, 
Slangen (2006: 161) argues that the effects of cultural distance, positive or negative, are 
connected to the level of integration (see figure 2). The higher the level of integration, 
the stronger the effect of acquired company’s culture is and vice versa. In this study the 
roles, competences and communicational actions of integration managers are considered 
to aim for the best possible acquisition performance. That is why when managing 
acculturation this study strives to recognize the disparity in studies and adopt a best 
possible approach for integration managers in order to overcome the acculturative 
issues.  
 
Nahavandi and Malekzadeh (1998: 84) introduced a framework that provides the 
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acquirer various modes of acculturation depending on two distinct dimensions: degree 
of relatedness and tolerance for multiculturalism (see figure 4). Tolerance for 
multiculturalism “refers to the degree to which an organization values cultural diversity 
and is willing to tolerate and encourage it” (Navahandi & Malekzadeh 1988: 83). Same 
study indicates that containment of multiple cultures within the organization does not 
make a company multicultural, but the appreciation of this diversity is the key. The 
second dimension, degree of relatedness, seeks to determine how closely related the 
acquired business is to the acquirer, mainly due to possible operational synergies. These 
dimensions produce four modes of acculturation that the acquiring company can utilize. 
The framework is very similar to the integration approaches (see figure 3) determining 
the mode of integration and these are even presented simultaneously by Ellis (2004: 
116) in her study on managing the acquisition process. 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Acquirer’s modes of acculturation (adapted from Nahavandi & Malekzadeh 
1998: 84). 
 
 
The four modes of acculturation are integration, assimilation, separation, and 
deculturation (see figure 4). The aim is to bring a more individualistic approach to 
culturally diverse acquisitions. Integration requires a high rate of tolerance for 
multiculturalism from the acquirer and a high degree of relatedness to justify the need 
for such drastic change. Nahavandi and Malekzadeh (1998: 82) have concluded 
evidence that although integration approach brings new structure to the organization it 
results in relatively little cultural and behavioral assimilation. On the contrary, 
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assimilation approach forces the acquirer’s culture, systems and behavioral norms to the 
acquired company, making the acquired company’s culture cease to exist, usually even 
in some level of mutual understanding. Separation is a relevant when the acquiring 
company has high tolerance for multiculturalism and the acquired company is largely 
from an unrelated business, thus not providing many synergies from strong cultural 
integration. This case is most likely produced by the unwillingness of the acquired 
company’s employees to adopt a new culture and continue to operate independently if 
allowed. Last and most unusual mode is deculturation, where the acquirer does not 
tolerate multiple cultures and the acquired company is highly unrelated. The acquired 
company does not yield to cultural assimilation but does not value culture, practices and 
systems of their own either. (Nahavandi & Malekzadeh 1998: 82−84.) 
 
Marks and Mirvis (1998: 201−202, 207−210) stress that managing different cultural 
combinations require an increased effort from integration managers. Choosing a proper 
mode of acculturation according to the framework (see figure 4) and identifying the 
typical challenges of that mode helps the management to prepare. Marks and Mirvis 
(1998: 200−210) have also introduced a variety of frameworks and tacks to confront 
culture clashes in international M&As, bridging it to cultural awareness, language and 
communication. Cultural awareness connects to understanding the norms and practices 
of the acquired company and their country of origin (Barmeyer & Mayrhofer 2008: 36–
37). Language is also a fundamental part of cross-border acquisitions and key personnel 
involved, again pointing towards integration managers, are way better off to learn at 
least the basics of the local language if it differs from theirs or the common corporate 
language. Acculturation is essentially managing people from different cultures and next 
this study will present other important people-related issues in post-acquisition 
integration.  
 
2.3.3. The people factor 
 
The dualism of post-acquisition integration between task and human integration (see 
figure 1) adopted from Birkinshaw et al. (2000) instigates the need for added attention 
to the people factor of M&As. There is also a significant international aspect to the 
people issues, because of the convergences that different national cultures involved can 
bring as presented in the acculturation chapter (Aguilera & Dencker 2004: 1356). 
Communication is perhaps the most important thing when dealing with people in the 
integration process and it is the main focus of this study, so it will also be presented 
separately. 
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The bottom line of human integration was stated to be the elimination of resistance to 
change and building mutual trust and respect between the employees of the companies 
involved. Failing to rise to the challenge with human integration has been noted to 
create problems with retaining key employees, uncertainty and capturing people 
synergies. In addition the insufficient human integration will eventually affect the 
success of task integration. (Birkinshaw et al. 2000.) 
 
Talent retention is identified as a key people issue in corporate HR, because companies 
that do not pay attention to retention after recruiting and developing their employees, 
lose the fruits of their labor to other companies (Evans et al. 2010: 289−290, 538). Due 
to the nature of M&As as periods of change and uncertainty, retention becomes a key 
issue (Cartwright & Cooper 2000: 62−63). As presented in the motives of M&As, 
capturing competence and knowledge are common reasons for conducting acquisitions, 
thus making talent retention a vital part of the integration process or otherwise the 
benefits the acquisition may diminish significantly (Evans et al. 2010: 538). 
 
In addition to talent management, other important people issues form around the 
involvement of human resource management (HRM) in the integration process and the 
actual integration of HR functions (Schweiger & Weber 1989: 72−73; Antila 2006). 
This relates to capturing people synergies and also creating a positive atmosphere in the 
company. Schweiger and Weber (1989: 72–73) indicated that when bringing together 
two organizations the different organizational cultures, structures and management 
systems and processes are all issues that relate to people management and hold the 
possibility of creating synergies when managed accordingly. In addition employees are 
usually concerned about personnel policies and systems such as pensions, medical plans 
and compensation, which were recognized in the same study.  
 
The final people-related matter is ‘the merger syndrome’, which is a superordinate term 
representing the reactions of employees and also managers to mergers or acquisitions. It 
is commonly characterized by “change of identity, centralisation of decision-making, 
stress, power games, decreased productivity, and by feelings of insecurity, anxiety, 
mistrust and manifold similar and simultaneously occurring phenomena” (Sinkovics et 
al. 2011: 29). In M&As the most notable effects surface when employees feel that 
things important to them are challenged, for example in the form of uncertainty created 
by rumors of restructuring or job losses, threats to social identity. These side-effects of 
M&As affect people on an individual level and are received differently by different 
people on all levels of the organization. Generally the best way to manage the merger 
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syndrome is perceived to be proper managerial communication, which is a critical 
aspect of integration managers’ work. (Sinkovics et al. 2011: 29–30.) 
 
2.3.4. Communication 
 
Communication is an effective mediating tool in post-acquisition integration and taken 
as the focus of this study. Communication is already identified to be a major factor in 
human integration, acculturation and also related to pre-acquisition activities in order to 
pass on the information from strategic planning. There is also major importance in 
communication when it comes to managing the merger syndrome of employees. First 
the study will look at the multiple stakeholders involved in the M&A, but narrowing the 
scope to employees and then identifying the most critical issues in communication 
during post-acquisition integration. The effects of communication on employees will be 
presented in the third chapter when looking at the outcomes of communication and 
answering the research questions. 
 
Communication is important to all stakeholders that are affected by the acquisition and 
different stakeholders have different information needs during the acquisition. 
Customers and investors are regarded as important stakeholders in M&As but 
integration managers’ are only indirectly communicating with them and thus they are 
not looked at more closely. From integration managers’ perspective, supplying top-
down communication to the information hungry middle managers and front-line 
employees is the key focus together with continuous communication with top 
management (see figure 5). This applies to the employees of both acquiring and 
acquired company, but more strongly on the acquired, due to increased possibility of job 
changing decisions and alterations. There is also the perception of ‘winners and losers’ 
within M&As, where the acquiring company might diminish the acquired and this ‘us 
and them’ mentality can seriously hinder communication and negatively affect the 
whole integration process (Cartwright & Cooper 2000: 79; McMurdy 2000). Essentially 
communication strongly affects the employees’ perception of the M&A, especially on 
the emotional side, not just the practical (Kusstatscher 2005: 130). Different 
stakeholders need information for different reasons but nevertheless require it from a 
proper source, because otherwise people not included in the decision-making rely on 
non-verbal signs and rumors that are available to them (Kusstatscher 2005: 120−121; 
Sinkovics et al. 2011: 38−39). This can create further confusion and uncertainty within 
the uninformed party.  
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Figure 5. Stakeholders’ information needs during M&As (adapted from Peng 2006: 
383). 
 
 
Management communication issues in post-acquisition integration discussed in this 
study are divided into subcategories adapting the research methods of Sinkovics et al. 
(2011) and Kusstatscher (2005). These subcategories are the announcement, 
communication frequency and intensity, rumors, and media releases combined with 
public opinion. This specifies the communication focus on a timeline starting from the 
announcement till the perceived end of the integration process. All of these need to be 
addressed appropriately by the integration management in order for the communication 
to work in a difficult situation such as post-acquisition integration.  
 
The announcement is stated to be “one of the most intensive emotional events in the 
M&A process” (Sinkovics et al. 2011: 38) but it is experienced in various different ways 
depending on the individual and the way the announcement is made. According to the 
results of the study by Kusstatscher (2005: 121−123) most of the middle managers are 
somehow involved in the due diligence process or otherwise informed about the M&A 
before the rest of the employees. This differentiates how the announcement affects the 
whole organization, but generally the reception is something between shock and anxiety 
or delight, pride and optimism, depending on how the announcement is made, how the 
employees perceive the new partner to be and what is the outlook for restructuring, in 
• Ownership structure? Return of investment? Plans 
for integration? My money! Investors 
• Progress of integration? Internal conflicts? Key 
personnel? Attained synergies? Top management 
• Continuous two-way communication. Integration manager 
• Job security? M&A activity added to day jobs? 
Where are we going? Vision? Strategy?  Middle management 
• Job security? What to tell to customers? Who sets 
my priorities and objectives? Where are we going? Front-line employees 
• Does it affect me? Am I still relevant? Quality of 
service and relationship remains?  Customers 
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other words, job losses. The merger syndrome is likely to peak at moments such as the 
announcement (Sinkovics et al. 2011: 29). Although the sample of the study by 
Kusstatscher (2005) consists of only a few cases with a retrospective approach, it is 
somewhat apparent that in situations where unofficial information floated around a lot 
before the official announcement or it was even unclear what event was the official 
announcement, the negative emotions were topmost. One noticeable and very important 
aspect of the announcement was the integrity of the information compared to the 
unofficial information. For example some employees already knew about possible 
redundancies even though in the announcement it was “business as usual”. This 
naturally spikes a lot of negative emotions amongst the employees. To conclude, 
Kusstatscher (2005: 124−125) provides a few valid baselines to follow which allow 
managerial communication to ideally make it through the announcement honorably. Be 
clear and honest, don’t keep your employees in the dark for too long and try to inform 
everyone at the same time, communicate with several channels and the more personal 
the better, but do not disregard the official announcement. 
 
After the announcement, communication frequency and intensity remains a key factor 
when driving the integration efforts forward. Kusstatscher (2005: 124) clearly states that 
systematic, rigorous and open communication is necessary all the way through the 
integration process. The study implies that the research results support the fact by 
noticing positive emotions from employees when management’s communication 
presents honest and frequent communication. The content of the message is not 
perceived to be the most important factor just the idea of open outlook on 
communication from the management brings symbolic value (Marks & Mirvis 1998: 
174). It is important to maintain a certain level of communication throughout the 
integration process in terms of both frequency and intensity, because during periods of 
little communication the feeling of uncertainty becomes a problem as explained earlier. 
Studies (Kusstatscher 2005: 124−125; Sinkovics et al. 2011: 39) have noted a 
discrepancy in the expected frequency and intensity of communication between levels 
of hierarchy. Managers in a position to communicate downwards perceive to pass on 
sufficient amount of information but employees on the receiving end generally feel that 
not enough information was shared. Too much communication is not something a 
manager can easily suffer from, and supporting this fact is the study of GE Capital’s 
acquisitions (Ashkenas et al. 1998: 176) stating it clearly: “Communicate, communicate 
– and then communicate some more”. 
 
The consequence and many times the intervening factor for all of these important 
31 
communication issues are rumors. When official top-down information is lacking or the 
frequency and intensity of information around the announcement or during the 
integration period is not sufficient, rumors are likely to spread and instigate negative 
emotions amongst employees. Rumors compensate the lack of information and thus 
need to be managed by the parties responsible for the communication in the M&A, 
mainly integration managers. (Kusstatscher 2005: 125−126.) 
 
The last listed issue is the effect of media releases and public opinion concerning the 
M&A, which can have a surprisingly strong effect on the emotions of the employees. 
They can initiate rumors when no “balancing internal source” (Kusstatscher 2005: 126) 
is available and also if and when providing conflicting information with official sources. 
Their effect can also be much more widespread than the traditional employee-manager 
communication relationship due to the publicity factor and stakeholders in this case 
vary from the employees to their families, clients and other networks the company 
might be associated with. Managerial communication needs to be aware that especially 
in a high-profile M&A the press and other public sources are likely to take some interest 
in it. Official press releases together with open and honest information from the inside 
to stakeholders are important means of controlling the effects of media and influencing 
the public opinion. (Kusstatscher 2005: 126; Sinkovics et al. 2011: 39.) 
 
Communication specifically in cross-border M&As brings a few additional variables to 
the mix. As already mentioned in the acculturation chapter, cultural awareness and 
language are both in key position when working in an international context, especially 
when it comes to communication. In addition to pure understanding of language, a big 
issue is how different communicative actions are perceived by different cultures. 
Message can be understood in a very different way and may produce unnecessary 
tension and misunderstandings. Differences in national cultures may also act as a 
mediating factor in all of these issues mentioned, not necessarily always negatively, but 
they are factors that integration managers have to consider when instigating 
communication in international M&As. (Marks & Mirvis 1998: 207-210.) 
 
As Schweiger and DeNisi (1991: 111–112) have compiled in their study, there are also 
critical outlooks on realistic communication arguing that management should not 
engage in it, due to possibilities of alerting competition, loss of employees and 
decreased managerial flexibility during the M&A process. They also present critical 
opinions on communication’s influence on reducing uncertainty as it has not been very 
directly researched.  But in the same study the empirical evidence from a field 
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experiment very clearly supports the fact, that realistic communication relieves 
uncertainty and increases job satisfaction. The subject is as controversial as almost any 
in the M&A context, but due to the convincing and reliable evidence, the positive 
effects of comprehensive communication are noted and studied further in the next 
chapter.  
 
Looking at the communication issues specified so far, the question arises, what is 
concluded to be the proper way of delivering communication then? Open, honest and 
realistic communication is seemingly presented as the general solution in multiple 
studies and should thus be the baseline for integration managers as well. An adapted 
version of a comprehensive communications program based on a merger of two 
international consumer products companies presented by Marks and Mirvis (1998: 175–
176) is provided to answer the question of how to communicate properly. Use of 
multiple media is vital in order to deliver the message effectively. Schuler et al. (2004: 
111) concur this finding and suggest that both conventional and electronic should be 
used but nothing can replace face-to-face communication, which is arguably the most 
important way of communication. Balancing positives with negatives is important in 
order to emphasize the positives but also to acknowledge the problems. Being clear on 
what is going on by communicating what is known but also stating what is not known. 
It is highly likely that there are more questions than answers. Overcommunicating by 
delivering the same message through various channels and repeating it if necessary. It is 
almost impossible to go over the top with the amount of communication. Checking 
communications frequently is important in order to know that the message has goes 
through and is interpreted correctly. Preferring small group conversations are perceived 
to be better than large announcements in getting the message through (Kusstatscher 
2005: 123). Effort that is made now is cheaper and easier than dealing with the 
uncertainty and other effects of improper communication later on. In addition to 
relieving uncertainty and anxiety, the final message that all these ways of managing 
M&A communication should try to get through, is the strategic, organizational and 
cultural end state of the integration, in order to clarify the logic behind all the synergies 
and actions the company commits to (Marks & Mirvis 1998: 74–75). These issues and 
guidelines of communication will be utilized when showcasing the different 
communication roles and competences of integration managers, and how they facilitate 
the integration process. (Marks & Mirvis 1998: 175–176.) 
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3. COMMUNICATION AND ROLES AND COMPETENCES 
INTEGRATION MANAGERS 
 
 
3.1. Common issues in integration management 
 
Managing post-acquisition integration and seeking the much needed synergies are 
formidable challenges and mediated with the possibility of miscommunication and 
inadequate human integration showing as resistance to change. In addition to the 
hardships the situation itself creates, the process has traditionally been dumped on top 
of everyday business, if the new business leader has to act as a change agent as well. As 
every acquisition requires some kind of integration, it is no light task in any case and 
dedicated leadership and integration management is necessary. (Evans et al. 2010: 550) 
 
No matter how initially successful and ‘fitting’ the acquisition looks, the real challenge 
for value creation is yet ahead. Almost all of the literature in this area is based on the 
notion that value creation takes place after the acquisition, hinting towards integration 
(Haspeslagh & Jemison 1991). Three fundamental factors to the leadership in the 
integration process were identified (along the lines of Sitkin & Pablo 2004; Fubini et al. 
2007) and they were creating a credible new vision, creating a sense of urgency, and 
creating effective means of communication. Sense of urgency is exemplified as a major 
factor in the success of smooth integration process, especially in human integration 
(Froese & Goeritz 2007: 108) and this reflects to the communication of the new vision 
(Evans et al. 2010: 550). Ashkenas and Francis (2000: 110) also created a clear list of 
four factors how integration managers are able to help the integration process: speeding 
it up, structuring the process, establishing social connections within the organizations 
and creating short-term successes that are crucial in the beginning. The ideal roles and 
competences of integration managers will be reflected on these factors. 
 
This leads to the question whether the integration manager should or should not be 
managing the business as well. Schuler et al. (2004: 104) state clearly that the 
integration manager should not be acting as the business manager, although the basis for 
that remains with the M&A experience of one large multinational, Johnson & Johnson. 
The demanding nature of the integration manager’s position requires the full attention 
and dedication of the manager in question.  On the other hand Carlos Ghosn in Renault-
Nissan merger acted as the CEO of Nissan and in the case study by Froese and Goeritz 
(2007) it is stated to be almost compulsory in order to achieve the necessary support and 
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influence behind the decisions. Ghosn is never identified as an integration manager, 
rather just the new business manager, although many of his characteristics and actions 
are undoubtedly relevant for integration managers. As Schuler et al. (2004: 104) 
indicate the problems of the integration manager’s involvement in running the business 
relies on objectivity as the search for true synergies from both of the involved 
companies can become biased. To conclude based on this evidence and connected to the 
integration manager’s need for support and trust from the CEO which Shelton (2003: 
87) calls for, there is a distinct reasoning that the manager should concentrate solely on 
the duty of being the integration manager and not collect any additional responsibilities. 
Integration management should be regarded as a distinct business function during the 
acquisition process, just as any other. But rather than having a profit and loss 
responsibility, the integration manager should be accountable for planning and 
executing the integration plan and reaching the goals that are set for it (Ashkenas et al. 
1998: 172). 
 
“Who should be responsible for making it happen?” is the question Evans et al. (2010: 
551) ask and is a critical question in the limited research on the subject. Michael J. 
Shelton (2003: 81−82), a consultant from McKinsey, suggests a few critical factors 
from a consultant’s more practical point of view regarding the selection and support of 
integration managers, where acquiring companies have a tendency to underperform and 
even fail. 
 
The first one is the recruitment of the right person for the job, where CEOs often aim 
too low. Project management is perceived as the core job description and it is definitely 
important, but companies fail to realize the full potential the position embodies and 
more so enables. In addition to the basic project management there are possibilities to 
work on deeper issues, not just oversee the implementation of planned actions. 
Integration managers can effectively help track and capture synergies by breaking 
deadlocks that occur within the integration process and thus preventing the momentum 
from being stopped. Although speed of integration is generally considered an important 
factor, there is no clear scientific evidence of the benefits (Angwin 2004: 425). Studies 
have also determined that the ideal speed of integration is individual for each case, some 
favoring a slower pace and others preferring to make the changes as quickly as possible 
(Schweiger, Csiszar & Napier 1993: 61). In any case, the sense of urgency is the key 
and needs to be created in order to have the integration on a forward motion and 
employees interested in working towards achieving the needed change (Kotter 1996: 
36). Shelton (2003: 82−83) indicates that financial markets require early signs of 
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created value from the acquisition and for the sake of employee retention the integration 
must stay on course and the integration manager is the one to smoothen this process. 
 
The second critical factor is the early involvement of integration managers. The 
necessity for early planning of integration in the first place was brought up by Ashkenas 
et al. (1998: 168−169) when they researched acquisitions conducted by GE Capital, 
although the idea has been surfacing already in the early 1990s. The planning of 
integration as early as possible, all the way in the pre-acquisition stage, will help ease 
and speed up the integration process. This supports the fact that the person responsible 
for the integration process needs to be involved as early as possible in order to learn all 
the necessary details about the deal and have sufficient time to plan the integration. 
There is also risk when one has to implement something others have planned 
(Teerikangas et al. 2011: 653). The integration manager’s involvement throughout the 
process is also perceived to bring continuity between the personnel responsible of 
making the deal and those that will run the new company and ensure a feeling of 
ownership during the whole process (Schuler et al. 2004: 104).  Shelton (2003: 85) 
proposes that the manager is to be put in place approximately a month before the 
announcement of the deal. This gives the manager enough time to adopt the vision and 
goals of the acquisitions and identify key resources needed to pursue them, be it then 
retaining talent or making sure that communication is sufficient. From a human resource 
perspective, Antila (2006: 55) has also hinted towards this phenomenon although she 
does not single out integration managers but calls out for roles of employee champion, 
administrative expert and strategic HR person with early involvement in the acquisition. 
These are all something that a potent and skillful integration manager can either perform 
or effectively delegate and thus ease the whole acquisition process. Because of the 
balance needed between task and human integration, it is vital to recognize the human 
integration issues early on (Ashkenas & Francis 2000: 116). 
 
The third critical issue relates to the support the integration manager needs from the 
higher ups, especially the CEO. Within the relatively short timeframe the integration 
manager needs to gain the full support and trust of the top management in order to pull 
the company through the integration process. Integration managers do not usually 
possess formal authority and thus need additional warrant to act as the CEO’s “proxy”. 
Even with a good integration manager appointed, the process can slump and fail if 
people do not take the initiatives, and the manager behind them, seriously. (Shelton 
2003: 87–88.) 
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3.2. Roles of integration managers 
 
3.2.1. General roles 
 
What are the specific roles integration managers should play in order to tackle the issues 
already mentioned and to ensure the best possible circumstances for a successful 
integration process? This chapter will begin to answer the research questions by 
identifying the general roles the integration managers play on a theoretical level before 
the focus moves on communication. As described in earlier chapters, the integration 
process is a complex procedure with high potential for failure but also creation of value. 
The shape and depth of the integration process depends on various factors such as the 
sought level and type of integration which creates a unique management scenario each 
time. Also as Birkinshaw et al. (2000) brought up the distinction between human and 
task integration (see figure 1) requires an even more complex approach from integration 
managers. These different elements in the integration process call out for an 
increasingly versatile selection of different roles integration managers needs to adapt to 
in order to facilitate the process. It is noteworthy that integration managers do not 
necessarily personally conduct all the actions related to a specific role but when acting it 
out are responsible for those actions to be happening by delegating them to subordinates 
when necessary.  
 
The role that best defines the core existence of the integration manager is the project 
manager. The integration process resembles a big project and needs a dedicated 
manager to shepherd the individuals and teams involved, and also in order to enable the 
fluent usage of multiple roles for the manager. Although as criticized before, it is most 
definitely not the only role if the company intends to get most out of the manager’s 
work contribution. The necessary project management and organizational skills need to 
stem from the manager’s competence to tolerate chaos, because in a large international 
M&A the integration process will most likely involve multiple cross-functional teams 
and dozens of people for the manager to coordinate. Not only does the manager create 
most of these functions but also manages them throughout the integration process by 
controlling timelines, assignments, meetings, and especially communication. Evans et 
al. (2010: 551) named this sub role the transition specialist. Unlike typical project 
management, in an integration process the individuals that work in the project are not 
directly under the supervision of the integration manager. That is why the manager 
needs “enough clout to be effective” and be able to motivate and commit people into the 
integration effort (Ashkenas & Francis 2000: 110). The uniqueness of the integration 
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process compared to other projects also nullifies the use of many traditional project 
management tools because of the dynamic nature of post-acquisition integration 
(Ashkenas & Francis 2000: 115). In addition to the creation of integration teams and 
managing the project, Ashkenas and Francis (2000: 115) also suggest that with this kind 
of role integration managers should create structures and frameworks where to operate 
and ease the review process for teams and executives involved. This can prove useful in 
future endeavors as these frameworks and structures can be regarded as organizational 
learning.  
 
Before worrying about the long run, the short-term issues and initial speed of 
integration needs to be faced. This thesis introduces a role called the sparring partner. 
This role is not really distinguished in the literature, but the need for it clearly exists due 
to the demand of the integration process. The integration manager’s responsibility to 
keep up the speed of integration on a suitable level and most importantly create a sense 
of urgency to ensure that effort is made for the integration, establishes a need for this 
kind of management role (Kotter 1996: 36; Ashkenas & Francis 2000: 111). Although 
empirical study on the subject does not blindly support the concept of “first 100 days” 
after the announcement of the acquisition being the most important period of time and 
acquisitions have been argued to even prefer a deliberately slower outlook on the 
integration process in order to ensure proper human integration (Birkinshaw et al. 2000; 
Angwin 2004: 428). Despite the critical view of the speed of integration, this study 
recognizes the need for a sense of urgency and to a certain level the need to keep up the 
speed of the integration, not necessarily at highest level possible but to maintain the 
momentum and avoid standstills. When successfully playing this role, integration 
managers can push the pace of the integration process on multiple areas, such as 
planning, decision-making, implementation and monitoring the progress against set 
goals (Ashkenas & Francis 2000: 115). 
 
Right alongside the role of the sparring partner, who keeps the organization on the move 
and on its toes, this thesis introduces a role called the implementer. Integration managers 
in this role engineer short-term results to prove the achieved synergies and enforce the 
implementation of the new strategy. This role makes use of the speed of the integration 
that the sparring partner keeps up and helps to identify synergies and transfer these best 
practices between the organizations. Most importantly as the implementer, integration 
managers strive to generate and communicate concrete short-term results and benefits of 
the integration process. With short-term results, they can build confidence in managers 
and employees justifying the acquisition and facilitating human integration. When 
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acting in this role, integration managers have to effectively rely on communication 
skills so that all necessary stakeholders receive the information and benefits are 
widespread. (Ashkenas & Francis 2000: 113, 115.) 
 
A few studies have identified a role related to resolving acculturative issues and 
building new culture within the new company. Ashkenas and Francis (2000: 115) call it 
the “ambassador” and alternative designations of similar roles are the “relationship 
builder” or even the “negotiator” presented by Schuler (et al. 2004: 105). This study has 
forged these roles into one, calling it the mediator. It is a role which essentially builds 
on integration managers’ social skills and emotional and cultural intelligence. The 
mediator eases up the integration process by forging social connections within the two 
organizations and bridging possible cultural and linguistic gaps, essentially interpreting 
and resolving potential conflicts both ways and giving each side a possibility to express 
feelings on delicate or even hot issues (Evans et al. 2010: 551; Ashkenas & Francis 
2000: 112). As an example, a common conflict in M&As presented earlier, that this kind 
of role is tailor-made to resolve, is the issue with perceived ‘winners and losers’ and the 
‘us and them’ mentality that often surfaces after a merger or acquisition (Cartwright & 
Cooper 2000: 79; McMurdy 2000). The acculturative side of this role is closely related 
to the chosen mode of acculturation as the degree of cultural integration very much 
dictates the number of acculturative issues that may arise. This mediator’s role is 
felicitous, because integration managers are able to move about within the organizations 
and associate with people on different departments and locations and also different 
levels of hierarchy (Ashkenas & Francis 2000: 112). Social relationships and 
connections are not necessarily the top priority but the mediating role they have should 
not be underestimated in the long run. 
 
To conclude, the identification of these general roles begins to answer the research 
questions on a theoretical level. It is clearly argued that with proper actions relating to 
managing projects, creating and maintaining sense of urgency and speed of integration, 
generating short-term results and managing acculturation have a positive impact on the 
integration process. These roles are presented in order to clarify the field of operation 
and set up grounds for the communication specific roles. It is also noteworthy that these 
roles may also include a hefty amount of managerial communication that is vital to their 
succession even though they are labeled as general roles.   
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3.2.2. Communication specific roles 
 
Effective communication is a vital part of various more general roles of integration 
managers during the integration process but some roles can be defined as more or less 
communication specific. This chapter identifies those roles and thus deepens the answer 
to the research question on the part of the roles of integration managers before moving 
on to competences that are needed to play these roles. 
 
The most traditional communication role presented by this study that integration 
managers have to play is the spokesperson. Looking at the various studies on 
communication in M&As already showcased (Marks & Mirvis 1998; Kusstatscher 
2005; Sinkovics et al. 2011), the role of the spokesperson is an integral part of various 
stages of the M&A process. The role derives straight from the general information needs 
of several different stakeholders although in this thesis the focus is mostly on the 
employees. The importance culminates at times such as the announcement and 
afterwards in the form of controlling the media releases and public opinion, and 
providing constant flow of information to the employees to avoid rumors. In terms of 
communication competences, this role requires quite a few and also cultural and 
emotional intelligence in order to get the same message through to all recipients despite 
the fact that different cultures perceive communication in a different way and also 
regarding the possible language barriers that complicate the flow of information (Child 
et al. 2001: 126). 
 
A communication specific role that rides slightly alongside the spokesperson is the role 
of the information gatekeeper, as Evans et al. (2010: 551) named it. This role requires 
very similar skills than the spokesperson due to the similar nature of the roles. As the 
information gatekeeper, the integration manager is between the two sides funneling 
relevant information into both directions and evaluating its relevance to each side. This 
prevents the acquiring company from suffocating the newly acquired company with 
requests. As Evans et al. (2010: 552) exemplify, Nokia uses their integration managers 
as filters to all requests for information coming from the acquiring side, to regulate the 
information. In the heart of all this, lies the manager’s communication skills and ability 
to decide how to deliver the information, when to do it and how often. From the general 
skill set shaped by Ashkenas and Francis (2000), the deep knowledge of the acquiring 
company provides much of the necessary information that will be needed but it is also 
imperative to quickly get familiar with the acquired business. The acquired company 
has to be let in to the operating methods of the new owner and what new resources, 
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tangible or intangible, are available to them and how to navigate through the new 
systems and standards (Evans et al. 2010: 551; Schuler et al. 2004: 104−105). This also 
works both ways as additional information is transferred from target to parent company. 
 
The third communication specific role this study presents is also closely related to the 
actual leadership integration managers bring to the equation. That role is the visionary 
which essentially formulates around the effective communication of the end state and 
goals of the M&A process and explaining the rationale behind the deal. As the name 
gives up, communicating the new vision of the company to the employees of both 
acquiring and acquired company is the key to succeeding in this and helps to build up 
morale and provide reassurance to the employees (Evans et al. 2010: 556). This role 
strives to communicate the corporate story and thus create a feeling of unity and justify 
the making of this acquisition (Fubini et al. 2007: 31, 37). This role is relevant to the 
resolving of issues such as demotivation, frustration, lack of commitment and lack of 
cooperation. There is a certain similarity to the concept of transformational and 
charismatic leadership, which aim to recognize the affective and emotional needs and 
responses of followers and have proven to create positive effects on employee 
performance and behavior (Bono & Judge 2003). Utilizing this kind of leadership when 
playing the role of the visionary cannot be considered imperative but will most likely 
result in a better outcome.   
 
The communication specific roles of the spokesperson, information gatekeeper and 
visionary continue to identify the role of communication in post-acquisition integration 
by identifying what are the roles of integration managers and what makes them effective 
in these roles. Communication was actively present in the roles mentioned earlier but in 
this case they constitute the focus of these roles that dominate the communication 
within the integration process. These roles aim to solve the issues of managing the 
information needs of different stakeholders with proper frequency and intensity, 
relieving uncertainty and anxiety of employees by means of providing information and 
providing a sense of reassurance, unity and common goals. Pooled with the general 
roles these create a toolkit that enables the integration managers to manage post-
acquisition integration in a sufficient way and provide answers to the challenges and 
issues that arise during the process.  
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3.3. Competences of integration managers 
 
3.3.1. General competences 
 
What features does a manager need in order to succeed in performing the roles 
described? The most important characteristics and skills of an effective integration 
manager, who essentially carries the most weight in the integration process, will be 
identified in this chapter first on a general level and then communication specifically. 
According to Shimizu et al. (2004: 335) there is a lack of theoretical and empirical 
research in this area and better knowledge about the human factors would become 
useful for improving the integration. Naming these competences will continue providing 
the answer to the first research sub question. 
 
The necessary skills research argues that integration managers should possess have been 
best defined by Ashkenas and Francis (2000: 114−115) in a practical manner. The first 
of the five skills listed is deep knowledge of the acquiring company. This is essential 
due to integration managers’ responsibility to guide the managers of the acquired 
company in areas such as reporting, seeking information, and working through the 
informal systems of the company. In principle the integration manager welcomes the 
new employees into the corporate culture of the acquirer, so the managers need to be the 
expert of it. For similar reasons Shelton (2003: 84) suggests searching for integration 
managers from within the acquiring company’s own talent pool. This skill is tailor-made 
to the information gatekeeper in order to manage the funneling of information between 
the companies. 
 
The second trait is a combination of a flexible style of leadership and tolerance for low 
recognition. Integration managers need to often shuffle between making tough decisions 
and supportive listening along the different levels of the organization. This requires a 
definite type of flexibility and social cognition; “a good integration manager knows 
which style is appropriate in which situation” (Ashkenas & Francis 2000: 115). This 
characteristic is generated by deep self-confidence and relatively small ego, which 
usually develop over time, if they are to develop. This supports the fact that veterans of 
the organization are more prone to becoming integration managers than young talent. In 
any case companies should maintain a proper talent management system in order to 
determine the people best suitable for this (Shelton 2003: 84). Stemming from the same 
characteristics is integration managers’ ability to function and succeed without getting 
proper credit or recognition.  
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The third competence tests the manager’s ability to tolerate chaos. This essentially 
seeks for extraordinary project management and organizational skills, which are put into 
use by creating and managing the matrix of integration teams required. Noteworthy 
features of integration projects are the difficulties perceived in reporting, accountability 
and authority, which hinder the manager’s ability to lead the project. The unique nature 
of integration projects also makes it difficult to use traditional project management tools 
and mechanisms. Naturally this competence is best related to the role of the project 
manager. 
 
The fourth competence is the manager’s ability to work independently in a responsible 
manner. Due to the unsupervised nature of the job, it is imperative that integration 
managers are capable of taking initiative and making independent judgments, but also 
when necessary, be able to turn to the senior executives from both involved companies 
for advice and guidance. Connected to this trait is the mutual trust and understanding 
between the CEO and the integration manager, because the integration manager needs 
sufficient authority, resources and support to manage all the tasks in the integration 
process (Shelton 2003: 87). This is more or less a good characteristic for integration 
managers in general and not clearly connected to any role. 
 
The last distinct skill is emotional and cultural intelligence. As is characteristic for 
international operations, especially for mergers and acquisitions, cultural factors 
together with human behavior create an immense amount of possibilities and also 
challenges. M&As can be very strategically and financially driven so integration 
managers need the ability to balance the human side and make the whole process 
manageable for the employees when creating operational success. This competence is 
viewed also as a vital part of communication and it will be presented more in-depth with 
the communication specific competences. 
 
To conclude, the studies by Ashkenas and Francis (2000) and Ashkenas et al. (1998) 
formulate the core general characteristics which represent the rather vaguely researched 
side of integration management and are based on experiences and competences of five 
individuals who have acted as integration managers previously. The results are suspect 
to critical evaluation due to the ever changing circumstances and details of the 
acquisitions in question. Studies of Evans et al. (2010: 551−552) and Schuler et al. 
(2004: 104−105) also identified a few noticeable characteristics and features that can be 
linked to the skill sets of successful integration managers. In these studies 
communication is specified as an extremely important factor but nonetheless it is not 
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divided into individual competences that formulate it so it will be reviewed in a more 
in-depth manner. These more general competences provide the grounds on which 
integration managers operate and a vital base to answer the first research question 
asking what competences are required from them for effective communication in post-
acquisition integration of IM&As. 
 
3.3.2. Communication specific competences 
 
The superordinate term communication skills embody a set of various more specific 
skills and competences that are rarely separated in literature. These are derived from the 
needs recognized from the issues that literature on both communication and integration 
management has presented together with the competences that different managerial 
roles require. This chapter finalizes the theoretical answer to the first research sub 
question and concludes the argument claiming what are all the necessary 
communication roles for integration managers and what competences are required to act 
those roles.  
 
Language skills are naturally a key part of communication in international M&As, 
especially but not exclusively, to integration managers acting in the communication 
specific roles of the spokesperson, information gatekeeper and visionary. Although it is 
not necessary to always be fluent in the language of the acquired company, it is 
advisable that the key personnel are able to speak the language of the country where 
operations are held (Marks & Mirvis 1998: 207). The corporate language in an 
international setting is quite often English, but being able to hang in with some small 
talk and hold a simple conversation in the native language sends a symbolic message of 
real effort of understanding (Marks & Mirvis 1998: 207). In addition to the actual 
spoken language there are the issues of various abbreviations and jargon present in the 
corporate environment. Schuler et al. (2004: 105) have indicated this as a key duty for 
integration managers and it is thus connected to the needed language skills.  
 
Emotional and cultural intelligence identified by Ashkenas and Francis (2000: 116) is a 
vital general skill that integration managers especially in the general role of the 
mediator in an international setting need to possess. In addition it also derives into a 
communication competence due to its dire importance when communicating with 
different people. As Marks and Mirvis (1998: 207-210) indicated, there are various 
culture specific communication issues outside just the spoken language because “cross-
border culture building requires people to have the communications skills and cultural 
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awareness to bridge differences”. Being culturally intelligent also minimizes the 
possibility of severe cultural miscommunication which can then haunt the integration 
process for a long time. Concerning the side of emotional intelligence, studies indicate 
that emotionally intelligent manager recognize employees’ emotions and thus are able to 
motivate and inspire them, essentially influencing their emotions with verbal and non-
verbal communication (Kusstatscher 2005: 117). The communication aspect of this 
competence is best visible with the roles of the spokesperson and visionary. They need 
the competence to get the proper message through and the skill to recognize how it is 
perceived and how it affects the emotions of the recipient. 
 
Knowledge of multiple communication methods derives straight from what was stated in 
the communication chapter as a key concept of delivering information with a necessary 
frequency and intensity. Marks and Mirvis (1998: 175) and Schuler et al. (2004: 111) 
both exemplify the frequent use of both personal and electronic methods of 
communication as key ways on delivering effective communication. Fubini et al. (2007: 
33) also mention that in addition to the use of multiple channels, communication should 
involve every level of management. This competence ties up to the role of the 
spokesperson most evidently as effective communication and delivery of information is 
essential throughout the integration process.  
 
It is not necessarily imperative but very useful for integration managers to have good 
networks within the organization including both the acquiring and acquired company 
and all levels of hierarchy, in order to deliver communication to all directions and also 
to receive feedback. This can be put together as communication networking skills which 
present themselves best with the communication specific roles of the information 
gatekeeper and spokesperson to facilitate the flow of information, the mediator to reach 
the necessary groups within the organization and also the project manager in order to 
effectively manage the possibly large number of integration teams. Having an extensive 
communication network can be also utilized in dealing with rumors and possible media 
releases and public opinions circling around the organization concerning the M&A. As 
networks are both formal and informal, they create multiple possibilities to answer to 
these issues. 
 
Credible conversation and presentation skills are both essential for integration 
managers. As this study has already argued, during the M&A there are various situations 
where integration managers need to convince the employees and also the managers to 
participate in matters of dire importance. Integration managers are also most likely 
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going to face a situation where a larger crowd is in need of clarification concerning the 
integration, be it the announcement or an update to the board of directors. At such time 
an ability to credibly present the facts and strategies, and also to convince the audience 
that this is the way to go, becomes a vital communication related skill (Dulewicz in 
Bambacas & Patrickson 2009: 111). From the communication specific roles these skills 
are especially crucial for the spokesperson and visionary needing to get the proper 
message through convincingly.  
 
Interpersonal communication in a way to “generate messages effective in attaining 
specific goals” (Bambacas & Patrickson 2009: 113), is a vital communication 
competence for integration managers playing the role of the visionary. The aim is to 
properly inspire the employees to pursue the desired end state of the integration and 
getting through to them with the vision of the new company. Integration managers need 
to possess interpersonal communication skills when they are “assuming personal 
leadership” (Fubini et al. 2007: 118) and figuratively leading the troops through various 
hardships into a better tomorrow. 
 
Listening is an integral part of communication as integration managers sometimes need 
to “serve as the lightning rod for hot issues; allow employees to vent” (Ashkenas & 
Francis 2000: 115). It is also imperative to listen to the employees in order to determine 
how the integration is progressing, what the atmosphere of the company is like and also 
to be able to adjust the output of information up and down the organization. 
Communication is as much about receiving as it is delivering messages. This 
competence is hard to pinpoint to a specific role but from the presented three it is best 
suited for the information gatekeeper and spokesperson, both of which need to exercise 
effective two-way communication. 
 
To conclude the findings so far, see the table below (see table 1) for a summary of all 
the managerial roles and competences identified. They are all argued to be an important 
part of integration management but due to the focus of this thesis, next the 
communication specific competences will be directed to their respective roles in order 
to answer the first research question. 
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Table 1. Roles and competences of integration managers.  
 
 
In relation to communication in international M&As, what are the roles and 
competences of the integration managers, and what makes them effective in these roles? 
This was the first research sub question and the communication roles and competences 
listed so far can be argued to provide a solid theoretical answer to this question. This 
study argues that in order to produce effective communication integration managers 
need to act out the following three roles: the spokesperson, the information gatekeeper 
and the visionary. Playing these roles is argued to require a set of seven distinct 
communication competences from the integration managers: language skills, emotional 
and cultural intelligence, knowledge of multiple communication methods, 
communication networking skills, conversation and presentation skills, interpersonal 
communication skills and listening. Not all the competences can be directly aimed at 
only one certain role, but a rough grouping can be made (see figure 6) according to the 
arguments made previously when presenting the roles and competences. An integration 
manager possessing these competences is arguably qualified to play these roles and thus 
provide effective communication to the post-acquisition integration process in 
international mergers and acquisitions. Question that remains is; what are the effects of 
communication and integration manager on employees’ emotions? 
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Figure 6. Communication specific roles and competences of integration managers. 
 
 
To summarize the literature review so far, this study has been looked into 
communication as a phenomenon, and examined the roles and competences of 
integration managers. Communication is an extensively researched subject and the 
general as well as communication specific issues of post-acquisition integration have 
been very closely documented by various studies (i.e. Haspeslagh & Jemison 1991; 
Schuler et al. 2004; Shimitzu et al. 2004; Sitkin & Pablo 2004; Kusstatscher 2005; 
Fubini et al. 2007; Evans et al. 2010; Sinkovics et al. 2011) but the concept of 
integration manager, especially in terms of their purpose in communication, has been far 
less studied although still recognized by literature (i.e. Ashkenas et al. 1998; Ashkenas 
& Francis 2000, Shelton 2003; Evans et al. 2010; Teerikangas et al. 2011). This study 
has critically evaluated the extant research on these subjects and has made relatively 
bold derivations connecting the two underlining factors; integration managers and 
communication.  
 
The relatively large number of research gives a more objective view about 
communication in general and post-acquisition integration, which enables the study to 
be more critical about the arguments presented. To conclude, this study agrees that 
sufficient communication is a very important factor in the integration process in order to 
tackle a series of issues such, most notable the merger syndrome of employees. On the 
other hand the studies regarding integration managers are much scarcer and thus the 
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study had to rely a lot on few core studies (Ashkenas et al. 1998; Ashkenas & Francis 
2000) when defining the basis for the roles and competences of integration managers. 
To address this gap in extant research and create the functional roles and identify 
required competences, this study made numerous connections between different studies 
discussing integration management and integration managers with divergent terms and 
points of view but similar content. Now the focus can move from the integration 
managers’ ability to produce effective communication the actual effects of this 
communication on employees.  
 
 
3.4. Effects of communication on employees’ emotions 
 
Integration managers pursuing a certain set of communication roles for which they need 
specific communication competences to be effective (see figure 6), which is a rough 
assessment of what is required to produce the ideal communication output for the 
situation. After this base for ideal communication has been identified, this study seeks to 
make arguments on what is the cause and effect relationship of integration managers 
acting these roles and what the outcomes of this created communication are. 
Kusstatscher (2005) and Sinkovics et al (2011) identified a gap in previous research 
concerning the role of emotions in M&As and this study adopts a similar view but with 
the additional focus specifically on integration managers.  With this approach this thesis 
relies heavily on these two articles which are based on the same empirical study, a 
relatively narrow sample, but by combining this with other studies (i.e. Schweiger & 
DeNisi 1991), previously showcased research on integration managers and theories on 
communication in general, this research strives to produce valid arguments on how 
managerial communication by integration managers affects the emotions of employees, 
and what outcomes they might produce. The goal of this subchapter is to provide a 
theoretical answer to the second research sub question, what are the effects of 
communication and the integration manager on employees’ emotions, and improve 
existing theory by creating a framework for future studies. 
 
The definition of emotion is a much disputed one (Kleinginna & Kleinginna 1981) and 
in order to achieve best clarity on the subject this study uses the interpretation made by 
Bagozzi, Gopinath and Nyer (1999: 184). Their study indicates that emotion is a mental 
state of readiness that ascends from cognitive appraisals of actions or thoughts. Emotion 
also has a phenomenological quality and is often expressed physically and may result in 
an action to either cope or affirm with the emotion. Accepting the definition, this thesis 
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will follow Kusstatscher’s (2005: 116−117) lead and utilize the cognitive appraisal 
approach stemming from earlier research (i.e. Mandler 1984; Frijda 1986), meaning that 
employees’ emotions need internal or external stimuli in order to emerge. “Appraisals 
are seen as interpretations of individuals related to significant changes in the 
environment. Depending on the subjectively perceived relevance of these appraisals, 
their urgency, or magnitude of challenges to an important value, the individual’s brain is 
more or less activated” (Sinkovics et al. 2011: 29). In this case the stimuli are then the 
employees’ appraisals of the changes brought by the M&A process and the 
communication by the integration managers. This underlines the noteworthy issue in 
cognitive appraisal theory, that employee’s emotions are affected by the perceived 
managerial communication, not just the message but how the receiver interprets it. 
Employees cling to every word communicated and form their individual perception and 
can recall it for a very long time (Kusstatscher 2005: 125).  
 
The issues in managing the communication by integration managers rely heavily on 
employees’ perception and provided communication frequency and effectiveness which 
will be looked more closely connecting to the cognitive appraisal theory. All the 
communication issues affecting the integration process, and the emotions they were 
argued to create, the usefulness of managerial communication in solving those issues 
and positively affecting those emotions is in question. The constant change that 
characterizes M&As is responsible for the creation of the merger syndrome that 
employees may suffer from, which in turn creates a set of emotions (Sinkovics et al. 
2011: 29–30). Following an M&A announcement or the perception of an upcoming 
M&A created by for example rumors, the negative emotions that most often strike the 
employees are anxiety, fear, uncertainty, distrust, shock, anger, depression, frustration, 
exhaustion, shame, grief, jealousy, impotence and degradation. There are also some 
positive emotions that may follow, which are pride, joy and compassion. Employees 
perceive the effects of M&As individually and the employee’s position in the 
organization may also have a significant impact on how they react to the announcement. 
Concerning the differences between employees, Sinkovics et al. (2011: 37) note that 
there is a significant difference between the emotional well-being of employees from 
acquiring and acquired companies, but more significantly accounting for it is the way 
the M&A process is managed. This also verifies that different employees perceive the 
changes and also communication differently. In cross-border M&As the international 
aspect and cultural differences also individualize the employees’ perception and 
emotions that follow to a further extent. (Sinkovics et al. 2011: 29–31.) 
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As Bagozzi et al. (1999: 184) defined, following proper external or internal stimuli, 
emotions are often expressed physically thus affecting the employees’ behavior and 
ultimately the ability to work, positively or negatively. As already discussed, the change 
that is created by M&As or even the rumors about an upcoming merger or acquisition, 
are the first stimuli that produces these different emotions for employees. After that the 
communication by integration managers is argued to produce additional stimuli to 
prevent negative emotions from affecting the employees’ performance and to support 
the positive emotions, but how and why do they affect them? The extant literature (i.e. 
Kusstatscher 2005; Sinkovics et al. 2011) recognizes the connection between 
managerial communication and employees’ emotions during an M&A integration 
process, based on the cognitive appraisal theory, but a more precise look into how this 
communication is produced and by whom is needed. Therefore this study presents a 
framework to argue what the cause and effect relationship of integration management 
and communication is (see figure 7) and aims to broaden the view on this part of 
existing literature.  
 
 
Figure 7. Framework for effects of managerial communication on employees’ 
emotions.  
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Presented in the framework are the positive and negative emotions that employees’ most 
often feel during the M&A process when looking at their perception of the outcome. 
Affecting those emotions is communication by integration managers, which is created 
by integration managers acting the communication specific roles and utilizing their 
communication specific competences. Based on the literature reviewed earlier in this 
study, this is argued to create an ideal communication output for integration managers 
providing an appropriate perceived intensity, frequency and message to communication 
in order to have a positive impact on the emotions of employees. Although as the 
cognitive appraisal theory indicates, perception is the key as each employee interprets 
the communication by integration managers in an individual way, confirming the 
integration managers’ need for emotional and cultural intelligence in order to get the 
right message through. 
 
Kusstatscher (2005) and Sinkovics et al. (2011) both report in their studies that as the 
cognitive appraisal theory suggests a proper stimulus produces an action-readiness 
outcome. This outcome represents the employees’ attitudes and actions towards the 
integration process and is thus very important factor for integration managers to 
influence.  Sinkovics et al. (2011: 43–44) and Schweiger and DeNisi (1991: 127–128) 
report in their findings that realistic, open, honest and frequent communication has 
positive effects on employees’ negative emotions such as feeling of uncertainty, fear and 
demotivation, which are common signs of the merger syndrome. It is also made evident 
that an official source of information for the employees, a trusted superior, can soften 
the shock effect of bad news quite significantly and also prevents the spread of rumors 
that increase the feeling of uncertainty. The feelings of distrust, disappointment, 
frustration, depression, impotence, degradation and exhaustion can be argued to be more 
typical to employees of the acquired company as they feel let down by their company 
and cannot control their own faith.  
 
Comprehensive communication methods, for instance provided by integration managers 
playing the different communication roles, can be argued to relieve these negative 
feelings by providing open, honest and realistic information to the employees about 
their situation and what is to be expected in the future (Kusstatscher 2005: 129–130; 
Sinkovics et al. 2011). The communication frequency, intensity and content are in key 
position as noted in the study by Schweiger and DeNisi (1991: 130) by indicating that 
“organizations that communicate caring and concern to employees, whatever the 
communication’s informational content, may be able to expect increased employee 
commitment” by relieving their negative emotions.  
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Although not all emotions stimulated by M&As are negative. As seen from the 
framework (see figure 7) there are also some positive emotions, but as Sinkovics et al. 
(2011: 37–38) indicated, they are more often generated by employees of the acquiring 
company. Nevertheless with proper inspiring managerial communication the feelings of 
joy, pride and compassion can give strength to all employees involved in the rough 
integration process. Especially through the role of the visionary, by utilizing the 
interpersonal communication skills integration managers can be argued to have a clearly 
inspiring effect on the employees by intensifying their positive emotions. 
 
To summarize the reviewed literature and conclude the look into the role of 
communication in M&As, the second research sub question asking what are the effects of 
communication and the integration manager on employees’ emotions, can be answered on a 
theoretical level. The narrow but comprehensive evidence and arguments by previous 
studies (Schweiger and DeNisi 1991; Kusstatscher 2005; Sinkovics et al. 2011) 
supported the notion that communication has positive effects on employees’ emotions. 
This study presented its own arguments claiming that proper communication efforts 
specifically by integration managers affects positively on the emotions of employees 
during post-acquisition integration by relieving their negative emotions and boosting 
positive emotions. The base for this argument relies on the cognitive appraisal theory, 
which explains how the stimulus employees receive, in this case individually perceived 
managerial communication, affects their emotions and thus provides a response in the 
form of an action. A distinct connection can be made to integration managers’ 
communication roles and competences which are argued to provide an appropriately 
perceived frequency, intensity and message for managerial communication to facilitate 
the employees’ needs during the integration process in international M&As.  
 
The focus of this research is to examine the role of communication, how the acquiring 
company utilizes integration managers during an acquisition and how the 
communication affects the employees. The extant literature examined so far and the 
framework that was created based on it will be compared to the findings yielded by the 
empirical research of this study in order to expand the theory base on communication 
and integration management in M&As. 
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4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
 
4.1. Research background 
 
The acquiring company (Firm A) in the empirical research is an international family-
owned company from Finland established in the 1870s. In 2011 the business group, 
including the acquired company, had approximately 2,000 employees in 15 countries 
mainly in the Nordic countries, net sales of 870 million euros and serving customers in 
more than 40 countries. The company headquarters is located in Helsinki. The acquired 
company (Firm B) is a family-owned business from a partially related industry, 
established in the 1940s in Sweden with approximately 1,300 employees and turnover 
of around 390 million euros pre-acquisition in 2007, which exceeded the acquiring 
company’s turnover at the time by over 100 million euros. (Acquired Firm 2008; 
Acquiring Firm 2009: 5; Acquiring Firm 2011: 5) 
 
The empirical research takes focus on this acquisition and its unique features to try and 
study how the communication and integration managers worked in the post-acquisition 
integration. The two companies have collaborated since 1989 when Firm A acquired a 
small share of Firm B while expressing interests in increasing their stake in the future. 
They are from a partially related industry, although the business of Firm B was not the 
main business of Firm A before the acquisition. The push for acquiring the controlling 
share and to integrate the acquired company into a more integral part of their business 
started in 2008 when Firm A began revamping their operations and became a unified 
business group instead of a holding company managing several firms. In the beginning 
of 2010, Firm B officially became an integral part of the business group when Firm A 
acquired the majority share. This was considered as the critical point which began the 
integration process and as it was mentioned in their annual report (Acquiring Firm 
2009: 10) that according to the chosen strategy the integration of management practices 
and standardization and development of HR and financial processes are key projects for 
2010. The remaining shares of Firm B were acquired in late 2011 and it became a fully 
owned subsidiary of Firm A, while they also reported that the integration process 
“proceeded according to plan” (Acquiring Firm 2011: 13). At first Firm B operated as a 
seemingly independent company and formed its own division within the group, but in 
the beginning of 2012 the integration process took a visible step further when Firm B’s 
name was faded out from the group and was left only as a legal entity and a brand name. 
Despite this apparent progress, the integration is still considered to be an ongoing 
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process by both sides and shows up in daily operations.  
 
What made this acquisition very significant and standing out from the rest, was that 
with this acquisition Firm A more than doubled its net sales and number of employees. 
An acquisition of a larger company is not unheard of but has generally been regarded as 
a rarity in M&As, which may account for some of the problems that the companies 
faced with their integration process (Gorton 2009: 1293). Although in this case the 
acquisition process was gradual and happened during more than 20 years of 
cooperation, which slightly softened the situation. Even though the companies had been 
in business together for a long time, once the real change began, it did not happen 
quickly or easily and the companies had their share of problems and doubts about each 
other. Many of the issues that arose during the research can be connected to the 
literature presented in the previous chapters. 
 
 
4.2. Research approach 
 
There are two basic approaches that are used in research; induction and deduction. 
Inductive research is based on empirical evidence and seeks to create theory based on it 
and thus it is called theory building research. Deductive research derives from logic and 
aims to draw conclusions from theory through logical reasoning. (Ghauri & Grønhaug 
2010: 15) 
 
Deductive approach imposes stricter scientific principles and rigorous logic. The 
researcher deduces hypotheses based on existing literature and theory. The hypotheses 
are then tested empirically and conclusions are made if the collected data supports the 
theory or not. Through this verification process that reaches back to the hypotheses from 
the collected data from this particular case, one can make arguments towards 
strengthening or weakening the theory they were based on. Deductive approach is 
mainly utilized in quantitative studies but can also be applied to qualitative data. 
(Ghauri & Grønhaug 2010: 15; Maylor & Blackmon 2005: 150–151) 
 
Inductive approach on the other hand aims to build theory based on empirical evidence 
and collected data. These findings are incorporated into existing theories and thus 
improving them, much as in deductive studies as well. Key reminder in inductive 
approach to research is that because the theories are based on empirical findings, they 
are not necessarily 100 per cent correct even though a high probability can be proven. 
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Inductive approach generally emphasizes the human aspect in the events, flexibility of 
the research structure and collecting of quantitative data with less concern for statistical 
generalization (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill 2009: 127). (Ghauri & Grønhaug 2010: 
15) 
 
Saunders et al. (2009: 127) indicate that these two approaches are not mutually 
exclusive within one research project; it can even be seen as beneficial for the outcome. 
Maylor and Blackmon (2005: 152) note that you might see researches alternating 
between approaches within a single project, for example first inducting a theory and 
then deductively test it. Thus the most important thing when choosing your approach is 
the nature of the research topic. A topic with plenty of available literature and theories 
to build upon calls for deductive approach. On the other hand, a scarcely studied field of 
research with an exploratory and also explanatory nature suggests an inductive approach 
in order to generate data and build foundation and theory upon that. Timeframe and 
available resources play a big role in this decision as deductive research is usually 
quicker to complete but inductive may prove more fruitful with emerging ideas 
throughout the longer process. Both approaches include risks and rewards and one has 
to consider the audience as well as personal preferences in order to achieve best results. 
(Saunders et al. 2009: 127) 
 
But as Eriksson and Kovalainen (2008: 23) note “these two ‘ideal types’ of research 
logic or traditions, deduction and induction, seldom exist as clear-cut alternatives”, 
abduction has been brought up as a term for their combination. Abduction makes the 
jump from descriptions and meanings to categories and concepts in order to create 
understanding and explanations. This gives the researcher the opportunity to utilize 
deduction on assessing the hypotheses of the research and induction to validate it with 
empirical evidence. (Eriksson & Kovalainen 2008: 23) 
 
This leads to the chosen research strategy and approach of this study, which leans 
towards the abduction approach. Studying communication in M&As as a phenomenon 
and defining the roles and competences of integration managers is very exploratory in 
nature due to the little theoretical basis and thus calls for inductive research. That 
combined with the explanatory type of the second research sub question about the 
effects of communication on employees and the overall aim of understanding the people 
factor in the chosen case with a relatively flexible structure, is a prime example for 
inductive research (Saunders et al.  2009: 127). Although there is basis for the use of 
deductive approach as well, because the exploratory study created the framework of 
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communication, the roles of integration managers and their effectiveness, utilizing the 
cognitive appraisal theory. In light of this gathered evidence and theory, there is a 
possibility to deductively draw conclusions and generally be used as the foundation for 
the empirical research. Thus the part of this research providing the arguments about 
what are the effects of communication and integration management compared to 
existing literature and the cognitive appraisal theory can be regarded as partially 
deductive. 
 
 
4.3. Research methods 
 
“Research methods refer to systematic, focused and orderly collection of data for the 
purpose of obtaining information from them, to solve/answer a particular research 
problem or question.” (Ghauri & Grønhaug 2010: 109)  The methods for business 
research are divided between qualitative and quantitative methods. Setting them apart is 
not quality but usually the procedure itself and if measurements are applied. Qualitative 
research aims to reach its findings without statistical methods or quantification and the 
differences vary from that to the different outlooks on knowledge and research 
objectives that qualitative methods can have. However, qualitative data can also be 
quantified but the analysis of the data is always qualitative. This indicates that they are 
not mutually exclusive like was the case with inductive and deductive approaches to 
research. Main differences between the two methods are listed in Table 2. (Ghauri & 
Grønhaug 2010: 109) 
 
“Qualitative research is a mixture of the rational, explorative and intuitive” and usually 
focuses on social process rather than social structures (Ghauri & Grønhaug 2010: 110). 
The reasons why to choose qualitative methods over quantitative mostly lie on the 
research problem, focus and purpose of the research project but the researcher’s 
experience and background can also have an effect on the choice. Qualitative research 
methods are ideal for uncovering complex details and gaining understanding about 
social processes and events. The people factor overall is in the center of qualitative 
research. (Ghauri & Grønhaug 2010: 110–111) 
 
 
 
 
 
57 
Table 2. The difference in emphasis in qualitative versus quantitative methods (Ghauri 
& Grønhaug 2010: 110) 
Qualitative methods Quantitative methods 
 Emphasis on understanding  Emphasis on testing and verification 
 Focus on understanding from 
respondent’s/informant’s point of view 
 Focus on facts and/or reasons for social 
events 
 Interpretation and rational approach  Logical and critical approach 
 Observations and measurements in natural 
settings 
 Controller measurement 
 Subjective ‘insider view’ and closeness to 
data 
 Objective ‘outsider view’ distant from 
data 
 Explorative orientation  Hypothetical-deductive; focus on 
hypothesis testing 
 Process oriented  Result oriented 
 Holistic perspective  Particularistic and analytical 
 Generalization by comparison of 
properties and contexts of individual 
organism 
 Generalization by population membership 
 
 
This leads to the choice of applying qualitative methods for the empirical research 
conducted in this study. The mostly inductive and explanatory nature of the integration 
manager and communication research in M&A integration with the heavy influence of 
human interaction calls for flexible qualitative research as it can provide building blocks 
for future hypothesis and explanations (Ghauri & Grønhaug 2010: 111). As the research 
also includes explanatory questions, qualitative methods are preferred (Maylor & 
Blackmon 2005: 220). The research does not seek statistical generalization of the results 
as it does not support the goals of the study, but rather theoretical generalization, which 
argues how well the findings support existing theory and if replication can be claimed 
(Yin 2003: 32–33). The purpose is to study how companies that are involved in an 
international M&A on the acquiring and acquired side utilize integration managers and 
communication in the integration process and how it affects the employees. 
 
What are the available methods for conducting such research? The most commonly 
used, the so called the five major research methods, presented by Robert Yin (2009: 8) 
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are experiments, surveys, archival analyses, histories, and case studies. The choice 
between them is tied up to three conditions: (1) the type of research question posed, (2) 
the extent of control an investigator has over actual behavioral events, and (3) the 
degree of focus on contemporary as opposed to historical events (see table 3).  
 
 
Table 3. Relevant Situations for Different Research Methods. (Yin 2009: 8)  
METHODS 
(1) 
Form of Research 
Question 
(2) 
Requires Control 
of Behavioral 
Events? 
(3) 
Focuses on 
Contemporary 
Events? 
Experiment How, why? Yes Yes 
Survey 
Who, what, where, 
how many, how 
much? 
No Yes 
Archival Analysis 
Who, what, where, 
how many, how 
much? 
No Yes/No 
History How, why? No No 
Case Study How, why? No Yes 
 
 
Experiment is perhaps the “gold standard” of research strategies and strongly ties to 
natural sciences, although very commonly featured in social science research as well 
(Saunders et al. 2009: 141–142). In all simplicity experiments study causal links and 
aim to find out if there is a link between two variables. Regarding the conditions 
presented by Yin (2009: 8), experiments are mostly used in exploratory and explanatory 
research that asks the questions in the form of “how” and “why”. The second condition, 
the extent of control of behavioral events, can regard experiment as the archetype of 
control as “an investigator can manipulate behavior directly, precisely, and 
systematically" (Yin 2009: 11). The third condition, the degree of focus on 
contemporary events, is very typical to experiments also due to the researches actually 
conducting the experiment for the study. (Saunders et al. 2009: 141–144). 
 
Survey is often related to deductive research and is very common way of conducting 
research in business and management studies. Surveys are mostly used for exploratory 
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and descriptive research to answer the questions “who”, “what”, “where”, “how many” 
and “how much”. Surveys are a relatively easy way to gather large amounts of data, 
often via questionnaires administered to a sample, and require no control of behavioral 
events. Surveys usually produce quantitative data which can be analyzed accordingly 
and used to make suggestions about “possible reasons for particular relationships 
between variables and to produce models of these relationships” (Saunders et al. 2009: 
144). The data is not necessarily as extensive as with other methods due to for example 
limitations of questionnaires but other techniques such as structured interviews and 
observation belong to survey method. Surveys are generally concentrated on 
contemporary rather than historical events. (Saunders et al. 2009: 144–145; Yin 2009: 
8–9) 
 
Archival analysis utilizes administrative records and documents as the main source of 
data. The notable difference of archival analysis to secondary data analysis is the fact 
that the data are used because they are a product of daily activities, an administrative 
tool and part of reality, rather than something collected for research purposes. The 
questions to ask in archival research are similar to surveys, as in questions “who”, 
“what”, “where”, “how many” and “how much”. Akin to surveys, this research method 
is independent from control due to the nature of utilizing previously gathered data. 
Where archival research can differ from previously presented methods is the ability, but 
not a necessity, to use more historical documents in order to answer questions focused 
on the past and to track changes over time. Ultimately the usefulness of archival 
analysis is inescapably tied up to the availability and quality of the administrative 
records and documents. (Saunders et al. 2009: 150; Yin 2009: 8–9) 
 
Historical review means a study that “describes what happened in the past so that we 
can understand the present” (Ghauri & Grønhaug 2010: 112). A very explanatory nature 
of historical review asks questions “how” and “why” and these questions concern with 
operational links traced over time (Yin 2009: 9). History studies are especially relevant 
when there is practically no access or control. Historical review, despite the name, can 
also close in on contemporary events but then the borders of the different methods begin 
to fade. Techniques utilized in history research vary from using existing records and 
reports in lieu with archive analysis, and interviewing to people who have witnessed the 
events. This can raise problems with the reliability of historical reviews, as people may 
have subjective memory about the events and one written source can be wrong. Thus it 
is recommended to cross-check written sources and interviews. (Ghauri & Grønhaug 
2010: 111–112; Yin 2009: 9–11) 
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Case study is the last remaining research method to be reviewed. It is regarded as a 
strategy involving empirical investigation of a certain contemporary phenomenon 
within its real-life context, which utilizes multiple sources of evidence (Saunders et al. 
2009: 145–147). Yin (2009: 9) reviews case study as the preferred method for 
explanatory research asking questions “how” and “why”, but Ghauri and Grønhaug 
(2010: 114) contradict it slightly by connecting case studies to descriptive or 
exploratory research, though not restricting to them. Saunders et al. (2009: 146) links 
case study mostly to exploratory and explanatory researches, thus indicating the multi-
faceted use of case study as a research method. Case study suits research where there is 
very little or no control of the events occurring, events that often occur very much in 
contemporary context. Case studies are ideal when boundaries between phenomenon 
studied and context are fickle and researcher seeks to gain rich understanding of the 
whole process and its context. Within the case study method there are various strategies 
for different situations, such as single and multiple cases, holistic and embedded case. 
Strength of case study is the possibility of utilizing a combination of data collection 
methods depending on the case, such as interviews, questionnaires, review of historical 
documentation and direct observation. (Saunders et al. 2009: 146) 
 
Based on the presented literature from Saunders et al. (2009: 145–147), Ghauri and 
Grønhaug (2010: 114) and Yin (2009: 18), case study was chosen as the research 
method in this study. The case study method supports the scope of the study, it being an 
exploratory/explanative qualitative study, and provides the ability to gain deeper 
understanding of the use of integration managers and communication in real-life post-
acquisition integration in contemporary context with the support of secondary data 
sources from history. The research problem and the context is appears in this case are 
not very clearly defined thus making case study a more viable option. 
 
On the subject of case study designs, there were two choices to make; a choice between 
single and multiple case studies and a choice between a holistic and embedded design. 
Yin (2009: 46) draws a two dimension matrix containing four types of case study 
designs depending on the two choices mentioned (see figure 8). A single case can be 
something critical, extreme or unique, or on the contrary something very typical to the 
phenomenon one wants to observe. Multiple case studies usually try to determine 
whether there is continuity in the findings between cases and thus aim to theoretically 
generalize them at least to some extent. Holistic and embedded studies refer to the unit 
of analysis within the case. Holistic case study concerns only with the organization as a 
whole and embedded study involves the examination of sub-units within the case(s), 
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such as divisions, departments or teams. (Saunders et al. 2009: 146–147; Yin 2009: 46) 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Basic types of designs for case studies (taken from Yin 2009: 46). 
 
 
In this study the choice of design leaned towards an embedded single-case study. The 
case in question is the conducted international acquisition including its integration 
process which is still in progress to some extent. The basis for the choice of a single-
case design lies on the representativeness of the case as it serves as a relatively typical 
case portraying an international M&A. Although all M&As are more or less unique they 
can still be compared to a degree and this case has many typical traits to support its 
representative value. The embedded side of the case design comes naturally from the 
involved companies as the units of analysis; Firm A, the acquirer, and Firm B, the 
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acquired. Originally there was a third unit as well, Firm C, which was also acquired by 
Firm A, but due to information constraints it was dropped during the research process 
and was only used as a side reference to reflect Firm A’s procedures during M&As. The 
units are studied separately because the acquirer and acquired operate in relatively 
different ways during the acquisition and post-acquisition integration and thus provide 
more depth and two sides to the case. (Yin 2009: 46–53)  
 
Regarding the timeframe of the case in this study, there was a choice between cross-
sectional and longitudinal study. Cross-sectional study is like a snapshot of the events 
taken at a certain time and longitudinal study resembles a series of snapshots or a diary 
over a certain period of time. Cross-sectional studies most often utilize the survey 
method and describe the occurrence of an event or relations between different 
organizations. Despite the quantitative and survey preferences of cross-sectional studies, 
they are by no means tied up to quantitative studies; interviews may often be conducted 
over a short period of time as well. Longitudinal study looks to study the event over a 
longer period of time and by expanding the timeframe it is possible to capture change 
and development as well. Despite the time constraints of this study, a certain 
longitudinal aspect was adopted and the case was analyzed with the intentions to reveal 
how employees’ feelings changed overtime during the integration process and 
depending on the communication efforts, although this was dependent on the 
employees’ own memory and opinion and secondary data. (Saunders et al. 2009: 155) 
 
 
4.4. Data collection 
 
The use of various data collection techniques have already been brought up as the 
strength of the case study method. What kind of empirical data there is for case studies 
and what techniques are available to collect it? Yin (2009: 101–103) provides a list of 
six sources of evidence (see table 4) that covers most of the ways of collecting data and 
evidence to conduct a proper case study. All of the sources have their strengths and 
weaknesses and none of them can universally be regarded as the absolute best, actually 
they are very complementary in nature. (Yin 2009: 101–102) 
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Table 4. Six sources of evidence: strengths and weaknesses (taken from Yin 2009: 102) 
 
SOURCE OF 
EVIDENCE 
STRENGTHS WEAKNESSES 
Documentation  Stable – can be reviewed 
repeatedly 
 Unobtrusive – not created as a 
result of the case study 
 Exact – contains exact names, 
references, and details of an 
event 
 Broad coverage – long span of 
time, many events, and many 
settings 
 Retrievability – can be difficult to 
find 
 Biased selectivity, if collection is 
incomplete 
 Reporting bias – reflects 
(unknown) bias of author 
 Access – may be deliberately 
withheld  
Archival 
records 
 [Same as those for 
documentation] 
 Precise and usually quantitative 
 [Same as those for documentation] 
 Accessibility due to privacy 
reasons 
Interviews  Targeted – focuses directly on 
case study topics 
 Insightful – provides perceived 
causal inferences and 
explanations 
 Bias due to poorly articulated 
questions 
 Response bias 
 Inaccuracies due to poor recall 
 Reflexivity – interviewee gives 
what interviewer wants to hear 
Direct 
observations 
 Reality – covers events in real 
time 
 Contextual – covers context of 
“case” 
 Time-consuming 
 Selectivity – broad coverage 
difficult without a team of 
observers 
 Reflexivity – event may proceed 
differently because it is being 
observed 
 Cost – hours needed by human 
observers  
Participant-
observation 
 [Same as above for direct 
observations] 
 Insightful into interpersonal 
behavior and motives 
 [Same as above for direct 
observations] 
 Bias due to participant-observer’s 
manipulation of events 
Physical 
artifacts 
 Insightful into cultural features 
 Insightful into technical 
operations 
 Selectivity 
 Availability 
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Documentation is clearly useful in case study research, especially as support material 
and for authenticating other collected evidence but as a research method it may suffer 
from access problems, coincidental or deliberate, and bias. Not everything that is 
written down can be considered as the complete truth. Archival records hold similar 
features than documentation, although usually providing the information in quantitative 
form but not necessarily any more accurately. With both documentation and archival 
records the researcher must be aware of the original purpose of the document, the 
audiences it was made for and the conditions that were present at the time. (Yin 2009: 
101–103) 
 
Interviews are perhaps one of the most important sources of information and way of 
collecting data in case studies. The nature of the interview should go in line with 
everything else in the research, such as the research question, problem, objectives, and 
strategy. Interviews are useful due to the possibility of focusing right on the subject and 
provide excellent insight into the subject with the opportunity to research causality of 
events and get explanations when necessary. The biggest problem lies yet again in bias 
in different forms. There are a few different types of interviews depending on the 
typology used. Saunders et al. (2009: 320) put them into three categories: structured 
interviews, semi-structured interviews, and unstructured or in-depth interviews. 
Structured interviews, also called standardized, are comparable to questionnaires, just 
administered by the interviewer. These kinds of interviews usually aim to collect 
quantifiable data and thus are identical each time. Semi-structured interviews take it 
towards qualitative research and give the interviewer more freedom to skip certain 
questions and vary the order of questions or add questions to clarify something further. 
Unstructured interviews, also called in-depth interviews, take it further by being more 
informal and being restricted only to the subject at hand without any predetermined 
questions. All of these have their pros and cons depending on the research approach and 
strategy in question. The other things to be considered with interviews, especially with 
the non-standardized variety, is whether they should be conducted one-on-one or one-
on-many and subsequently face-to-face, telephone or via internet. What also comes into 
play in interviews is the language used. It can be the mother tongue of both interviewer 
and interviewee, only one of them or a foreign language for both, which may have an 
impact on the outcome of the interview. (Saunders et al. 2009: 318–321) 
 
Direct observation refers to observing the case in its natural setting in real time. It can 
vary from formal, for example the observation of meetings and factory setting, to less 
formal, during other visits and even during the collection of other evidence such as 
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interviews. This kind of data collected via observation is mostly in the supportive side 
rather than main source of evidence, but can give very valuable insight to the case. The 
pitfalls of observations usually lie on its time-consuming nature, especially when with 
more observers the reliability increases. It should also be noted that having observers, 
one or many, can change the course of events just because of the fact that it is observed. 
To affect the scene even more, participant-observation introduces the researcher into 
the mix and taking functional roles within the case. It may open up unusual access and 
information from the ‘inside’ but problems lie within the biases created by manipulating 
the events. Firstly, external observation may suffer when participating in the events, 
secondly the researcher can easily become a biased supporter of the group being 
studied, thirdly the participant role may be too time-consuming and require too much 
attention that it affects all other work, and fourthly the studied group is too dispersed for 
effective participant-observation. (Yin 2009: 109–113) 
 
The last source of evidence evaluated was physical artifacts, which may also refer to a 
technological device, a tool, a work of art or whatever physical evidence of the 
phenomenon studied. It may not be the most important piece of evidence in business 
studies, but examples such as a workbook or first mutual annual report after a merger, 
may open a broader perspective that connects all the dots to the phenomenon. (Yin 
2009: 113) 
 
With these various data collection techniques showcased, the following decision was 
either to choose one of them and go with the mono method design or choose more than 
one and adopt a multiple method design. Combining data collection methods has two 
options; multi-method and mixed method research. The former uses a combination of 
data collection techniques and analyses but is restricted to either quantitative or 
qualitative studies and the latter is using both quantitative and qualitative methods in the 
same research. Although even in mixed-methods there are two types of research, the 
mixed method which uses both methods but does not combine them. On the opposite 
side mixed-model research combines the methods and may quantify qualitative data and 
vice versa. (Saunders et al. 151–153) 
 
For this case study the best suited option for data collection was clearly a multi-method 
approach which combines interviews and documentation. Interviews were the main 
source of data and documentation was used as support material to verify events and 
triangulate evidence. More specifically the interviews conducted were semi-structured 
theme interviews where managers from Firm A and employees from Firm B were 
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interviewed in one-on-one and small group settings. All of the interviews were held in 
Finnish as it was the first language of all but one of the interviewees and the 
interviewer. The interviews were recorded with the participants’ consent and transcribed 
afterwards for analysis. The material was stored in coded form with the researcher as 
the only person with access to the raw data to maintain anonymity of the participants. 
The semi-structured interview was used because of the relatively difficult subject for the 
people to fully grasp with straight questions and to let the participants speak more 
freely. Utilizing the flow of the conversation without being restricted to a distinct 
pattern was also very important in order to seek the best ways to clarify the feelings and 
emotions going on during the integration process. Semi-structured interviews are also 
suggested as the main type of interview for explanatory/exploratory research which this 
study represents (see table 5). The exploratory part refrains to the use of integration 
managers and explanatory to the effects of communication on employees.  
 
 
Table 5. Uses of different types of interview in each of the main research categories 
(taken from Saunders et al. 2009: 323) 
 Exploratory Descriptive Explanatory 
Structured    
Semi-structured    
Unstructured    
 = more frequent,  = less frequent. 
 
 
With the perfect research designed, then comes the reality. What mostly hindered the 
research process, especially time wise, were difficulties to reach the right people for the 
interviews and schedule them. Contacts were relatively scarce but fruitful when they 
materialized. The contact person, the HR manager of Firm A, helped to arrange the 
interviews and was the first interviewee which served as a pilot interview. The entire 
process of scheduling and interviewing all the participants took way more time than 
originally expected, over 2 months in total, and thus slightly delayed the research 
process. The interviews lasted from 47 minutes to 1 hour and 15 minutes. People 
interviewed from Firm A were all part of the management team and had been in some 
contact with the acquisition and integration of Firm B, but were interviewed also 
because of their relation to the company’s general integration management strategies, 
communication in the integration process and their own feelings towards such events. 
Employees interviewed from Firm B were in different positions in the organization and 
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one had changed positions after the acquisition but still worked within the company. 
The interviewees from Firm B had a slightly longer history within the company than the 
ones from Firm A, which gave them more perspective to how things had changed during 
the integration process over a longer period of time. Participants were fewer than 
initially planned but the interviews proved to be very informative and their experiences 
revealed a lot of nuances about the use of integration managers and effects of 
communication in M&As. As the aim of this study was not dependent on providing any 
statistical generalization, the low number of participants was acceptable. Table 6 lists all 
the participants and their information. 
 
 
Table 6. Interviewees’ profiles. 
 
Employer Position Employed since 
Interview 
setting 
Interview 
duration 
Firm A HR Director 2008 1-on-1 47:37 
Firm A Communications 
director 
2010 1-on-2 1:01:02 
Firm A General counsel 2010 1-on-2 1:01:02 
Firm B Country manager 
(Finland) 
2003 1-on-2 1:15:08 
Firm B Country sales 
manager (Finland) 
2006 1-on-2 1:15:08 
 
 
The interview questions were virtually the same for all participants with only slight 
difference between acquirer and acquired company. Maylor and Blackmon (2005: 259) 
introduce multiple informants as a strategy especially when seeking opinions and 
subjective answers, but also to see how consistent the answers are along the line and 
especially between acquirer and acquired companies. One other useful concept from the 
same authors (Maylor & Blackmon 2005: 260) is multiple viewpoints as a way to 
triangulate evidence which means looking at the research from different angles and 
seeking as many probable answers as possible. This is utilized already in the interview 
phase by researching the subject from different angles and examining how much the 
opinion varies within the company regarding the participant’s original position before 
the acquisition. 
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Interviews were clearly the main source of data for this research but in order to 
triangulate the evidence properly multiple methods and data sources are used (Saunders 
et al. 2009: 151–153; Maylor & Blackmon 2005: 258–259). This aims to spot unreliable 
data and seeing if some evidence conflicts with the evidence collected via some other 
method. In this research the second source of data used in addition to interviews was 
documentation, which can be very informative with proper access. Documents that were 
used in this research included annual reports, news stories, official press releases and 
company announcements found from both public sources and received from company 
representatives. The variety of documentation attained was slightly unsatisfactory due to 
poor access, but enough to provide triangulation to some of the evidence from the 
interviews and formulate enough understanding to make conclusions. Most of the 
documents were public and thus represent more the ‘official line’ of the company rather 
than what was said behind the scenes in unofficial memos and internal communication.  
It was unclear if the reasons behind the denial of access to more documentation were 
deliberate due to confidentiality or coincidental due to lack of time and dedication for 
the project.  
 
Despite the certain disparity between the ideal research design and how it materialized 
in reality, the data collection process was sufficient to validate the proposed research. 
Once the data had been gathered, the focus can move to how the data was analyzed.   
 
 
4.5. Data analysis 
 
Various authors (Ghauri & Grønhaug 2010: 206; Saunders et al. 2009: 503) regard the 
book by Miles and Huberman (1994: 10) as the source of data analysis, where they 
discern it into three concurrent activities: data reduction, data display, and conclusion 
drawing/verifying. Data reduction means selecting, focusing, simplifying, abstracting, 
and transforming the data from transcriptions and notes. This process occurs throughout 
the research project regarding almost every aspect of it, such as choosing cases and data 
collection methods, and formulating research questions. It refines into writing 
summaries, singling out common themes and writing memos when data collection 
progresses. Data reduction is the part of data analysis where the researcher makes 
analytical choices in order to focus and organize the data into a more understandable 
form for the conclusions to be made. (Miles & Huberman 1994: 10–11) 
 
Data display is an organized compilation of the data that enables conclusion drawing 
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and action. Most common types of data displays in qualitative research are matrices, 
figures, charts and graphs, essentially anything that can assemble the information into 
something that is easy to access and helps the reader to draw conclusions or move on to 
the next useful fact of the analysis. Data display works hand-in-hand with data 
reduction when analytical choices are made when choosing which piece of data in 
which form is suitable for the displays and thus forms an integral part of data analysis. 
(Miles & Huberman 1994: 11) 
 
Drawing conclusions and data verification is involved from the beginning of data 
collection as are the other activities. All regularities, patterns, explanations, and 
causalities are to be noted throughout the process, but with certain openness and 
skepticism due the incompleteness of the analysis. As the data collection progresses and 
data is refined through reduction and displaying, more solid conclusions can be made, 
although hypotheses are made and results are predicted from the beginning in almost all 
the cases. Once conclusions can be drawn, the process of verifying them is necessary 
for in order to ensure validity of the results. (Miles & Huberman 1994: 11–12) 
 
These three streams that form data analysis can be displayed as an interactive model 
together with the data collection itself (see figure 9). It showcases how the researcher 
first moves forward during data collection and then shuffles back and forth between the 
three streams to make the conclusions and verify them. (Miles & Huberman 1994: 12) 
 
 
Figure 9. Components of Data Analysis: Interactive Model (taken from Miles & 
Huberman 1994: 12)  
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By following this model by Miles and Huberman (1994: 12) on a general level, the data 
for this research was analyzed by using a combination of summarizing, categorization 
and structuring of meanings, demonstrated by Saunders et al. (2009: 490–491). 
Summarizing large amounts of data collected through interviews conducted for the 
study into a more condensed form helps to understand the emerging themes and see the 
relationships between the themes. These key points from the interviews ease the process 
of displaying the important data in an accessible form and in drawing conclusions. By 
utilizing the summarized forms of the gathered data a certain set of categories can be 
developed. In this study the categories were feelings toward the M&A and integration 
process, use of integration managers and communication. By reorganizing the data and 
attaching it into these three categories, the conclusions for answering the simpler 
research questions became easier to draw. Last form of data analysis is a relatively loose 
way of structuring the data using narrative. It is “based on individuals’ accounts of their 
experiences and the ways in which they explain these through subjective interpretations 
and relate them to constructions of the social world in which they live” (Saunders et al. 
2009: 497). This is a very inductive approach to the study and aims to reveal the more 
hidden meanings, feelings and emotions that the participants experienced during the 
integration process. To make sense of the narrative research this study adopted the 
explanation building method by Yin (2009: 141) so that questions how and why is the 
communication in post-acquisition integration affecting employees could be answered. 
(Saunders et al. 2009: 490–498) 
 
 
4.6. Reliability and validity 
 
Reliability and validity of the study are there for “reducing the possibility of getting the 
answer wrong” when planning research design (Saunders et al. 2009: 156). Reliability 
measures how consistently your research yields the same results on more than one 
occasion, can the same observations be made by other researchers and is it obvious how 
conclusions were made from the collected raw data. Saunders et al (2009: 156–157) 
sums up the following four threats to reliability from past research: subject or 
participant error, subject or participant bias, observer error and observer bias. 
 
Subject or participant error refers to fluctuation of results due to for example different 
interview conditions, location, time of the day or day of the week (Saunders et al. 2007: 
156). Due to the busy schedule of the participants the interviews were planned several 
weeks in advance and according to the participants’ schedules in order to avoid any 
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excessive stress for the participants that might affect their answers. All of the interviews 
were conducted at daytime in order to avoid unnecessary tiredness. Although 
participants often scheduled the interviews for Mondays, they appeared to be very 
enthusiastic about the research and showed little to no rush to ‘get it over with’. Also the 
location of the interview was chosen by the participants and it varied from conference 
rooms to the office canteen, which had seemingly little effect to their openness in the 
interviews. 
 
Subject or participant bias on the other hand can have more severe effects on this kind 
of studies relying heavily on data collected from interviews. Saunders et al (2007: 325) 
describes the problem so that interviewees may feel sensitive about the intrusiveness of 
an unstructured interview seeking explanations or explore certain events and thus 
choose to retain information about some subjects or not be willing to discuss them 
because of personal feelings or the sensitive nature of the information. This may lead to 
participants revealing half the picture and thus altering the truth perhaps in their own 
favor, in their employee’s favor or even in order to slander someone. It is also possible 
that participants answer according to ‘corporate line’ or answering the way they are 
expected to by the interviewer. These are very common threats in M&A research 
because integration, a very sensitive subject itself, is often with a lot of uncertainty and 
the possible merger syndrome may still be in effect.  
 
By guaranteeing anonymity for the participants, some of these problems could be 
avoided. The participants were provided with the general themes of the interview so 
they could prepare to discuss them better, but no exact questions so that they would not 
have prepared answers waiting and to ensure the open nature of the interview. Saunders 
et al (2009: 327) also hint that even agreements to participate in such research may be 
hard to come by from important people due to participant bias, but in this research it is 
not likely due to several executive level managers agreeing for interviews with 
seemingly genuine interest and openness, but alas, little personal involvement because 
of their position in the acquiring firm and short history within the company. Overall the 
interviewees seemed to be very open about the subject, despite its relatively sensitive 
nature, and on many occasions even kept going after the initial scheduled time was up. 
Discrepancies between tones and attitudes towards post-acquisition integration, 
especially when considering the success of failure, were evident but in none of the 
interviews the participants seemed to be withdrawing much.  
 
Observer error includes many similar factors as participant error, in this case 
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discrepancies in the interview process affecting the interviewer. Due to the unstructured 
nature of the interviews and the research not seeking statistical generalization, the 
observer error was not a severe issue to the study. With ample preparation in terms of 
obtaining knowledge about the case companies and acquisition itself, and preparing the 
interview questions and situation appropriately, the observer error was minimized. 
(Saunders et al. 2009: 328–335) 
 
Observer bias was another possible threat to the reliability of the research, meaning that 
interviewer’s “comments, tone or non-verbal behavior creates bias in the way that 
interviewees respond to the questions being asked” (Saunders et al. 2009: 326). 
Researcher’s own beliefs and opinions are easily pressed on the participants during the 
interviews, especially if the frame of reference is highly theoretical. Bias can also be 
displayed in the interpretation of participants’ answers during the data analysis. During 
the data collection observer bias was avoided by letting the interviewees use narrative 
and storytelling for describing the events, especially when it came to discussing their 
feeling during the integration process, without forcing any certain terms and theoretical 
connections on them. The interpretation of the answers seeks to retain the context it was 
revealed in and also taking note of the distinct emotions present during the speech, thus 
minimizing the possibility of observer bias. (Saunders et al. 2009: 326) 
 
Validity concerns how well the findings of the study represent the reality that was 
studied. Social studies generally employ three validity tests for research: construct 
validity, internal validity, and external validity test. (Yin 2009: 40–41) 
 
Construct validity means “identifying correct operational measures for the concepts 
being studied” (Yin 2009: 40). This concerns mostly the data collection phase and seeks 
to nullify the problem of subjective research methods without developing a valid set of 
operational measures. In order to ensure construct validity for researching integration 
management, and effects of communication on employees’ emotions during the 
integration process, this study clearly identified the concepts that were studied in a 
theoretical framework and utilized multiple sources of evidence as described in the data 
collection section. 
 
Internal validity is “seeking to establish a causal relationship, whereby certain 
conditions are believed to lead to other conditions, as distinguished from spurious 
relationships” (Yin 2009: 40). As a partially explanatory study, establishing internal 
validity was highly necessary. The research design ensures that when making 
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conclusions about causal relationships, for example why communication by manager A 
affected the feelings of employee B, there were no other factors directly affecting it. As 
a relatively narrow research, some inferences about past occurrences are necessary but 
need to be approached with caution. In order to ensure internal validity explanation 
building is utilized to analyze the situation objectively. (Yin 2009: 42–43) 
 
External validity defines “the domain to which a study’s findings can be generalized” 
(Yin 2009: 40). As Saunders et al (2009: 158) note that “this may be a particular worry 
if you are conducting a case study research in one organization”, there are not very solid 
foundations for statistical generalization. In that situation the purpose of the research is 
explanation of what is happening in that particular case and setting, seeking analytical 
generalization instead. To seek best possible external validity, a solid theoretical basis 
was constructed in form of a framework before conducting the empirical study. (Yin 
2009: 41–44)   
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5. FINDINGS 
 
 
This chapter presents the findings of the empirical study collected with the interviews 
and from other secondary data. They are divided into three subchapters with a summary 
in the end in order to display the results in the best possible way. First subchapter 
presents the timeline of the acquisition, how the integration process progressed, what 
were the main issues in it and just a general overlook to the case in order to give insight 
on how the integration managers and their roles and competences in communication fall 
into the case. Second subchapter focuses on how integration managers were used in this 
acquisition, what roles they played and what competences those roles required from 
them. Also included in this part is evidence referring to what roles and competences 
were clearly absent in the integration process despite reported need for them. Third 
subchapter concentrates on the employees’ feelings regarding the acquisition and 
integration and how different types of communication and the integration managers 
affected them.  
 
By examining how the interviewees respond to the questions and how the gathered 
documentation supports or contradicts this evidence, an understanding can be formed 
about the use of integration managers, their roles and competences and the effects of 
communication in an actual international M&A setting. As all of the interviews were 
conducted in Finnish, the quotations made to support the evidence are translated into 
English as directly as possible. 
 
 
5.1. Integration process 
 
The timeline of the whole acquisition process and cooperation of Firm A and Firm B 
spans from 1989 to present day (see figure 10). The integration process is considered to 
start in 2010 with Firm A’s acquisition of the controlling share of Firm B as seen on the 
timeline. The interviewees presented different points of view about how the integration 
process went, but agreed that in any case it is the most important period in an 
acquisition and presents a lot of challenges but also opportunities. Especially the 
managers in Firm A had a very eager approach to acquisitions and how to make them 
work: 
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‘The official announcement is just the starting point, the point where it becomes 
public, and that’s when the real work starts. A lot of effort has been put to the 
integration process as the management team seemed to always be more 
concerned about announcements and integration rather than getting the deal 
finalized. Everybody knows it is going to happen, so better concentrate on the 
more important thing which is to make it work!’ 
 
 
Timeline of the acquisition process 
Operational changes 
Co-operation 
starts and Firm 
A acquires a 
small share of 
Firm B 
  Firm A starts to 
revamp its 
operations and 
forms a unified 
business group 
  The announcement! 
Firm A acquires the 
controlling share of 
Firm B 
 
Firm A 
acquires full 
ownership of 
Firm B 
  
Shared intranet 
created for the 
business group 
Managerial changes 
  Old owner 
retires as CEO 
of Firm B 
 
CEO and HR 
director are 
hired for the 
business group 
(Firm A) 
CEO #1 left 
Firm B 
CEO #2 is hired for 
Firm B 
 
 
Communications 
director is hired for 
the business group 
(Firm A) 
  CEO #2 left 
Firm B 
CEO #1 is hired 
for Firm B 
CEO of Firm A 
appointed as an 
interim CEO 
CEO of Firm A 
appointed as an 
interim CEO of 
Firm B 
Pre-acquisition stage Integration process 
1989 2005 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Figure 10. Timeline of the acquisition process.  
 
 
The reality of the case with Firm B was slightly different from the ideal situation and 
what is possible for the business group at the moment, because the situation was very 
different when this acquisition was made. The relationship between the two companies 
had time to evolve throughout the long period of co-operation and the general consensus 
was that the acquisition was done for the benefit of all and the integration created more 
possibilities for both companies.  
 
‘It went from offering internal corporate services to actually building something 
together.’ 
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By integrating the support functions they could avoid doing the same things multiple 
times in multitude of ways and also providing the acquired company something they 
never had before. Although integration itself should never be the reasoning for doing it 
but there has to be a legitimate basis and need for it. For example, after the majority 
ownership was acquired in 2010, there was an employee survey conducted in the group 
that was aimed to find out how the working environment was and if the employees were 
happy. Acquired companies, including Firm B, were especially happy to be included in 
this because Firm A would pay for it and they could only reap the benefits. In part it was 
a gesture of goodwill to the acquired companies but also benefited the acquirer by 
showing how the integration affected the employees. The survey was also conducted in 
2012 and with the results Firm A could also review how the integration process was 
progressing. 
 
‘Some things we have to do for ourselves anyway so it is easy to take our “new 
friends” with us.’ 
 
The integration process included the restructuring of Firm B to increase profitability, 
also mentioned as a turnaround project, but this brought up the fact that these changes 
were coming almost three years after the controlling share was acquired.  
 
‘During the last year there has been more work done than on the previous three 
together, things have really started to happen.’ 
 
This speaks of the problems, mostly ineffectiveness and slowness of change, that had 
been plaguing the whole acquisition process even before the integration was regarded to 
have begun. The initial problem lied within the ownership issues as Firm A had 
gradually acquired more and more of Firm B’s shares while striving for changes to no 
avail as up until 2010 they did not have the power to drive them through. As the 
acquired side saw it: 
 
‘After the old owner backed away as the CEO of the company in 2005 and a new 
CEO (#1) was appointed, Firm A began to seek changes even though they did 
not have a controlling share yet. But as seen by us, the employees, it did not 
really have an effect, nobody really wanted to change much and not much 
pressure was put on it (by Firm A). It was so that after the ownership had 
changed, the Finnish side expected changes and the Swedish side feared them.’ 
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The interviewees from the acquired company also sensed that there was some hesitation 
from Firm A to begin the integration process earlier. Their interpretation was that the 
acquirer was afraid that they would uncontrolledly bring in too much too soon without 
proper ownership to back it up with, thus the delay in starting the integration. The 
acquirer’s side reasoned it by seeing the acquisition of Firm B more like a friendly 
takeover in the beginning and deliberately kept the companies more separated as the 
business group and support functions were still being built in 2008 and were not yet 
ready to be integrated with.  
 
‘Having shared communication channels, such as the intranet, is everything in 
acquisitions. It is a basic necessity to connect the acquired company to your 
channels so they can have access to the information network. Also we had 
several sets of values from different companies within the group but the shared 
values and base was not really built yet.’ 
 
As the business group was being formed in 2008 and most of the management team of 
Firm A having been hired then or even later, the reason for the hesitation and slowness 
to begin the integration early was apparent. Not much actions and communication from 
the acquiring side was possible before the controlling shares were acquired in 2010 and 
even after that it was hindered by having to deal with an active minority shareholder 
with relatively significant rights, as communication was coming from two directions, 
the old and new owners. After the controlling shares were acquired the direction was set 
towards the integration and unified business group: 
 
‘When the majority vote was achieved then little by little internal pressure was 
forming in Sweden to get the next step done as well. It wasn’t just our will but it 
became the will of the whole organization and it lead to us being able to do it.’ 
 
The shared intranet for the whole business group was established in 2010, which 
enabled further communication with the acquired companies but more could be done 
when sole ownership was finally achieved in 2011.  
 
‘After achieving majority vote and then later sole ownership, we [Firm A] began 
to communicate a lot more. That included information bulletins through the 
shared intranet, meetings, lunch meetings and speeches by the new CEO 
[interim]. This included both formal and informal communication.’ 
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Ownership issues were not the only problems, but also the difference between the two 
businesses, complexity, lack of communications function and experience as well as old-
fashioned ways of the acquired company was reported to be a hindrance to the 
integration process especially in terms of communication. For example both sides were 
reporting a neglect of documentation which is known to complicate integration and this 
required action and introducing new ways of working from Firm A to get the 
documentation up to speed. Both Firm A and Firm B are family owned companies and 
have high commitment to the owners, and very non-bureaucratic and established ways 
of operating. So when the interviewees were asked what the hardest thing in the 
integration process was, the subject which surfaced from the acquired side, was the old 
routines and how leaving them behind felt hard.  
 
‘Maybe the hardest thing in the integration process was when the old routines 
are gone and you need to learn the new ones, especially when in this case they 
were all redone at once. You got the feeling that the integration was progressing 
but you are not sure if it is going to the right direction as it was all very 
confusing.’ 
 
To conclude, confusion and uncertainty seemed to be the key operational problems in 
this case, which can perhaps be traced back to the lack of communication and active 
hand in management which both sides recognized to have been plaguing the integration 
process. Also the issues with previous ownership hindering the changes and the creation 
of the business group alongside the integration process made their mark on this 
integration process. Nevertheless during the last year, mostly after the interim CEO 
replaced CEO #2, the situation was reported to have improved along with the increase 
of communication. To address the situation more thoroughly from the human 
perspective and in light of the research questions, the focus moves on to how integration 
managers were used in this case and how did their communication affect the situation 
and the employees. 
 
 
5.2. Use of integration managers  
 
The concept of integration manager was familiar to the interviewees, although the 
opinions varied in terms of who should be appointed as one, what do they actually do 
and where should they come from. The use of integration managers as they are 
described in the relevant literature (i.e. Askhenas et al. 1998; Ashkenas & Francis 2000) 
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was generally non-existent in this particular case as mentioned by an interviewee on the 
acquired side: 
 
‘I couldn’t really see anyone being the integration manager or being really in 
charge of that.’ 
 
The acquiring side clearly recognized how an integration manager was lacking in this 
acquisition and had intentions to appoint an integration manager to all future 
acquisitions. However, despite the lack of an appointed integration managers, the 
evidence heavily suggests that several managers acted or at least tried to act some of the 
roles that integration managers have been proposed to act in order to carry out the 
integration process.  
 
There was no specifically appointed integration manager who was in charge of the 
integration process, but generally it was the acting management of Firm B that was 
responsible for it amongst the day-to-day business as well as some of the managers of 
the acquiring company. In late 2010 a new CEO (#2) was hired for Firm B and his 
responsibility was to implement the desired changes and get the integration process 
going once the ownership issues had been solved to allow it. This was closest to the 
general integration manager role but there were still big gaps to fill. 
 
‘The new CEO (#2) came in and took the role [of integration manager] and I 
think he got pretty clear instructions from above [Firm A] how to proceed with 
it. After he came, it took maybe half a year and then personnel started to 
change.’ 
 
An effort was put forth by the new CEO (#2) to get the change going but the actions 
were seemingly lacking necessary determination and a sense of urgency to get it 
through with the personnel, especially the old management. 
 
‘Then you could see the old guard [management] slowing it down and nothing 
was happening.’ 
 
‘When the change comes, you need to quickly find out who are really the right 
people for the new organization. When you have the old management who live 
the old days, you have to have a pretty straightforward communication with 
them whether they are in or out. That is probably one reason why the CEO (#2) 
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had to go, because he couldn’t get it done. You wait that people would change 
but they don’t always do that.’ 
 
The CEO (#2) left in late 2012 and the CEO of Firm A replaced him as an interim CEO, 
which also included the responsibilities of the integration manager. This change seemed 
to have the desired effect to kick-start the integration process at least according to the 
acquired side: 
 
‘The changes really started to happen last year, in 2012, but before that nothing 
really happened. I think that was where they were heading when the 
management was changed, but that didn’t happen because of the CEO (#2) but 
because of the CEO of Firm A. This is not a fact, just my interpretation but I 
think these things are linked together.’ 
 
This did not solve all the problems but by the time the interviews were conducted, a lot 
of progress had been made as noted by many of the interviewees, but still the 
integration process was considered to be ongoing. 
 
When Firm A began to revamp its operations and created the business group in 2008, a 
HR director was hired to address the people factor and to represent HR related roles, 
essentially create the group-wide protocols that also affected Firm B in its integration 
process when it began. These values, policies, guidelines and channels were the basis of 
the ‘integration package’ that was something that will be implemented on the acquired 
companies as a norm. Although as these processes were designed and implemented at 
the same time as Firm B was integrated into the business group, it was more about 
fixing already created problems brought by the acquisition and testing the newly created 
integration protocols. In the actual terms as a sort of integration manager in the HR side 
it consisted of a lot of Excel sheets with listed protocols and practices of the companies 
involved and decide where to go with them, but seemingly having a positive effect on 
the integration.  
 
‘As a matter of fact, these HR things are surprisingly important [in the 
integration process] because they bring a lot of visible change to the new 
employees.’ 
 
The communications director for the business group was not hired until mid-2010 when 
the integration process was already on its way, which was a prime example of how the 
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•Main integration manager from mid-2010 to late 2012 
CEO #2 
•Main integration manager from 2009 to mid-2010 and from late 2012 to 
mid-2013 
•Setting up the intranet  
Interim CEO 
•Integration of human resource management 
•Setting up the intranet 
•Creating the 'integration package' 
HR Director 
•Development of the intranet and other communications channels 
Communications Director 
acquisition process lacked integration management, especially on the communication 
side. Before hiring a specific communications director, these tasks were handled by a 
communications person from one of the divisions as a side job which reflects to the 
quality of communication to all parties involved. 
 
‘Better than nothing but it wasn’t her job to be honest.’ 
 
Communication was neglected when the business group was forming and in the 
beginning of the integration, which did not help the merger syndrome of the acquired 
employees when it was needed the most. Although the communication processes have 
picked up in many aspects and the level of communication has risen closer to the ideal 
situation, much described by the interviewees, which gives a contrast how much behind 
it really was when the integration began. 
 
As key findings about the use of integration managers, this research recognized four 
managers with different tasks during the integration process, which suggests that they 
were at least partially integration managers (see figure 11). From overall use of 
integration managers the study can move on to separating the different roles of 
integration managers in order to explain what parts were there and what parts missing in 
comparison to what the literature suggests.  
 
Figure 11. Recognized integration managers.  
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5.2.1. General roles 
 
Integration managers act different roles to fulfill their purpose and in literature and in 
the interviews for this research, the most recognized role that integration managers act 
is undoubtedly the role of project manager. The integration process needs somebody 
who has all the processes and subprojects in their hands, schedules everything and deals 
with the whole ‘package’. This was perhaps the most important role that most of the 
interviewees called for but still was executed poorly in this acquisition. The project 
manager role was loaded for the acting CEO and main integration manager at the time 
so to a degree this failure can be blamed on the frequent changes in the management, 
ownership issues slowing down and adding confusion to the process and overall lack of 
communication, but the whole project was clearly not managed well enough as an intact 
package for the integration to progress as planned.  
 
Part of managing the integration process as a project, but also something to be 
considered as a separate role for the integration manager, is the need to keep the 
integration process moving forward during the whole time and introduce a sense of 
urgency. This role is recognized in this study as the sparring partner. Lacking project 
management and control of time resulted in failure to keep up with the planned schedule 
and keeping the change going, as was noted by most of the interviewees. A necessary 
sense of urgency was introduced at times by taking more severe actions such as 
replacing much of the old management, but again the lack of consistency was apparent. 
This role belonged mostly to the acting management but merely in the beginning of 
their terms. The acquired side described one period of the situation the best. 
 
‘It has been a process of many years and I was left with the feeling that there 
was a soft change process on the way which did not work. Then it was ended as 
the pace was too slow, management was changed and some speed was 
introduced to the process. This is how I interpret the situation afterwards.’ 
 
The interviewees from Firm B talked about not seeing or hearing about any results that 
the integration process has produced, to keep them motivated on continuing it. This is a 
task that integration managers should arguably keep up with by acting the role of 
implementer, but evidence suggests that it was neglected.  
 
‘One big miscommunication in integration has been all the projects that are 
running, in production and being improved, but when you try to look for the 
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results you are thinking where is the money going, because you can’t find any 
concrete results.’ 
 
Another task touching on this role was separation of the integration projects from other 
projects, which evidently caused confusion with the employees. This requires re-
evaluation of the implementer role, which is followed-up on in the discussion. 
 
Acculturation and cultural issues are a very relevant part of the integration process and 
need to be taken into consideration by the integration managers. In this case the cultural 
distance between Finland and Sweden was not reported to have caused big missteps and 
was managed well enough, perhaps due to the long history of co-operation between the 
companies and relatively small cultural distance. The real problem that the interviewees 
reported were significant cultural issues descending from Firm B’s earlier acquisitions 
from England and other European countries as seen by the interviewees from Firm B:  
 
‘I was in contact with the acquired companies in Europe quite a lot and it was 
very challenging on a personal level in a new country with different culture 
where you have to learn the way they do things and the processes are different. It 
was a big challenge for Firm B, bigger than they ever imagined, and I have 
heard from both sides that it did not go so well.’ 
 
This ’integration within integration’ was a factor that was culturally and also 
operationally significant as it increased the complexity of the business but the evidence 
suggested that it did not receive much attention from integration management or 
warranted a more dedicated role, such as the role of mediator proposed earlier in this 
study. Interviewees from Firm A agreed to having underestimated this factor:  
 
Integration within integration was a big factor in this case as Firm B had 
acquired several companies in the last decade and they had and still has exactly 
the same challenges as Firm A faces now. The most challenging parts of this 
integration process were faced in the companies that Firm B had recently 
acquired because they were geographically and structurally far with lot of 
possibilities for duplications and mix-ups coming from new owners first in Firm 
B and now Firm A as well. 
 
Once the communications director was hired, the mediator role and acculturative issues 
got more attention and much more effort was put on managing this integration within 
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integration at least regarding the cultural and linguistic side.  
 
‘In terms of communication you have to always think about how you can get all 
the employees to hear the things that we want them to hear, because it is not 
necessarily with English. The corporate language of Firm A is English, but 
almost everything is translated to Finnish and Swedish. In addition to that many 
things are also translated into Russian and Estonian.’ 
 
This is done because Firm A has production and employees in several countries where 
language skills, especially English, are limited so they have to be offered information in 
their own language so it is really understood.  
 
The general roles of integration managers were acted with varying degrees of success 
and by identifying these roles in this case, present or absent, the basis for 
communication specific roles is set up.  
 
5.2.2. Communication specific roles 
 
From the integration managers’ communication specific roles in this case, what comes 
up first is the spokesperson, as the job required a certain amount of public speaking and 
being a figurehead for this acquisition. This role was acted by various managers, but the 
acting CEO of Firm B was usually the one who had the most responsibilities regarding 
this role, but with varying success. The interim CEO of Firm B was the most credible 
spokesperson and had most success in this role. Doing the announcements and speeches 
were the main part of this role and they were mostly done in an orderly fashion and the 
interim CEO toured the acquired company and talked about the acquisition. Nonetheless 
the evidence suggests that due to the variance in the integration management, a certain 
lack of consistency could be seen in the spokesperson’s role as a whole. This improved 
when the communications director was hired and started to contribute to the role, and 
the emphasis on proper communication was increased significantly which resulted in 
more content and finesse to the message.  
 
Sharing information between the companies is one important aspect of integration 
management and it was fairly directly hinted to have been lacking in this acquisition on 
both sides. Acquired side reported a lot of confusion regarding responsibilities, 
timetables and sources of information caused by the restructuring efforts and key 
employees changing positions during the integration process. Acquiring side talked 
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about new services that the business group offers to Firm B after the acquisition, which 
they might have never had before but need to learn to make use of in order to gain 
synergies. Both sides could have used improved integration management in the early 
parts of the integration in the role of information gatekeeper to share these things across 
the board and thus ease the acquired company to settle in and make use of the new 
resources as well as enable the acquirer to capture the value of the acquisition right from 
the beginning. Although the evidence suggests there was a deficiency in the flow of 
information, the argument can be made that this role was partially fulfilled by the HR 
director and the communications director in terms of sharing information about the 
values, policies, guidelines and channels that were included in the so-called integration 
package. In addition to that the development of the intranet and other information 
channels can be regarded as an increase of information flow, or at the very least making 
it possible, which fits this role.  
 
The last communication specific role to be recognized in integration management is the 
visionary, which revolves around communication of the end state and goals of the 
acquisition. This role was executed with mixed results, as the management of the 
acquiring company, and the integration managers, put a lot of emphasis on the shared 
values, history, identity and also the end state of the integration, a unified business 
group, but according to the acquired company, the communication lacked certainty and 
concrete measures to reach these things. As one interviewee from Firm B put it: 
 
‘Being a visionary and painting a pretty picture does not work. In this case when 
there is a new owner and it demands better results but the communication stays 
on this level with no clarifications. It creates uncertainty, you feel that can we 
really do it and what are we going to do?’ 
 
This opinion of the acquired employee connected to the fact that communication was 
inconsistent at best during the integration process and the frequent managerial changes, 
the results of visionary work and inspiration to the acquired employees were not 
satisfactory despite the heavy emphasis on it.  
 
To conclude, the evidence suggests that there was a real need for a dedicated integration 
manager to fulfill or assign to others many of the general and communication specific 
roles identified in literature in order to make a more successful integration process. 
Acting management of the acquired company and several managers from the acquiring 
company (see figure 11) tried to contribute to this on top of their day-to-day work, but 
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•Acting management (CEO #2 and Interim CEO) 
Project manager 
•Acting management (CEO #2 and Interim CEO) 
Sparring partner 
•No evidence of any manager seeking to fulfill this role 
Implementer 
•Communications director 
Mediator 
•Acting management (CEO #2 and Interim CEO) 
•Communications director 
Spokesperson 
•HR director 
•Communications director 
Information gatekeeper 
•Interim CEO 
•Communications director 
•HR director 
Visionary 
this did not produce ideal results and actions were taken at times almost several years 
too late. The findings show consistency between the roles acted in this acquisition and 
those suggested by literature as only the role of mediator was left unfilled, although 
there was arguably a real need for it as well. No clear additional roles were recognized 
but the features and objectives of existing roles seemed to need some adaptation and 
will be taken into consideration in the conclusions of this study. Figure 12 summarizes 
the key findings of this section, the recognized integration managers’ roles and which 
integration managers acted them, if they were acted at all.  
 
 
Figure 12. Roles of the integration managers and their actors.  
 
 
5.2.3. General competences 
 
A number of competences that integration managers need or should have in an ideal 
situation were suggested throughout the interviews, but looking at what were the most 
noticeable competences in this acquisition is a more difficult question. The competences 
were harder to define and to single out simply because identifying the integration 
87 
managers in the first place was not self-evident and the roles were more abstract than in 
theory. The main focus is on competences that are required for effective communication 
as the research question stated, but in order to create basis for that, also general 
competences that came up in the evidence will be reviewed. 
 
Deep knowledge of the acquiring company was mentioned first in literature (Ashkenas 
& Francis 2000: 114−115) and unsurprisingly the acquiring side did put emphasis on it 
when asked about the needed skills of integration managers. 
 
‘The most important job that the integration manager does is to bring the culture 
and working methods of the acquiring company. If you don’t have it in your 
backbone it will not work, it is not a consultant’s job.’ 
 
This also stresses the fact that the manager has to be from the acquiring company, but 
the main message was that you need to know the business and culture in and out. The 
acquired side’s stand in this was almost exactly the opposite as they valued knowing the 
acquired business as thoroughly as possible, being a trusted and experienced person 
who can spar them on the matters regarding the integration process. These were the 
ideals that both sides valued most, but in reality the knowledge of the business is about 
being able to guide the employees through things such as reporting, seeking information 
and so on. Shortly after the controlling shares were acquired the integration manager at 
the time, CEO #2 of Firm B, shuffled the positions of almost all key personnel 
throughout the organization in order to clean the house and introduce change, which 
caused a lot of confusion and there was nobody capable of clarifying the situation. 
 
‘Almost the whole last year we were looking for the model and areas of 
responsibility, who is in charge of what, who you can ask about what and then 
when the new people came in… these details that affect the work of a lot of 
people, they are lost. Schedules, how long does it take to make something and 
where do you find this information.’ 
 
This skill is not necessarily something that a freshly appointed CEO can be argued to 
possess, but something the organization definitely needed from someone in the 
integration team and the role of information gatekeeper is all about it.  
 
Flexible style of leadership was mentioned especially by the acquiring side as adapting 
to certain situations and being aware of which style of leadership is the most 
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appropriate. Of the actual integration managers throughout the acquisition, especially 
the interim CEO was suggested to being good at adapting well to different situations 
while acting as the CEO and integration manager during the period when management 
was changed and integration was running wild. Evidence of this came from comments 
about being both open and easy to talk to but also giving a properly straight answer to 
surrounding questions when necessary. In addition the communications director 
emphasized situational awareness to a very high degree in their integration management 
style and philosophy and consequently the evidence shows that the integration team in 
Firm A is formed from different types of people with different styles of leadership to 
cover the various situations. 
 
When it comes to the integration manager’s ability to tolerate chaos, there was not 
much evidence available, other than several managers embracing the fact that 
acquisitions bring chaos, but in a good way. Although when looking at how the different 
roles, especially the project manager role and information gatekeeper, were carried out 
and how well the integration managers survived in the chaotic situation that the 
integration process brought upon Firm B, a certain lack of this ability can be seen. Lack 
of proper knowledge of the acquired business, or more so the skill to organize better 
internal communication during the turnaround project in combination with the 
questionable ability to tolerate chaos were perhaps the deciding negative factors for the 
CEO #2 as an integration manager. The situation especially in the beginning of the 
integration process would have required a largely more from the management in order 
to keep the project together and moving forward. 
 
These general competences that surfaced in the interviews are heavily related to the 
roles already presented and describe the various skills that integration managers 
required during the integration process and to what extent they actually possessed them 
in this case. As well as with the general roles, the general competences form basis to the 
communication specific competences that indicate how extensive or narrow the skillset 
for proper communication of the integration managers in fact was. 
 
5.2.4. Communication specific competences 
 
The competences that the previously presented roles require for effective 
communication stemmed from various situations during the integration and builds up 
the understanding why the integration process progressed as it did.  
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The importance of language skills never became a focal point in the interviews and as 
the corporate language of both companies is English and as Swedish is the second 
official language of Finland, the assumption is made that the integration managers had 
and were required adequate language skills in these languages to prevent larger issues. 
Although the communications director in the role of the mediator made a point about 
the company policy of translating almost all company news into local languages to 
ensure understanding. 
 
That being said, the natural progression in the competences of integration managers is 
conversation and presentation skills, which were noted to be of vital importance for the 
integration managers. The interviews revealed that the communication by CEO #2 of 
Firm B was very uncertain and he clearly lacked good conversation and presentation 
skills, which lessened his credibility as an integration manager especially as a visionary 
and spokesperson. On the other hand, the interim CEO who was noted to be a very good 
speaker and easy to converse with, can be regarded having very good skills in 
conversation and presentation, which can also explain some of the disparity in the 
success in communication between those two integration managers, which is explained 
in more detail later on with the effects of communication. 
 
Another clearly noted competence that was seen in this case is emotional and cultural 
intelligence. Cultural factors in this acquisition were not particularly heavy as the low 
cultural distance between Sweden and Finland was managed relatively well, although 
the interviewees from Firm B did mention this disparity between the countries that may 
have gone unnoticed due to the lack of cultural intelligence: 
 
‘One thing that nobody never even mentioned here [in Finland], that was 
probably in the back of the head of someone and we know it for sure, that in 
Sweden they know marketing and conceptualization very well. The reason why 
these kinds of functions will remain in Sweden is because they do it well!’ 
 
This is a situation where cultural intelligence connected to the flow of information and 
answering the questions that surround the integration process are necessary, as by acting 
the roles of information gatekeeper and spokesperson. In addition Firm B’s previous 
acquisitions in other countries introduced some problems that required cultural 
intelligence to be solved, but they were reported to have been very difficult and thus 
hint a lack of cultural intelligence from integration managers on those acquisitions, if 
there were any. On the other hand, emotional intelligence was regarded as a very 
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important skill by the acquiring side but it was presented in the form of situational 
awareness so that integration managers are able to address the particular situation in the 
best possible way. It is also very much related to having a flexible style of leadership. 
 
‘These things are massive, a lot of information is coming in and you need to be 
able to tell apart what is the most important thing, bring on the two-three basic 
messages in the situation and build on it, not even trying to tell everything at 
once. Situational awareness in my opinion absolutely, as in what tone, what way, 
how hard, how sensitive and so on, that is managerial communication and 
communication skills in general.’ 
 
Preparing for the expected and being able to handle the unexpected with were the keys 
on handling the emotionally attached employees with questions. Also being able to say 
‘I don’t know the answer, but I will get it for you’ or ‘that we don’t know yet but we 
will come back to that in two weeks’ or ‘now there are no news on the situation’ were 
noted to be important in calming down the employees when no real information is 
available. In the past these skills were lacking on many of the integration managers as 
the information flow was non-existent and the integration process generally did not 
receive the emotional attention from the managers involved to have motivated the 
employees well enough in a visionary role. Regarding the comments from the acquiring 
side, the situation has improved once they came up with a proper communications 
function and director with these skills. 
 
Knowledge of multiple communication methods and communication networking skills 
can be regarded as one in this case as they overlap in many occasions. The need for both 
of them became apparent from many of the interviews, especially from the acquired 
side but also agreed by the acquiring side. The problem stemmed from the ownership 
issues which prevented much of the communication and also from inadequate 
communication infrastructure in the beginning of the integration. These factors had 
probably a much bigger effect on the integration managers’ ability to communicate, 
rather than their lack of knowledge or ability, but results are the same. Evidence of the 
shortcomings these problems created were showing when it came to providing 
consistent communication to all levels and parts of the company. An example of that lies 
in how the acquiring side realizes the difference that physical distance makes especially 
in an international setting and how it showed on the acquiring side.  
 
‘The closer and tighter the whole organization is, the faster the information 
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travels, even though you wouldn’t believe it. It is a fact that physical proximity 
helps to spread out information and it is maybe so that the more spread out the 
company is the more structure and means of communication has to be created in 
order to pass on information.’ 
 
The results of lacking communication networking skills and means of communication 
topped up with physical distance surfaced in the interview with Firm B when asked 
about how they perceived the communication strategy in this acquisition and what was 
told to them: 
 
‘Well now we have a different view of this for sure, if you think about what was 
told in Sweden and what was told here [Finland], definitely a big difference, I 
would think so.’ 
 
They noted a clear difference between received communication in the Finnish and 
Swedish offices of Firm B, one being in the same building as Firm A and the other in 
another country. On top of that the employees of Firm B reported that many group wide 
projects and important communication regarding them were left on a too high level with 
no support to the operative level causing uncertainty on how it affects everything else 
and how should these projects be conducted.  
 
Integration managers, in this case at the time the interim CEO and HR director, created 
the shared intranet for the business group to facilitate this need to reach all levels of the 
company. The communication director hired later on came in to continue this 
integration manager’s role of building communication networks for all to use. When 
asked about if they really had an official communications channel with this acquisition, 
the answer sums up how these competences were created and made possible for 
integration managers to use: 
 
‘Yeah we did, but it was more like a type of notice, as in putting an 
announcement to outside sources. So the really professional communication 
strategy that we plan it for the people [employees] and outside the company and 
that they would be timed… we were pretty far from that. […] Now we have a 
communications director who of course develops the intranet, communications 
channels and makes sure that when announcements come, they are done 
professionally, and also has improved our visual image. Extremely important!’ 
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These skills are a combination that integration managers especially in the roles of 
spokesperson and information gatekeeper can be argued to need, as reaching all levels 
of the companies with both new information and relevant everyday communication is 
seen as very crucial.  
 
Interpersonal communication came up as a double-edged sword, as evidence from the 
acquiring company’s interviewees heavily suggest the need for inspiring communication 
from integration managers playing the role of visionary, but acquired company failed to 
see the usefulness of the role. 
 
‘Being a visionary and painting a pretty picture does not work.’ 
 
Although this is not the whole story due to the fact that both sides reported to have 
valued and noted attachment to the personality of the leadership and management of the 
company because of the family background. Also the communication coming from the 
CEO and main integration manager was scrutinized very closely, thus indicating that 
good interpersonal communication is of vital importance and made a difference between 
the effectiveness of communication of CEO #2 and interim CEO both as a visionary and 
spokesperson. 
 
The evidence collected in this research argues that most but not all of the competences 
recognized by extant literature (see table 1) were either possessed or definitely needed 
by the integration managers in this case (see figure 13). The arguments made to support 
the necessity of each competence prove that they are all valuable skills for the 
integration managers. 
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• Knowledge of both acquiring and acquired business 
• Flexible style of leadership 
• Ability to tolerate chaos 
General competences recognized by evidence 
• Language skills 
• Conversation and presentation skills 
• Emotional and cultural intelligence with situational awareness 
• Knowledge of multiple communication methods and communication 
networking 
• Interpersonal communication 
Communication specific competences 
recognized by evidence 
Figure 13. Competences of integration managers recognized by evidence.  
 
 
These designated roles of integration managers that require these specific competences 
to be successfully acted are argued to have a big influence on the integration process, 
showcased by the evidence of the effects of their presence and also absence at times. 
Most of the general roles and competences were supported by the evidence as well, but 
following the focus of the study the further conclusions will be made about the 
communication specific roles and competences. Competences required for these roles 
were listed in the literature review (see figure 6) earlier in this study and now it is done 
again based on the gathered evidence (see figure 14). Key findings of this section are 
the competences utilized in the three communication specific roles which were fulfilled 
by the various integration managers in this case. Some variance can be seen in 
comparison to the literature review, but mainly the competences are distinctively 
similar. By identifying what roles were played by whom, to what extent and using 
which skills, this study can draw conclusions on what kind of communication was 
present during the integration and how it really affected the employees that were on the 
receiving end. Also the differences between how the acquiring and acquired side 
perceived the situation have given more insight about the integration process.  
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Figure 14. Communication specific roles and competences of integration managers 
recognized by evidence. 
 
 
5.3. Effects of communication on employees’ emotions 
 
During the integration process it is difficult to grasp all the change that is happening 
around and to make sense of what is really going on, especially with limited amounts of 
information coming your way. Interviewee from Firm B summed it up well when 
thinking about the whole process in retrospect and how he saw the communication 
during the integration.  
 
‘Now it is easy to think about the situation as a whole and the timeline, but when 
things start to happen, the communication about what is happening is coming 
from a very narrow point of view.’ 
 
The announcement is perhaps the most emotionally intensive event and it created a lot 
of feelings on both sides. On the acquiring side the feelings and emotions that surfaced 
•Language skills 
•Conversation and presentation skills 
•Emotional and cultural intelligence with situational awareness 
•Knowledge of multiple communication methods and communication 
networking 
•Interpersonal communication skills 
Spokesperson 
•Language skills 
•Emotional and cultural intelligence with situational awareness 
•Knowledge of multiple communication methods and communication 
networking 
Information gatekeeper 
•Language skills 
•Conversation and presentation skills 
•Emotional and cultural intelligence with situational awareness 
•Interpersonal communication skills 
 
Visionary 
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were almost completely positive, mostly regarding the big opportunity that the 
acquisition presented, only citing the negative side by noting that a change that a big 
acquisition brings can be slightly overwhelming and the workload can be heavy.  
 
‘For us it’s one of the most interesting things! An opportunity, really hectic and 
chaotic but in a good way, because we are doing something that will take this 
company further.’ 
 
‘Awfully positive feeling! It is not chaos in the meaning that we don’t know what 
we’re doing but so many things just happen at the same time.’ 
 
‘Opportunity… of course it is an opportunity. But it definitely means work, a lot 
of work.’ 
 
On the acquired side the general feelings about the announcement were slightly 
different the amount of confusion that a change of this magnitude brings was clearly 
showing. 
 
‘What do they actually tell you then? What is going to change and what is not 
going to change? That is often not clarified.’ 
 
There was a big difference between Firm B’s Finnish and Swedish offices in terms of 
received communication because in Finland they had been sitting in the same offices 
with Firm A for a long time already. This included a lot of unofficial communication 
that was probably lacking elsewhere and made a big difference when the announcement 
came and how the reception differed between Finland and Sweden. The interviewee on 
the Finnish side got a bit of a pre-warning and was much more prepared for it as well.  
 
‘I got the information about the acquisition a few days before the official 
announcement and they said it is going to happen but Sweden does not know it 
yet and cannot be told. I was told about it in person, no official memo or 
announcement for us.’  
 
This small piece of unofficial communication may have had a positive effect on how the 
announcement was perceived when it came, even though the interviewee’s 
preconception about the acquisition was already leaning towards positive.  
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‘To me it [the announcement] was good news and awaited information when it 
came. We knew already that this is the direction we are heading to and the 
timetable was approximately known so that finally something will begin to 
happen. The feeling was mainly promising or excitement for the possibilities, but 
it was probably quite different in Sweden.’ 
 
The rumors were already out before the announcement and they were remarkably grim 
in Sweden with more concrete fears about lay-offs and general uncertainty about the 
future. The announcement did not change the tone much, because according to the 
interviews fear, anxiety and uncertainty were the first emotions after the announcement 
for most employees in Firm B. The announcement came in the form of an official press 
release as it went public, just the bare minimum as the acquiring side described the level 
of their communications function at the time of the acquisition. It was not received very 
well in Sweden as the information was very vague, not much was told in terms of facts 
and what is going to happen in the near future, so speculations began immediately.  
 
‘When they [colleagues] heard in Sweden that Firm A is going to acquire all of 
Firm B, the first thing was uncertainty and fear of what is going to happen. Why 
is company from this industry taking over a company from that industry? We 
have more turnover than they, what can they possibly bring us? It was already 
clearly told that Firm B wants to grow in the European market and now a 
Finnish company comes and takes us over, what can they do and what do they 
know? Still to this day people at Firm B think that Firm A’s business is so 
different from ours, that our product line is that much bigger, and it is such a 
complex mechanism with so much purchasing from abroad, products, factories 
and so on, that there are doubts if this (Firm A) is the right owner.’ 
 
Firm A being the smaller company and from only partially related industry, it caused 
doubt and disbelief on the employees. Also because it was not a known company in 
Sweden it increased the feelings of fear and uncertainty on that side as it is relatively 
reasonable to fear for your job when a company from another country takes you over as 
it is possible that jobs will be moved away. Rumors about moving the headquarters to 
Finland ensued as all the premade plans for investments in new offices and production 
in Sweden were put on hold indefinitely without a good explanation, which increased 
the uncertainty on the Swedish side. 
 
‘For us in Sweden the announcement created a lot worse situation because we 
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got the notice that cooperation procedures will begin and people will possibly 
have to be fired. […] We knew that people will have to be let go but nobody 
knew from where, Finland, Sweden or Europe, which makes the speculations 
that much bigger and people start to fear for their jobs and freeze. It is bound to 
decelerate the progress.’ 
 
After the announcement it took almost two months to get the new organizational model 
out which answered some of the questions regarding the lay-offs and what changes are 
to be expected. Two months of turmoil without sufficient information to relieve the 
negative feelings is a long time and is a typical example of what can produce a bad case 
of merger syndrome to the employees. The new organizational model was part of the 
strategy which did indeed give directions but still lacked communication and clarity 
about quite a few important matters. 
 
‘Our management team and Firm A had a strategy meeting to plan how this will 
proceed [the integration] and I was with them on the implementation part. The 
new CEO (#2) [of Firm B] for the first and last time, brought up the strategy, 
and you could definitely hear Firm A’s voice in it. It was not highlighted but at 
least I could see that these are things that Firm A values. What was lacking in 
the strategy was the communication about things such as will the headquarters 
and decision-making stay in Sweden. None of these things were discussed and 
still isn’t. These are just the things that people listen to with sensitivity, who is 
making these calls, where are we going to end up and so on. So if there is no 
clear message, then it is left floating around and people will think that it’s the 
acquirer plotting.’ 
 
When the rumors had been out for quite some time about moving the headquarters to 
Finland, then the CEO of Firm A actually came out in person to say that the 
headquarters will remain in Sweden and they do not mean to change anything but Firm 
A is now the owner and what the new strategy will be. But this was only when the clear 
symptoms of the merger syndrome had already been occurring among the employees.   
 
The communication strategy of Firm A seen from the management team’s point of view 
had big emphasis on communicating the common mission, vision, and values so as 
many people as possible are aware why they are all part of this group. The plan was to 
create and communicate the common story and history in order to explain everyone why 
the companies have been put together. In this case Firm A had a history with the same 
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products as Firm B and thus it was meant to make them feel more welcome and ease up 
the effects of the merger syndrome. The response of the Firm B’s Finnish side was as 
follows:  
 
‘[Regarding the common history]… they did that as well and it was showcased 
differently in the company presentations than before but it might have stuck on 
the level that ‘it is at your own responsibility, go read it’. Regarding the common 
values, the message has gone through to Firm B at least to the people I have 
spoken with and I have experienced that they have been welcomed in a positive 
way as they are things that we can all agree on.’ 
 
An argument can be made that the communication strategy did have some positive 
effects with the common values but not to the extent that was initially desired, 
seemingly due to lacking implementation. The Swedish side did not receive even that 
much information and their perception of Firm A company was not changed much 
despite the new communication strategy. 
 
‘Regarding these efforts and their competence in the core business of Firm B, 
nothing much was really heard in Sweden. I did not know much about Firm A 
either.’ 
 
Despite this being their initial perception of Firm A and the reception it got as a new 
owner, especially in Sweden, some people apparently knew better and later on 
information regarding the collaboration changed their view a bit. 
 
‘But at the time the acquisitions that Firm B made in order to expand to Europe, 
they were funded by Firm A. I don’t know if anyone told that!’ 
 
’Many of us knew it but the communication should have been done better by 
Firm B, regarding how good this co-operation with Firm A has been since the 
90s.’ 
 
The communication strategy of Firm A had emphasized the common history a lot but 
this part, which really changed some people’s minds and affected their feelings about 
the acquisition in a positive way, was left out of official communication or otherwise 
disregarded.  
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After the announcement and little initial communication, the turnaround project of Firm 
B was on its way and actions were taken to get the integration process moving. The 
problem of not labeling your actions properly and insufficient communication of the 
integration plans seemed to have a negative effect on the acquired side and their 
emotions toward the integration process. 
 
‘A lot of the changes that have occurred have the sign of integration on them, 
such as HR changes and working methods, and you notice that these are done 
because of it. It has a lot to do with how you listen to the message yourself. The 
thing that we have noticed is that things get mixed up when you put them under 
some topic even though they don’t belong there. A lot of these pains and issues 
have been because of our own growth and not that much the integration process 
with Firm A, but we have perceived it as a part of it. So you don’t know when it 
is ever going to end.’ 
 
The interviewees from Firm A did mention that every action should be validated and 
given a reason, but in this case it seemed to be still lacking. The acquiring side did 
admit that there should be a clearer distinction on what things are parts of the 
integration process and what are just general group wide projects. This matters 
especially on how the things are communicated to the employees and how they perceive 
the communication that is coming from the acquiring side. 
 
‘We have room to improve on making the communication a part of the everyday 
life, as in from the ‘special’ integration communication following the acquisition 
into the communication that goes on normally within the company.’ 
 
With this much confusion on what is happening, the perception of ‘winners and losers’ 
and ‘us and them’ are fairly common in integration processes that affect especially the 
acquired companies and their employees in a negative way (Cartwright & Cooper 2000: 
79; McMurdy 2000). This kind of mentality was very much present in this acquisition, 
especially when the old ownership and management was still around. As a family 
company with high commitment to the owners and relative unfamiliarity with the 
acquiring company, the preconditions for such mentality among employees were there. 
As told by the acquired side: 
 
‘The thing about the so called older guard, they were the guys who had 
increased our net sales 30 times bigger in 10 years. When a new owner comes 
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and wants to change that, you think why? It is always a hard change to do.’ 
 
In the face of the feelings of loss, the interviewees from Firm B agreed that these 
changes that came with the integration would never have been possible with the old 
management as they seemed to have trouble already with changes stemming from Firm 
B’s own internal and external growth and changes in the business environment. Some 
traces of the ‘us and them’ mentality is said to still remain as many of the changes, 
especially in HR, have a certain tone that they come from the acquirer, but noticeably 
less. Still the employees of Firm B clearly identify themselves as part of Firm B rather 
than a part of the business group and Firm A. Although the interviews revealed that the 
employees, especially in Sweden, are starting to think that as a company Firm B is 
seizing to exist, which can lead to them perceiving themselves as the losers of this deal. 
This can be regarded to have negative effects on their performance but also further the 
integration process if old ways are given up. After all they used to form their own 
division within the business group, but in 2012 the company name was faded out and 
only remains as a brand name thus possibly enhancing this feeling of losing their 
company for the employees. 
 
How the communication actions related to the integration process concretely affected 
these emotions the employees were feeling? The interviewees from Firm B agreed that 
not much communication, official at least, ever came directly from Firm A. The 
corporate strategy was confidentially communicated to the management of Firm B but 
never passed on to the employees. This could have been a strategic choice for Firm A 
not to do it but also had an effect in strengthening the ‘us and them’ mentality for the 
acquired company. Communication aiming to relieve this mentality and bring the 
companies closer together came in the form of showcasing the common history in the 
same field that the companies shared. They also told more about the acquirer as a 
company and what they are part of after the acquisition. Eventually the communication 
improved once there were proper grounds with ownership issues solved, 
communications director hired and proper communications channels established, such 
as the joint intranet, which explains the gradual relief in the emotions of employees. 
 
The tone of the communication played an important role in how the employees 
perceived the communication and thus in dealing with their merger syndrome. The 
interviews revealed that the communication still worked relatively well with the first 
CEO (#1) of Firm B who came after the previous owner had stepped down from active 
role. The approachable personality and open style of communication suited the family 
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history of the company well. 
 
‘Firm B has never been a corporate-type of firm, but it has always been very 
attached to the personality of the owner or leader.’ 
 
The next CEO (#2), who was hired by Firm A and expected to start making the 
necessary changes for the integration process, had a very different style of 
communication and there were slight problems with communication between the new 
CEO (#2) and other managers which was reflected to the employees as uncertainty.  
 
‘In his [CEO (#2)] time the communication was rather uncertain, but you 
wouldn’t really notice it until it changed. I am not sure if the former CEO (#2) 
was really that insecure or was it just the delivery, but so it seemed and that is 
the feeling you got. [The communication was] somehow a bit too soft and vague, 
so that you get the feeling that this doesn’t have to be like this. It is a question of 
character in the sense that if you are going to make changes, the people making 
the changes need to be credible as well.’ 
 
Once the CEO (#2) left in late 2012 and the CEO of Firm A replaced him in the interim, 
the employees reported a noticeable positive change in communication. The overall 
style of communication went from insecure and uncertain to confident, precise and 
clear, which was necessary as the need for changes brought a lot of questions that 
required answering. Having clarity in the company on who is going to answer these 
questions and what is the company line. The change in communication of the CEO also 
had a positive effect on the communication passed on by other managers, an example 
seen by the interviewee from Firm B in his own boss, which then gave him a boost of 
confidence as well. Concrete communicational measures that this change brought to the 
situation were increased open discussion regarding the speculations that floated around 
and giving reasoning to demands such as why there is a need for improved profitability.  
 
The enhanced communication eased the uncertainty and fears of the employees, but a 
lot of negative emotions remained as the company was still in the midst of a turnaround 
project aimed to improve their profitability, partially connected to the integration. In 
retrospect though the interviewees agreed that the situation has improved a lot and in 
the end the improved communication played an important part in the success of the 
turnaround project: 
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‘Now a year afterwards it is easy to look back and realize that if the 
communication had not been there, as in we would have still had the old model 
and needed to make the changes, it would have surely been quite a bad 
situation.’ 
 
To conclude, the key findings of this study reveal that the acquisition and the following 
integration process had significant emotional effects on the employees. Particularly on 
the employees in Sweden a clear case of merger syndrome could be detected based on 
the interviewees’ own experiences and those of their colleagues. The merger syndrome 
produced a set of emotions, some of them negative and some of them positive 
depending heavily on the receiver’s perception of the situation. The perceived 
managerial communication from the integration managers, which may have been scarce 
at times, undoubtedly had positive effects on the employees’ emotions regarding the 
acquisition although some negative emotions still remain (see figure 15). Especially 
when providing revealing information about future events and clarifying on existing 
uncertainties, the integration managers managed to ease the employees’ uncertainty 
about the future and fears about losing their jobs as well as give them confidence and 
motivation. Also the visionary efforts and being a part of the business group has given 
the companies more sense of unity. Unfortunately there are arguably still traces of the 
merger syndrome in hints of doubt about whether they are going to the right direction 
with the change, confusion about operations and a sense of loss about the old company 
among some employees, but with significantly less negative effects.  
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Figure 15. Effects of communication on employees’ emotions.  
 
  
EFFECTS OF COMMUNICATION ON EMPLOYEES' EMOTIONS 
Positive: Gradually with the improvement of 
communication the effects of the merger 
syndrome have relieved considerably. 
Employees have gained more confidence and 
more sense of unity, and eased their 
uncertainty and fears about the future. 
Negative: Initial response to the acquisition 
was bad and communication responded poorly 
at first. Remaining negative effects; little 
confusion about operations, a sense of doubt 
about the direction the company is heading to, 
and grief about the loss of the old company. 
PERCEPTIONS OF THE ACQUISITION AND EMOTIONS THAT SURFACED 
Positive: Excitement, opporunitism, relief 
Negative: Fear, uncertainty, anxiety, 
confusion, doubt, disbelief, shock, loss 
COMMUNICATION BY INTEGRATION MANAGERS 
The announcement and speeches, strategy with common vision, history and values, style and 
tone of communication, communication channels, frequency and intensity of communication, 
clarity and content of the message. 
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6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
This chapter presents the discussion of the findings, makes the necessary connections 
between theory and the findings and ultimately provides grounds for the conclusions. 
Additionally the limitations of the study are showcased here alongside with the 
theoretical implications that are provided to inspire further research and practical 
implications for the use of managers and organizations struggling with communication 
and integration management.  
 
 
6.1. Discussion of the findings 
 
International mergers and acquisitions have become common activities in business as 
means of external growth, but are generally regarded as risky moves with high failure 
rate. Failure often stems from the company’s inability to capture and create value during 
the post-acquisition integration, which often originate from people related issues. The 
human response to M&As is often the so-called merger syndrome, which is the cause of 
negative emotions of employees. This emphasizes the importance of proper integration 
management and communication to relieve the negative feelings. This study focuses on 
finding out how companies manage the integration process and the merger syndrome of 
the employees.   
 
Literature has defined some of the roles and competences of integration managers that 
are required for effective management and communication in the integration process, 
and some additional roles and competences were created earlier in this study based on 
the needs of organizations presented by extant research and literature (i.e. Ashkenas et 
al. 1998; Ashkenas & Francis 2000, Shelton 2003; Evans et al. 2010; Teerikangas et al. 
2011). When examining the effects of communication the study has relied on the 
cognitive appraisal theory to argue how managerial communication affects the emotions 
of employees suffering from the merger syndrome and how important it is for the 
employees and thus to the success of the integration process (Mandler 1984; Frijda 
1986; Kusstatscher 2005; Sinkovics et al. 2011). By using these theories and existing 
studies as the foundation, this research is aims to reveal the answer to the following 
research questions: 
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 What is the role of communication in post-acquisition integration in 
international mergers and acquisitions? 
 
o What are the roles and competences of the integration managers, and 
what makes them effective in these roles?  
 
o What are the effects of communication and the integration manager 
on employees’ emotions? 
 
Similarly to the previous chapter, the discussion is divided into three subchapters; 
integration process, use of integration managers and effects of communication on 
employees’ emotions. The key findings of this empirical research were mostly in 
support of previous research with some exceptions. The integration process was 
partially typical and posed many problems which were recognized as common by extant 
literature, but also contained unique structures such as the creation of the business group 
alongside the integration and issues with previous ownership. Integration managers 
were present in the case to a lesser extent than literature generally suggests as none was 
directly appointed or given the responsibility, but several managers were arguably 
acting many of the recognized roles and showing signs of the required competences. 
Need for improvement on some of the roles and competences can be derived from the 
evidence. The negative emotions that arose after the acquisition were partially typical 
and in support of the literature as was the notion of how the communication by 
integration managers had a positive effect on them. Nonetheless there were also 
discrepancies as not all of the communication actions and integration managers’ roles 
have the desired effect on the feelings of employees and some negative effects still 
remained. These key findings are discussed in more detail and in light of extant 
literature so that further conclusions can be made about the role of communication in 
the integration process in international M&As. 
 
 
6.1.1. Integration process 
 
The acquisition of Firm B and the following integration process still ongoing to this day 
provided big hurdles for the acquiring company in terms of management of the 
integration process in both operational and human level as well as how to provide 
sufficient communication throughout the process. The acquisition process and 
especially the following integration were full of confusion and uncertainty especially in 
the beginning. The unique features of this case, such as the size of the acquired 
company, creation of the business group, and ownership issues, slightly debilitated the 
progress. But the situation improved after the initial problems and advanced 
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significantly over time and has become more of a success by the time when this 
empirical research was conducted as well as a learning experience to the acquiring 
company for future acquisitions. 
 
When looking at the timeline of the acquisition (see figure 10), the pre-acquisition stage 
(Marks & Mirvis 1998: 28; Schuler et al. 2004: 86), which includes the reasoning, due 
diligence and actually closing the deal, begins very early on with the collaboration of 
the companies. The reasons and motives for the acquisition were not that closely 
inspected in the research except for the mentions that Firm A wanted to expand their 
business more into the field of Firm B since the beginning of their co-operation, thus it 
had been the plan all along. As M&As are considered a great opportunity and way of 
externally growing your business, although with a lot of pitfalls, the acquisition itself 
cannot be regarded as a bad decision by any means. Arguably the problems with the 
acquisition were timing and preparation as it happened before the acquiring company 
itself was ready for it, which they admitted to, and therefore the integration process has 
been long and tedious as the company has built its support functions and integration 
practices along the way.  
 
The due diligence process was less relevant to the scope of the study and because of the 
long collaboration between the companies. The business itself was generally well fitted, 
although derived from the interviews there were slightly less synergies than initially 
expected. What was slightly underestimated was the significance of the ‘integration 
within integration’ concerning the companies Firm B had acquired earlier containing 
cultural issues (Angwin 2001: 36; Cullinan et al. 2004: 98). In addition the human side 
of due diligence was arguably flawed as it is meant to seek out the potential liabilities 
the acquired human capital will bring, which then again materialized in terms of 
defective management that slowed down the integration process and eventually resulted 
in lay-offs so the integration to could progress properly (Schuler et al. 2004: 99; Evans 
et al. 2010: 541−543).  
 
When the closing of the deal and the announcement approach, communication and 
preparations for the integration should be up and running, but despite the co-operation it 
did not happen in time. This was caused by several factors, one being the confusion 
surrounding the acquisition of the final shares.  
 
‘We didn’t know whether we will get the last stake [of Firm B], which gave pretty 
significant rights to the previous owners. We didn’t know if it’s going to happen 
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even in 2016 but it happened already in 2011.’ 
 
Employees of Firm B interpreted the slowness to start the integration as hesitation from 
Firm A, which can argued to make the situation slightly unsteady for them as no 
concrete plans about the future are given. The acquiring side reported that the reason for 
it was because the support functions including the communications channels of the 
relatively newly formed business group were not completely ready to be integrated 
with. No integration manager was appointed at the time nor later on and altogether the 
planning of the integration was arguably deficient. Therefore as all the signs were 
indicating, the acquisition and following integration process of Firm B was labeled as a 
prototype acquisition upon which the procedures and functions were built for future 
references.  
 
‘In this company when we’ve acquired others we haven’t thought about it much 
beforehand and have then fixed it later on. Now we are more ready so if we 
would acquire the next company we have at least mentally decided that these are 
the things we are not giving up. Our values, our intranet, you know? You have a 
set of guidelines and policies ready that will be applied when Firm A acquires a 
company. You won’t just leave the company be with one guy coming in to report. 
In general you will start integrating.’ 
 
This begs to ask the question whether this is just an excuse if hasty acquisitions have 
been made before without learning, but the evidence support the fact that the 
transformation from a holding company owning several businesses to a unified business 
group has made a more active integration of acquired companies a better alternative 
than before.  
 
The integration process is divided into task and human integration according to 
Birkinshaw et al. (2000: 396) examined earlier (see figure 1) in this thesis. This case 
example showed similarities of success and also failure as the due diligence process and 
planning of the acquisition forecasted. Task integration seeks the possible operational 
synergies, which were there but not quite as plentiful as the acquirer probably 
anticipated but found already in some support functions and are still looked for in other 
functions. Overall the motive for the acquisition lies more on the wholeness of the 
business group rather than integrating the core businesses of the two companies when it 
comes to operations. Human integration on the other hand seeks to eliminate resistance 
to change and building mutual trust and respect between the companies, which is 
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important to the whole group. The findings suggest that this was arguably a difficult 
task as at first the old management slowed down the integration process, the acquired 
employees had serious doubts about Firm A as the right owner and the interviewees 
indicated that letting go of the old routines was perhaps the most difficult task. Although 
the evidence indicates that this resistance to change has been slowly overcome with 
both personnel changes and gradual building of trust and confidence by improved 
management. Because of the small size of the sample and interviewees from the 
acquired company, this change is hard to completely confirm as differences between 
people are likely to occur. Nonetheless most of the evidence suggested a gradual 
positive change in employees’ perceptions of the acquisition, progress in the human 
integration is likely.  
 
In this case the level of integration (see figure 2) described by Child et al. (2001: 94−96) 
has changed drastically during the years, starting from low levels as an increasing part 
of the holding company that Firm A used to be. The move to partially integrated came 
after the majority ownership was acquired and some support functions were integrated. 
Then it has been creeping more towards full integration with the sole ownership and 
later with Firm B losing its name with only brand names remaining. The reason for this 
is all about the believed advantage it will bring to the parent company, and in this case 
the reason can be argued to be the integrity of the new business group.  
 
To identify the type of integration (see figure 3) in question, related to the dimensions 
identified by Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991: 139−145), this study argues that Firm B as 
a company does not require high organizational autonomy to function but as an essential 
part of the new business group, there is a relatively high need for strategic 
interdependence in order to gain proper synergies. This determines that they are in more 
in the area of absorption, although the evidence suggests that as the businesses are that 
much different there will not be full absorption, but still a relatively tight integration. 
 
Acculturation was not a big issue in this acquisition especially when it comes to 
national cultures because of the small cultural distance between Finland and Sweden, 
but this relates more to the corporate cultures. Looking at the modes of acculturation 
framework (see figure 4) by Navahandi and Malekzadeh (1998: 84), the acquiring 
company showed relatively high tolerance for multiculturalism as well as degree of 
relatedness similarly to the type of integration. Some evidence suggests that the mode is 
leaning towards assimilation as the acquired employees felt that Firm B has seized to 
exist and many of the acquiring company’s systems were adopted. On the other hand the 
109 
acquiring side has put heavy emphasis on building something new and creating mutual 
history and values based what the involved companies shared, which is evidenced by 
how the business group’s values were originally defined: 
 
‘We didn’t go with Firm A nor did we go with Firm B but built something new.’ 
 
All things considered this brings it down closer to acculturative integration with the 
notion that Firm B is effectively being absorbed but still has had a big impact on the 
new company’s culture.  
 
As suggested when separating task and human integration, the people factor was very 
important in this acquisition and especially in the integration process. Considering that, 
what the acquirer invested a lot in, was to take HR into consideration early on. A 
corporate HR director, who also acted as an integration manager, was hired right at the 
inception of the business group and thus HR has been involved and integrated better 
than most other functions and based on relevant literature (Schweiger & Weber 1989: 
72–73; Antila 2006), arguably produced visible results for the employees, captured 
people synergies and softened the human integration in general. Although the acquiring 
side regarded these efforts to integrate HR very highly, the tone that the acquired 
employees spoke of it indicated that it was not all positive. While high level of 
integration in HR was arguably a visible change for the acquired employees, it also begs 
to question whether it is desirable at first. The lack of substantial evidence about the 
effects of early integration of HR in this case prevents further analysis but suggests this 
as a further line of research.   
 
Communication being the scope of this study and the main method of managing the 
people factor in integration, a quick look is taken into what kind of overall 
communication and in what situations was present in this integration process before 
connecting it to integration managers and discussing the effects of communication. With 
the lack of a dedicated integration manager producing continuous communication, many 
stakeholders (see figure 5) were arguably left with insufficient information regarding 
what is going on and what is going to happen in the near future. This applies most of all 
to the middle management and front-line employees of Firm B, who suffered 
significantly in the beginning from uncertainty regarding their job security as well as 
confusion on the direction of the company. The top management got more information 
but on the other hand showed substantial resistance to change and inability to cope with 
it that happened regardless of the communication.  
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The main issues generally found in communication as indicated by Sinkovics et al. 
(2011) and Kusstatscher (2005); the announcement, communication frequency and 
intensity, rumors, and media releases combined with public opinion, draw the outline to 
the communication in this case. As already indicated in the discussion about the pre-
acquisition stage, the importance of the announcement was severely underestimated and 
as literature suggests, it was just the emotionally intensive event plagued by rumors 
arguably producing more uncertainty, fear and anxiety for the employees, who were left 
without much additional information. Communication frequency and intensity was 
another case that arguably lacked in the beginning with no dedicated communications 
function and lack of dedicated integration managers. This improved with the hiring of 
the communications director and building up improved communications channels later 
in the integration. For the same part as official communication was lacking, rumors 
were rampant throughout the integration process taking its place as the sources of 
information for employees. At some point with more efficient integration management, 
especially by the interim CEO, measures were taken to address the rumors with direct 
communication and relieve the negative effects they caused. The last issue, media 
releases and public opinion was interesting in this case, because at first the official press 
release was the only information the employees got as the announcement of the 
acquisition. It initiated a lot of rumors because there was no internal source to balance it 
out as literature suggests (Kusstatscher 2005: 126). On the other hand due to the lack of 
a proper communication function the media releases were relatively scarce as well and 
as the companies were not listed in the stock market not that many media releases were 
officially required either. The strongest effect was arguably in Sweden as Firm A is a 
fairly unknown company from another country and raised more questions about the 
situation but mainly just within the company’s employees.  
 
To conclude, the integration process began with typical problems such as resistance to 
change, confusions about operations, and lack of communication, but the situation 
improved over time which can arguably be connected to the enhancements made in 
integration management and communications functions, although results of some 
integration actions remained questionable. To examine this connection of 
communication, integration management and their effect on the course of the integration 
process and employees emotions, the discussion moves to the use of integration 
managers.  
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6.1.2. Use of integration managers 
 
The use of integration managers, their position, duties and origins are debatable and in 
this case the findings claim that even though no integration manager was directly 
appointed there were several managers operating as integration managers to facilitate 
the integration process (see figure 11). The findings also indicate that many of the roles 
derived from literature were acted out in this case by different managers possessing 
different competences (see figure 12); therefore arguments about connections could be 
made between the ways of producing sufficient communication and fulfilling certain 
roles by using certain skills during the integration process. 
 
There are different opinions about whether the integration manager should or should not 
be managing the business as well or just the integration (Shelton 2003: 87; Schuler et al. 
2004: 104; Froese & Goeritz 2007). The conclusion this study made based on theory 
was that the integration manager should solely concentrate on that position and not 
collect any additional responsibilities. The arguments supporting that stated that if the 
integration manager is also an acting manager of either business, it can jeopardize their 
objectivity in finding synergies. In this case there with no directly appointed integration 
manager so this logic could not directly be applied. As the evidence suggested, the 
situation varied a lot as the main responsibility for the integration was loaded on the 
acting management of Firm B, but shifted from CEO to another several times due to 
changes in management. This goes against the conclusion this research made about the 
position of the integration manager, but does not go without theoretical support (i.e. 
Froese & Goeritz 2007), debating whether it matters or not. Although acquired side was 
reported saying that in future acquisitions an appointed integration manager, who is not 
managing the business because of the possibility of vested interests, would be put in 
place, thus supporting the original notion.  
 
As the CEO #2 came in and took the integration manager’s responsibilities and strived 
for change, what also left room for improvement was the ability to create a sense of 
urgency in the beginning of the integration, which according to Kotter (1996: 36) needs 
to be created in order to have people interested in working for the needed change. Even 
the acquired side admitted that the change was welcome, as they had been waiting for 
something concrete since the rumors about the acquisition first started. In contrast, 
when CEO #2 left and was replaced by the interim CEO, who reportedly managed to 
create a sense of urgency in the employees and managers alike so that changes started to 
happen in a significantly different pace. The situation changed and improved 
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significantly between those two periods, so not all the blame and praise can be put on 
the CEOs, but an argument can be made that the integration manager can inject more 
speed to the process and it showed positive signs.   
 
One critical factor that literature talks about and was seen in the findings as well is the 
early involvement of integration managers, which is debatable in this case. Most of the 
integration managers were hired during the acquisition and integration process and as 
Teerikangas et al. (2011: 653) argued, there is always a risk when one has to implement 
something others have planned. In this case it can be regarded even worse as the 
preparations and planning for the integration were lacking considerably and as the 
acquiring side indicated, decisions were made first and then problems were fixed 
afterwards. Some integration managers, such as the HR manager and interim CEO, were 
present when the announcement was made in the beginning of 2010, but the full and 
continuous responsibilities for integration management were not taken up until CEO #2 
was hired later that year. The communications director who took charge of the 
communications function was also hired the same year, which started to improve the 
overall communication, but it can still be considered a late arrival. Shelton (2003: 85) 
argued that the integration manager should be put in place at least a month before the 
announcement, but in this case there was the factor that the managers were hired from 
the outside, making it even harder to adjust to the job on the fly. One thing that was 
clearly successful was the early involvement of HR, which was proposed by Antila 
(2006: 55) and was argued to have had a positive effect on human integration.  
 
Another critical factor that affects all the integration managers is the support and trust 
that they need from their superiors in order to do the job as well as respect from the 
employees, which is also highly dependent on whether they have formal authority or not 
(Shelton 2003: 87–88). In this case there was formal authority all along, as the 
integration managers were mostly acting management of the acquired company or from 
the management team of the business group. Trust and support issues that any of the 
managers may have had were not uncovered in the research either. On the other hand, 
respect and credibility to make the needed changes was something that may have been 
lacking. CEO #2, who was the main integration manager in his time, seemed to 
somewhat lack the respect of the employees and was not able to drive through the 
changes with necessary conviction. In contrast the interim CEO managed to get way 
more progress done in the short periods as the acting manager and reach more levels of 
the business. This also applies to the difference between their successes at creating a 
sense of urgency for the changes during the integration. This questions whether 
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authority may have an effect on it as the interim CEO was also the CEO of Firm A at the 
time or is it a matter of personality. To further examine how the integration managers 
supported the integration process, the focus moves on to their roles and competences.  
 
These recognized integration managers appearing in the case were acting a set of 
different roles as the evidence suggests. The general roles that literature recognized 
were project manager, sparring partner, implementer and mediator, of which only 
implementer was clearly left out in this case, although the presented findings support 
the argument that there was a need for such role in the integration process. 
 
Project manager is the core role of an integration manager and can be regarded as such 
in the future, but as the findings presented, in this case a clear-cut project manager was 
missing and closest came the acting managers of Firm B with varying degrees of 
success. Reasons for this were accounted for the frequent changes in management thus 
causing instability and can be argued to be overall component that was missing as there 
was no clearly appointed project manager whom the employees could even perceive as 
the integration manager. This casts a shadow over the acquisition as deficiency in 
project management can be argued to hinder the proper use of integration teams, slow 
transitions, and hamper the creation of frameworks to support future acquisitions 
(Ashkenas & Francis 2000: 115; Evans et al. 2010: 551). The evidence supports these 
apart for the last part, as in this case the integration package represents such framework, 
consisting of the guidelines and policies that the HR director mentioned they have 
gathered for future acquisitions. 
 
The role of sparring partner was executed with inconsistency, as speed and sense of 
urgency was considered generally lacking in the integration, but at times an injection of 
speed was made. Examples of these injections of speed and sense of urgency were 
pretty much all the managerial changes that brought in a new CEO or a the interim 
CEO, which created rapid waves of change which then slowed down again. The concept 
of first 100 days being the most important was not fully supported, but the fact that the 
integration process needs to move forward to be effective is still there (Angwin 2004: 
428). In this case the first 100 days after the acquisition were almost completely ignored 
in terms of integration, which arguably produced some of the negative reactions from 
the acquired employees. When the integration was supposed to happen the acquired side 
had also shown signs of frustration for not seeing enough change after almost several 
years of ineffectiveness and seemed relieved when the injections of speed and sense of 
urgency came. This supports the notion that they are indeed important factors to 
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consider in the integration process and worthy of a role for the integration manager. On 
a contradictory note, some theories (Schweiger et al. 1993: 61; Birkinshaw et al. 2000; 
Angwin 2004: 428) suggest that for proper human integration a slower pace may be 
desirable and the optimal speed is individual in each case, but in this case the evidence 
supports the fact that more speed and a sense of urgency would have made a better 
result.  
  
Confusion was a key issue in this integration and both sides reported having trouble 
distinguishing what was part of the integration and what was not, both in 
communication and with different reform projects. In addition the different projects 
seemed to yield no reward or ever show results, which had demoralizing effects on 
employees and made the integration process look like it is in a standstill, even if it was 
not at the time. Ashkenas and Francis (2000: 113, 115) saw the role of implementer 
generating and communicating short-term results, and to respond to the needs suggested 
by this study’s findings, the role is updated to include clarification of areas of 
integration. This can arguably reduce confusion and enable the non-integrated parts of 
the company to calm down concentrate on their work rather than worry about the 
integration. On a contradictory note, by hiding some of the more drastic reform 
measures performed on other non-integrated parts such as lay-offs to the integration 
process, the acquirer can possibly avoid some of the criticism and resistance they might 
otherwise create and thus aim to avoid excessive communication and unnecessary 
transparency of the situation.  
 
The mediator role is there to take care of acculturation and cultural issues, which 
stemmed mostly from the earlier acquisitions of Firm B, so-called integration within 
integration situation. These structural and cultural problems were identified but in the 
beginning not addressed properly, but by hiring a communications director the acquirer 
made it possible to establish a more professional way of communication which can be 
argued to have improved the situation in light of cultural integration. Furthermore as 
literature suggests (Evans et al. 2010: 551; Ashkenas & Francis 2000: 112) this role is 
also there to build connections with the acquired company in order to essentially 
interpreting and resolving potential conflicts. Maybe the best example of such conflict is 
the perceived ‘winners and losers’ as well as ‘us and them’ mentality (Cartwright & 
Cooper 2000: 79; McMurdy 2000). Evidence of how they wanted resolve these conflicts 
came with the emphasis on the companies’ common history, common values and 
examples throughout the times, which can be argued to have eased the situation. What 
to conclude from this evidence, this role seems to be the archetype of integration in an 
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international setting, and the conclusion is that every manager in contact with the 
acquired company should be a mediator of sorts, rather than seeing it as a solution to 
solve problems and conflicts. 
 
The spokesperson was the first of the communication specific roles that the evidence 
identified and it is something that is extremely important to the main integration 
manager and is supported by others in providing content to the role. As the findings 
indicated, the interim CEO was the one who assumed on this role the best, but that was 
not enough for the whole integration process as other integration managers struggled 
with it. The announcement and a short period following it, which literature (Marks & 
Mirvis 1998; Kusstatscher 2005; Sinkovics et al. 2011) sees as the most important 
period in terms of communication, were managed with the interim CEO regarded as the 
integration manager but communication was seriously lacking and the hiring of CEO #2 
did not change it for the better. The importance of this role cannot be denied but in this 
case it is full of conflicts regarding how well it was performed.  The interim CEO is 
generally regarded as the best spokesperson, but the announcement and short period 
following it were arguably one of the worst periods of time in terms of communication 
quality and frequency. Subsequently the hiring of the communications director and 
inception of proper communications function was suggested to be the key to providing 
more constant flow of information to the employees and improve the content of this 
role, but it did not improve the situation with CEO #2. To conclude, the evidence is two-
sided regarding whether the important factor is the personality and communication style 
of the manager or the content, quality and frequency or the message. Seemingly neither 
is a deciding factor and thus the role is a combination of both, suggesting that a proper 
communications function does contribute immensely to this role.  
 
Theory (Evans et al. 2010: 551; Schuler et al. 2004: 104−105) sees the role of 
information gatekeeper as a funnel and middleman of information between the 
companies, even suggesting that they filter excessive information. The evidence 
suggests that the problem in this case lied within the very limited flow of information 
which lead to confusion among the acquired employees regarding responsibilities, 
timetables and so on. On the other hand the acquiring side had support functions, new 
systems and operation methods ready without proper use due to limited information, 
which all supports existing theory about the need for this role. As the findings argued, 
the parts where this role succeeded were sharing information about the integration 
package, especially the HR related factors because of the HR director, and development 
of the intranet and other information channels to increase the flow of information, on 
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account of the communications director. This leads this study to make the conclusion 
that the role of information gatekeeper requires contribution from each unit that requires 
such flow of information to ultimately be successful. An integration manager in the 
middle may facilitate the movement but the sources need to produce and actively seek 
the information. 
 
The last role is the visionary, which was something that the acquiring company really 
emphasized in their approach to integration in order to communicate the corporate story 
and thus create a feeling of unity and justify the making of this acquisition as suggested 
by Fubini et al. (2007: 31, 37). The role is acted to battle demotivation, frustration and 
lack of commitment, but seemingly the problem was even too visionary approach and 
communication on too high levels, as the acquired side required more concrete 
measures on how to proceed. This role was seemingly useful in trying to explain what 
the end state of the integration was and can be regarded as a main integration manager 
role, but according to the evidence and in line with the theory the argued solution is to 
be more consistent and precise with communication regarding the means to achieve the 
end state aimed at specific levels of the organization.  
 
To conclude the discussion of the use of integration managers and their roles, many of 
them can be argued to produce results as the theory suggested. Some roles seemed to be 
in need of modification and adaptation to the specific situation, but no additional roles 
could be identified as all findings regarding what was missing but needed in the 
integration fell into the existing categories. It was surprising that some of them seemed 
to be even more much suitable as general guidelines for all managers on how to interact 
within integration context and in contact with the acquired company instead of 
dedicated roles for integration managers. This suggests that the key conclusion about 
the use of integration managers and their roles in a comprehensive and broad manner by 
several managers is mostly about ensuring that all sides of the integration are taken into 
account and as theory suggested, producing sufficient communication for the 
information needs of all stakeholders.  
 
Competences that are required to act out these roles were identified in abundance, but 
not to the extent what theory suggests. Of the six general competences only three came 
up and even then modifications were in order. First was deep knowledge of the 
acquiring company, which proved to be true and supporting theory in terms of bringing 
in the culture, especially in an acquisition with heavy cultural integration (Ashkenas & 
Francis 2000: 114−115). But the contradiction to this competence came from the 
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acquired side, stating that in order to really gain synergies and trust of the acquired 
employees, the integration manager needs to have deep knowledge of the acquired 
business as well. The evidence supports both views and the argued solution is more 
about utilizing a good integration team consisting of trusted employees from both 
companies acting as proxies on both sides rather than putting all hope on one integration 
manager. This reasserts the argument that integration managers are a lot about 
organizing their teams to conduct all the tasks. This also supports the theory that to 
ensure best possible knowledge, the integration managers are better off coming from the 
company’s own talent pool than from the outside, as Shelton (2003: 84) suggested. 
 
Flexible style of leadership was the second general competence that got received 
support from the evidence and seemingly the need for such social cognition is supported 
by the evidence because of the chaotic situation and various situations managers face. It 
is hard to argue against such basic skill that all situations of change require from the 
managers. Theory combined this with tolerance for low recognition but that part could 
not be derived from the evidence and was thus excluded in this case.  
 
The third and last general competence was extensively tied down to the manager’s 
flexibility in order to possess the ability to tolerate chaos. The interviewees from the 
acquiring side seemed to embrace the chaos that acquisitions bring and regarded it as 
productive and hectic. This raises questions at least regarding the acquisition of Firm B, 
because the evidence argues that the confusion and uncertainty that was surrounding the 
integration process was not managed well. This is either caused by actual poor ability to 
tolerate chaos or then derives from the defects of integration managers in areas such as 
project management. Ability to tolerate chaos can be compared to flexible style of 
leadership in terms of fundamental abilities to function in a rapidly changing 
environment such as integration and is hard to argue against as it seems to affect all 
other functions.   
 
The general competences were mostly fundamental skills of change management with 
the addition of more knowledge required about the acquired company. What was left out 
compared to the literature were the ability to work independently and emotional and 
cultural intelligence. Independence never became a factor as there was no specifically 
appointed integration manager in this case. Emotional and cultural intelligence was 
regarded very highly but so much more in relation to communication that it was only 
viewed in that context and will follow in the communication specific competences.  
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First curiosity in the communication specific competences was the fact that listening 
was never mentioned as an important factor or at all, even though for example Ashkenas 
and Francis (2000: 115) rate relatively highly in their study of integration managers as 
communication is “as much about receiving as it is delivering message” to be able to 
provide effective two-way communication. This questions the acquiring company’s 
ability to take into account the needs and desires of the acquired employees and might 
partially explain some of the issues throughout the integration.  
 
Another competence not directly mentioned but something that was still derived from 
the evidence was language skills. Marks and Mirvis (1998: 207) emphasize the fact that 
integration managers should be able to at least speak a little of the local language in 
addition to the corporate language and in this case it was so with Swedish and maybe 
thus was never mentioned as an issue. Schuler et al. (2004: 105) connect language skills 
to the corporate language, used jargon and abbreviations, as well which may have 
caused more difficult, as the acquired side kept mentioning the difference between the 
two businesses. 
 
Conversation and presentation skills were mentioned as skills of high importance, 
especially to the acting management of the acquired company, similarly the main 
integration managers. Theory regards this very highly and the evidence very clearly 
supports the importance of these skills, because the arguments about clear differences in 
the effectiveness of communication between the CEO #2 and interim CEO due to the 
differences in these skills. Evidence from the interviews directly argues that the CEO #2 
had difficulties in credibly presenting the needed changes and convincing employees 
and managers of their importance. 
 
Emotional and cultural intelligence was only considered as a communication skill as 
mentioned earlier and the evidence was mostly in support of the theoretical grounds 
with some exceptions. Theory (Marks & Mirvis 1998: 207-210; Ashkenas & Francis 
2000: 116) argues that this skill is needed to face the many communication issues 
outside of just the spoken language that occur in cross-border M&As, but this case 
brings up little evidence of that. The problems occurring with Firm B’s earlier 
acquisitions, the so-called ‘integration within integration’, were mostly reported to be 
operational rather than cultural, which can be argued to be because of small cultural 
distance between the countries of operation. Emotional intelligence on the other hand 
received significant amounts of support from evidence and it is argued to be very 
important skill so that managers are able to respond better to situations with emotions 
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running high and produce communication that is perceived well by the employees, very 
much in support of the existing theory (Kusstatscher 2005: 117). Additionally to build 
on existing theory theory, the utilization of this skill was argued to require a strong 
sense of situational awareness to be truly efficient.  
 
Knowledge of multiple communication methods and communication networking skills 
were merged into one competence in the findings, but in light of the evidence and 
existing theory, there is not enough support to update theory on this basis. Even though 
the skills complement each other, it is possible to have very good knowledge of 
different communication methods and utilize them effectively without possessing a 
large network throughout the company which can more often be connected to unofficial 
communication. In this case the evidence does not reveal any information about 
integration managers’ extensive networks or them utilizing a lot of personal 
connections, although no contradictory evidence is found either. The evidence supports 
existing theory (Marks & Mirvis 1998: 175; Schuler et al. 2004: 111) on the part that 
without the use of multiple communication methods, the acquiring side failed to provide 
consistent and comprehensive communication. Fubini et al (2007: 33) highlighted the 
importance of reaching every level of management, which was argued to be severely 
lacking according to the findings and affected the integration negatively. 
 
Last communication competence was interpersonal communication which produced 
mixed results, as interviewees put high emphasis on the personality of their leaders but 
downplayed the importance of inspiring interpersonal communication. Also the 
interviewees’ views about the difference between the two CEOs in terms of 
communication and its effectiveness seemed to contradict the argument against the 
value of interpersonal communication skills. Although it can be argued to that because 
of other hardships and lack of information surrounding the integration the displeased 
employees were not satisfied with the high-flown visionary talk that the acquiring side 
admitted to have accentuated when they were asking for more concrete information. 
The bottom line is that interpersonal communication can be regarded as a valuable skill 
but in this acquisition it did not produce noticeable positive results. 
 
When researching the use of integration managers, their acted roles and possessed 
competences in search for the ideal communication output, this study has found 
evidence and made arguments both in support and against for the existing theories and 
literature and after the discussion a set of conclusions can be made about the ideal use 
of integration managers. Firstly, there should be an appointed integration manager who 
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is not formally in charge of the business but acts as a figurehead to the integration 
process and is backed up by an integration team with representatives from all necessary 
departments, such as finance, HR, communications and so on. The appointed integration 
manager should be a trusted and respected person from the acquiring firm with credible 
knowledge of the acquired business and be involved early on, definitely before the 
integration begins. Secondly, from the roles of integration managers (see figure 12), the 
main integration manager should clearly be on point in acting the roles of project 
manager, spokesperson and visionary, as those roles require a single person to be above 
the rest and are the key to keeping the integration process organized and sufficient 
communication flowing. This does not mean that the rest of the roles are not needed nor 
should not be acted by the main integration manager, but should be taken more as 
guidelines of ideal integration and communication handled by the whole integration 
team. This divides the responsibilities to people closer to the targets of integration and 
thus ensuring more precise information and closer communication with all levels of the 
company. All the competences that the findings revealed are seen as useful and even 
vital especially to the main integration manager, but also very much according to the 
roles that findings suggested and thus important to all managers in the integration team.  
 
The key conclusion is to have one integration manager in charge with a wide variety of 
skills to ensure that all the necessary roles are acted which will arguably confirm that all 
sides of the integration are taken into account by the manager or the integration team. 
This is argued to produce ideal communication output for the information needs of all 
stakeholders that will positively affect the emotions of employees, which is discussed 
further in the following section.  
 
6.1.3. Effects of communication on employees’ emotions 
 
Ultimately employees’ emotions during the acquisition and integration process proved 
to be a very difficult subject for discussion due to the sensitive nature and possible 
merger syndrome but some evidence that was mainly in support of existing theory could 
be gathered and put up for discussion. To answer the final research question, the effects 
of communication on employees’ emotions are reviewed in light of extant research. 
Bagozzi et al. (1999: 184) defined emotion as a mental state of readiness that ascends 
from cognitive appraisals of actions or thoughts and this thesis utilized the cognitive 
appraisal theory in order to study the effects of perceived communication on employees’ 
emotions. The study has uncovered definite evidence that the acquisition brought up a 
lot of emotions on the employees and evidence also clearly shows that communication 
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that the integration managers produced had some kind of effect on those emotions, but 
how, why and to what extent compared to the theory? 
 
As the theory states, employees perceive the effects of M&As individually and the 
employee’s position in the organization may also have a significant impact on how they 
react to it (Sinkovics et al. 2011: 29–31). In this case many of the interviewees reported 
having positive emotions regarding the acquisition, even on the acquired side, mainly 
regarding the opportunity that this acquisition presents and how it was already being 
expected. These feelings were used to inspire other employees, especially in the 
integration manager’s visionary role, to feel positive about the acquisition and give 
them strength to overcome the rough integration process. The problems usually arise on 
the acquired side, and there the top emotions that were reported to have been showing 
on employees of Firm B were fear, anxiety, uncertainty, and confusion. The rumors 
before the announcement and vague information that was released at first were major 
causes for these negative feelings as shown in the findings.  
 
As Sinkovics et al. (2011: 43–44) and Schweiger and DeNisi (1991: 127–128) stated in 
their studies, the cure for these negative emotions comes from realistic, open, honest 
and frequent communication. In this case the communication was more or less realistic 
and honest when it came in, but frequency and openness in sharing it was terribly 
lacking which had lessened the effect. For example, it took almost two months to get the 
new organizational model out after the announcement and in the meantime the 
employees reported nearly no communication from the acquirer. Even the new model 
was not very open about the real changes that might be coming and where they would 
come, especially in terms of lay-offs or other cuts, which did not reveal the employees’ 
fears, feelings of not being able to control their own faith and distrust towards the 
acquirer. After these symptoms had occurred, the interim CEO as the integration 
manager came out and tried to clear out the rumors and clarify on the strategy and make 
speeches in the acquired company. This was reported having positive effects on the 
employees and relieve their negative emotions, thus supporting the existing theory. The 
possible negative effects of the acquirer calling the shots can be considered less harmful 
than the rumors and uncertainty that may otherwise occur.  
 
Having an official source of information in the form of a trusted superior showed signs 
of positive effects on the employees’ emotions, as suggested by Sinkovics et al. (2011: 
43–44) and Schweiger and DeNisi (1991: 127–128). An example of this was from the 
acquired side as the interviewees reported a significant increase in confidence and relief 
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from uncertainty when their own superior started getting more information after CEOs 
changed and passed it on to the employees as increased confidence, open discussion, 
reasons for the changes and clearing up rumors. 
 
In comparison to the meticulous scrutiny of official communication, the extant literature 
has left unofficial communication to a much lesser role. This study only provided some 
evidence about the benefits of unofficial communication in the light of increased 
communication between the firms when they were in the same offices and how 
unofficial early information about the announcement may have affected the employee’s 
perception about the acquisition. Theory (Kusstatscher 2005: 124−125) is more 
concerned about the negative effects of unofficial communication in forms of rumors 
and possible discrepancies between official and unofficial information in cases such as 
incoming lay-offs, but an argument can be made that it needs more attention in the 
future studies.  
 
The tone of the communication that was received was a big factor on how it was 
perceived by the employees, which again was of high importance in the cognitive 
appraisal theory (Kusstatscher 2005: 116−117). Approachable personality and open 
style of communication produced was working for CEO #1, but the situation was more 
stable then and the integration process had not official begun. With the CEO #2 in the 
midst of the integration process, the manager itself was reported to have been less 
approachable, the tone of communication was much more uncertain, vague and lacking 
credibility. Even though the communication might have been there, this change in the 
tone made the employees perceive it differently and with less effect on relieving their 
negative emotions. Moreover this received support when the CEO #2 left and the 
interim CEO was appointed, as the change in the tone and character was claimed to 
have made a remarkable positive change in the employees’ perception of the acquisition 
and integration. As the acquired side put it: 
 
‘Somehow this is a question of character; the interim CEO is very precise and 
clear. You can question [the decisions] but once you get the answer, then you 
don’t question it anymore.’ 
 
Although this made a produced a relatively clear cause and effect relationship, the study 
can question whether the CEO #2 ever received a chance as being appointed as the new 
CEO shortly after the acquisition and in the midst of the integration. The argument can 
be made that the acquired employees never saw the CEO as one of them thus hindering 
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the effects of communication because of the heavy emphasis on individual perception 
(Kusstatscher 2005: 116−117; Sinkovics et al. 2011: 29). 
 
As their integration strategy and plan to relieve the negative feelings of the acquired 
employees, Firm A put a lot of effort in communicating the long common history and 
shared values. This was aimed at relieving mainly the ‘us and them’ mentality and had 
mixed effects on the employees, as some parts were perceived as a fringe idea at best, 
but some parts gained support and made them feel that indeed they have something in 
common and maybe this company is not that bad after all. Although the evidence 
suggested that a bigger positive effect was created by knowing the fact that with the 
gradual acquisition and increased ownership, Firm A had actually been funding a lot of 
Firm B’s projects in the past and been a big support for their expansion in Europe. This 
was left out of most of the communication regarding the common history. The 
conclusion can be made that employees felt more relieved and positive about the 
acquisition when they received information about actual benefits and captured value 
from the co-operation rather than more visionary communication and supports the 
notion about the benefits of realistic communication (Schweiger & DeNisi 1991: 127–
128; Sinkovics et al. 2011: 43–44).  
 
The fluctuating communication output regarding projects that were part of the 
integration process, had negative effects on the emotions of employees, especially when 
there were no concrete evidence of progress or clear-cut separation of what was normal 
operations and what was part of the integration. This caused a lot of frustrations on the 
acquired side and was admitted by the acquiring company. They as well wanted to 
achieve a more normal working environment and getting over the integration period if 
possible, but not much effort was made on that part. This created feelings that the 
integration process never ends and demotivated employees. 
 
Overall the increase in communication, no matter the content, is claimed to have a 
positive effect on the employees’ emotions, as the study by Schweiger and DeNisi 
(1991: 130) suggested, because “organizations that communicate caring and concern to 
employees, whatever the communication’s informational content, may be able to expect 
increased employee commitment” by relieving their negative emotions. The increase in 
communication compared to the beginning of the integration process can be argued to 
have improved the situation and relieved employees’ negative emotions. Although to 
provide an opposite argument, the literature reviewed in this study did not regard the 
difference between employees’ perceptions on what communication is integration-
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related and what is unrelated, which seemingly may have cause confusion and negative 
feelings when everything, good and bad, is perceived to be part of the integration. 
 
To conclude the findings that this study procured (see figure 15), the acquisition had 
significant emotional effects on the employees of both firms, positive and negative. 
Communication that came from different integration managers acting the roles defined 
earlier had positive effects on the emotions of employees much to the support of 
existing theories, but not in complete unison. Not all forms and means of 
communication produced the desired outcomes that theory suggests, even though the 
results were mostly positive. In addition to the obvious lack of communication, the 
scarce motivational effects of visionary work compared to the effort and acquirer’s 
decision to not communicate directly to the employees and thus cause slight displease 
and rumors about who is really in charge and doubts about the direction the company is 
heading, seemed to be the low points of this integration. But it is undeniable that much 
of the perceived communication produced positive outcomes on the employees’ 
emotions in form of gained confidence, relieved fears and increased certainty. By 
comparing what the evidence revealed about the general feelings of employees in the 
beginning of the acquisition and in the end, the positive effects of the increase in 
communication during the almost three years of integration can be clearly pointed out 
from the findings. It can also be argued that to a degree the resulting communication is 
connected to the integration managers’ roles and to what extent they were fulfilled.   
 
 
6.2. Limitations of the study 
 
This study has several methodological and theoretical limitations that have to be 
acknowledged when considering the results. Theoretical limitations are more about the 
focus and scope of this study, as the lens through which the integration manager’s 
competences and actions will be studied is communication. The challenges of 
communication during post-acquisition integration will take into account multiple 
stakeholders but as the clear focus of this thesis, the effects of communication by 
integration managers are limited to employees. This study will also acknowledge other 
angles such as leadership or acculturation but does not take them under closer scrutiny 
because of definition issues. Limitations related to the research methodology and how 
the research was conducted was mainly concerning the reliability and validity of the 
study. As the pros and cons of the research methods have already been discussed in the 
methodology section, the limitations of the whole study are reviewed here in terms of 
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their influence on the results and the study’s ability to make conclusions. 
 
The purpose of this study was to research the use of integration managers and effects of 
communication on employees’ emotions, but was based on a limited amount of data 
from an in-depth case study. As the primary data, only five people were interviewed in 
three separate interviews and out of these five interviewees only two were employees 
from the acquired company. Therefore in addition to their own feelings, much of the 
evidence provided was based on their perception of how their colleagues reacted to the 
acquisition and how the following communication changed their feelings. The 
remaining interviewees were from top management of the acquiring company thus 
limiting the views to relatively high levels of the organization. In addition the mother 
tongue of one of the interviewees was not Finnish and thus may have had an effect on 
their responses during the interview. On the acquiring side, some interviewees had not 
been with the company at the time of the final acquisition, but joined shortly after, thus 
providing only their view of past events not based on first-hand information. It can also 
be noted as a limitation that neither of the two main integration managers were 
interviewed directly. Overall the quality of the conducted interviews was good and they 
were very informative but concentrated slightly too much on the ideals of integration 
practices, managers and communication instead of the actual events and feelings that 
were felt during the process. Regarding the secondary data, the amount and quality of 
documentation that the researcher was able to procure regarding the acquisition was 
relatively limited due to access problems. 
 
To address these limitations regarding the research methodology, the aim of the study 
was not to make statistical generalizations, but to conduct an exploratory and 
explanatory research on how integration managers are actually used in a real acquisition 
and how much their produced communication affects the emotions of employees with 
the possibility of theoretical generalization. Because of the sensitive nature of M&As, 
especially the integration period and the merger syndrome, it was difficult to arrange 
even the few interviews that this research consisted of and after a longer period of 
chasing after additional interviewees, they were regarded not possible under these 
circumstances. Secondly it is such a sensitive subject that even though the interviewees 
were relatively open about it, much of the feelings and emotions were not discussed 
directly but had to be read between the lines and scrutinized from the transcripts with 
relentless data analysis. Thirdly, the inexperience of the researcher may have affected 
the quality and quantity of the data both primary and secondary data. Even though the 
secondary data was partially lacking, the documentation used were comprehensive 
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enough to aid in triangulating the primary data and thus provide satisfactory results. In 
the end the evidence produced was good enough to enable this study to make the 
necessary conclusions within the research context and overall give a good sneak peek 
on the integration management practices used in this case, what effects they had on the 
acquired employees as well as make suggestions on what was missing in them. In 
general the results were in support of existing theory with some exceptions, but certain 
theoretical generalizations could be made.  
 
The aspect of internationality was relatively restricted in this study as it was limited to a 
few European countries, mainly Finland and Sweden, although some additional cultural 
dimensions came with the integration of Firm B’s previous acquisitions as well as both 
the existing operations of both companies in other European countries. This potentially 
diminishes the study’s ability to argue how much the cultural factors in a more 
culturally distant international M&A may affect the outcome, but is also a unique 
feature of this specific case. Additional research with more culturally diverse 
environment is recommended.  
 
 
6.3. Theoretical implications 
 
The various limitations of this study and the many questions that communication in 
integration management left open call for more studies on this subject. This study 
managed to produce and validate some theory building arguments and make 
conclusions that may lead to theoretical generalization, but additional studies on 
integration managers and communication are generally needed so that replication can be 
claimed. More in-depth studies specifically on the effects of communication on 
emotions of employees are clearly needed, as this research only scratched the surface of 
how the situation and different methods of communication affect them but lacked depth 
on that area. Furthermore this research concentrated on integration management and 
communication in very high levels of the organization especially on the acquiring side, 
despite looking at effects of communication on employees’ emotions. Additional 
research on how integration management and communication functions on lower levels 
of large multinational companies would be insightful. Other lines of research should 
study the effects of specific forms of communication in more detailed manner, such as 
unofficial communication which was left to a very small role in this research. Further 
research could also be conducted to reveal how communication and increase in 
communication during the integration reflect to the performance of the M&A as this 
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study mostly ignored the performance aspect. 
 
Instead of the communication aspect, future studies could also concentrate on the 
stronger influence of level and type of integration, acculturation, leadership, the people 
factor or a specific situation such as hostile takeover or a merger of equals. Integration 
managers’ roles connected to other mediating factors than communication would be 
useful for the overall picture on integration management. Qualitative studies of different 
M&A situations continuing the theoretical generalization and theory building of this 
study, but with emphasis on different topic would undoubtedly prove useful. Findings 
on how the differences in these factors affect the integration management would provide 
useful information as they were only acknowledged but not researched further in this 
study. 
 
 
6.4. Practical implications 
 
This study provides companies and managers a few practical implications based on the 
empirical findings, subsequent arguments and following discussion. First and foremost 
the existing theory and findings of this study imply that there is a need for dedicated 
integration manager. Additionally, integration managers operating in a cross-border 
setting should pay extra attention to the utilization of communication during post-
acquisition integration. In order to facilitate the integration process, they should also 
take note what roles can be made use of and what competences they should develop in 
order to do that. To update the extant literature, this study came to the conclusion that all 
the roles of integration managers are not necessarily something to be taken literally to 
suit a specific situation, but more references on how to produce ideal type of 
communication for integration management. Integration managers and their supporting 
integration teams should keep these roles in mind in order keep relative focus on the 
most important tasks that successful integration requires. 
 
Looking at the effects of communication on emotions of employees, this study indicates 
that managers should take the emotional outcomes of acquisitions into account and need 
to develop their emotional intelligence and situational awareness to be able to 
understand how the employees are feeling during the integration and how to best 
respond to it. To conclude, managers should make use of all the aspects presented in this 
study when trying to improve their own management competences in communication 
and see what tools they can use to have positive effects their employees.  
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In addition to implications for integration managers’ to improve their own performance, 
this study implies that acquiring firms should take note of these roles, competences and 
effects of communication when they are planning future acquisitions. From the example 
of this case, it includes most importantly the planning and execution of the 
communication strategy throughout the M&A starting from the earlier stages, the 
selection of the main integration manager, taking into account how the manager fits into 
the profile presented by this study and how to build the suitable integration team around 
it to facilitate proper integration and communication output. Also in addition to the 
selection of the manager, the findings of this study can prove useful when training 
managers to the demanding job of integration manager.   
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APPENDIX 1. 
 
 
OUTLINE OF THE INTERVIEW 
 
Questions for the acquiring company / acquired company 
 
Interviewee and their background with the company: 
 
 
Location of the interview: 
Date and time: 
Setting of the interview: 
 
Basic questions:  
 
1. Your role in the company before, during and after the M&A? 
2. Have you been involved in other acquisitions? On-going integration at the moment?  
3. Differences between domestic and international acquisitions if been involved in both? 
4. How do you perceive the acquisition and especially the integration process? Chaotic, 
productive, difficult, easy etc.? 
a. How did you feel when you first heard about it/it happened? Emotions 
present? 
b. When did you hear about it, the announcement, prior knowledge, involvement 
before? How were you informed and by whom? 
c. How did you proceed after knowing about it as in pass the information 
onwards? 
Integration manager related: 
 
5. Has there been an integration manager appointed to take care of the integration 
process/be responsible for it in the long run? 
a. Who was it? What did that person do? 
b. More as a social concept, not an appointed manager really. 
Communication specific: 
 
6. What are the communication strategies the aquirer used in the acquisition, more 
specifically in the integration process? Were you involved?  
a. Who communicated what to whom? Official, unofficial?  
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7. Main purpose of the communication strategy used (relief anxiety, employee retention, 
increase employee satisfaction) or has there been any thoughts about this (just to give 
out information)? 
a. Why do you think this was done? Was it effective?  
b. Did your feelings/emotions change from the beginning due to receiving 
information/communication? 
 
8. What did you consider to be the most important things that needed to be 
communicated to the newly acquired company? 
a. Mission, vision, strategy etc.? 
b. Were you satisfied with the information? If not, why not? 
c. Did the message come out clear? 
 
9. Your perception on the success of the utilized communication in the integration 
process (if not, why not)? 
a. Ever been on the acquired/acquirer’s side? How would you improve the 
communication had you been on the other side? 
 
10. Personal style of communication?  Roles you play in M&As, communication or 
otherwise? 
 
11. Any vital skills that managers should possess when communicating in such situations? 
 
